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0. Executive summary 
0.1 Background of  study 
In the 1990s  Member States of the European Community will  meet with  the challenge  to 
prepare their  economies  for  the arrival  of a  truely  Common  Market.  As  Member  States 
progress  towards  the  completion  of the  Common  Market,  policymakers  concerned  have 
become acutely aware of the urgent need that their various countries be able to compete in 
terms of - notably - relative cost levels, effective tax levels, and the mix of provisions offered 
by the public sector. 
As  from  July  1,  1990  the  European  Community  has  embarked  upon  Stage  I  of  the 
European  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU).  During  Stage  I  a  high  degree  of 
convergence of economic policies and performance is strived for.  Regarding public finances, 
the  convergence  aimed  at  implies  greater  budgetary  discipline  in  a  number  of Member 
States, in that excessive deficits have to be avoided. 
More specifically,  at its Maastricht meeting of December 10,  1991  the European Council 
set reference values for  both the general government deficit as well  as  general government 
debt.  With  some qualifications,  net borrowing  of general government  should  not  exceed  3 
percent of Gross  Domestic Product  (GOP)  at market prices.  Total gross  debt  at nominal 
value outstanding at the end of the year should amount to no more than 60 percent of GDP. 
At  the  end  of  1991,  the  public  finances  of  only  three  Member  States  - i.e.  France, 
Luxembourg  and  the  United  Kingdom  - fully  respected  these  reference  values.  The 
remaining Member States will have to increase taxes and/or cut public.Spending to a various 
degree,  in  order to  (gradually)  bring their  deficit-to-GOP  ratio  and/  or debt-to-GOP  ratio 
down to or below the reference levels agreed upon. 
0.2  Aim of  study 
This study  aims  to analyse  the flexibility  of national government  revenue and  expenditure 
instruments in the context of economic and  monetary union,  while  not taking a  particular 
view on the optimal size of the public sector. Moreover, the analysis assumes a status quo on 
tax harmonization in  the EC (e.g.  that the 1989 proposal for  a minimum withholding tax of -11-
15% will not be accepted). Building upon relevant theoretical notions and taking into account 
historical experience since the early 1980s, the study intends to provide an empirical basis on 
which  policy  recommendations  could  be  formulated  to  Member  States,  as  regards  their 
options in achieving and maintaining sustainable budgetary positions in the successive stages 
of EMU. 
On the revenue side, possible constraints from tax competition - as partly induced by the 
internal  market,  and  further  strengthened  by  growing  integration  of goods  and  services 
markets  as  well  as  enhanced  cross  border  mobility  of  assets,  enterprises,  workers  and 
consumers - may in some Member States seriously limit the scope for future tax  increases. 
Emerging tax competition could hamper the tax intake at a time when a number of Member 
States need  to  undertake painful  efforts  to  redress  imbalances  in  their public  fmances,  in 
order  to  bring  down  their  excessive  public  debt-to-GOP  ratio  towards  the  Community 
average. 
On the expenditure side, the study classifies spending items by major functional category. 
Separate country studies discuss the scope for reducing outlays, given legal, institutional and 
political factors typical of the Member State concerned. The study also considers the merits 
of alternative ways  to  cut  back  public  spending,  given  - for  example  - the level  of public 
investment and present defense spending. 
Recent  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  examines  the  variation  in  political  and 
institutional  arrangements  which  may  affect  outcomes  of the  national  policy  formation 
process. Building upon this literature, the study also examines how cross-country differences 
in  public sector size and  debt accumulation among Member States during the 1980s can be 
explained. 
0.3 Summary of  main results 
First,  the  study reviews  trends  in  taxes  and  public  spending  in  all  Member  States  of the 
European Community. By 1990, not withstanding tax reductions during the second half of the 
1980s,  in  almost every Member State the tax  take out of GOP exceeded the 1980-tax level. 
Also, during the 1980s national tax levels have somewhat converged. On the other hand, the 
already  large  variation  in  national  tax  mixes  has  further  increased.  Broadly  speaking,  tax 
competition has been a factor in bringing down the (top) rate of the personal income tax,  in 
reducing  corporate  income  tax  rates,  and  in  harmonising  the  standard  rate  of the value 
added tax to some degree. 
After a  marked  expansion  in  the  1970s,  public  spending levels  in  most  Member States -III-
tended  more or less  to  stabilize over the  1980s,  most  southern States being the exception 
here, in part because they started from lower spending levels. 
The  growth  of  government  debt  in  Member  States  of the  European  Community  is 
positively related to the freguency of government changes,  implying that countries with less 
stable  governments  may  have  greater difficulty  to  satisfy  the Maastricht  criteria for  fiscal 
policy.  In  themselves,  however,  these  budgetary  criteria  might  constitute  an  important 
external incentive to policymakers concerned, which may compensate for the lack of internal 
political stability. 
The  study  also  finds  evidence  that  improved  bud&etaty  procedures  might  strengthen 
attempts to pursue stable fiscal  policies,  since the growth  of government debt is  negatively 
correlated with sound budgetary procedures. It was also found that in countries with left-wing 
governments the share of public spending in total output generally tends to grow faster. 
The study  offers  a  detailed  analysis  of budgetary policies pursued in  five  Member States: 
Belgium,  Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. These countries have been selected, 
because: 
- they  all  face  the challenge  to  substantially redirect present tax and spending policies,  in 
order to attain the reference values for  government debt and (hence)  deficit which  have 
been laid down in Maastricht (Denmark being the sole exception here);· 
- three  have  a  track  record  of  rather  successfully  attacking  major  budgetary  problems 
(Belgium, and notably Italy being the exceptions here). 
Tabel 0.1  outlines the profile of selected Member States. Levels of public spending are above 
the EC-average (  48.6  percent of GOP),  except in Ireland. Projected deficits in  1992  exceed 
the Maastricht target, except in Denmark. In all cases, the debt ratio exceeds the Maastricht 
target, notably in Italy (106  percent of GOP) and in Belgium  (128  peF~ent of GOP). Table 
0.1  serves  to  illustrate  the  need  for  (thorough)  budgetary  adjustments  in  Italy,  Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, in that order. 
In  addition  to  several  usual  macroeconomic  indicators,  table  0.1  includes  three  items 
indicative  of problems  that  national  governments  will  meet  in  trying  to  attain  budgetary 
targets previously set. The redress of public finances is complicated because of demographic 
trends in  all countries (except in Ireland), notably so in  Italy. The same country has also  by 
far  the  highest  score  on  the  political  instability  index.  Political  instability  is  assumed  to 
increase,  the higher the total number of government changes between  1981  and  1989.  The 
minimum value for the scale used is  2.  In practice one would  expect no  more than, say,  10 
government  changes  per decade.  Together with  Belgium  (22)  and  Ireland  (33),  Italy  (31) -IV-
ranks  lowest  on  the  quality  index  of budgetary  procedures,  which  for  EC Member States 
varies between 22 (Belgium) and 61  (France). 
Evidently,  those  Member  States  where  strong  adjustment  is  most  in  order,  are 
unfortunately  also  most  handicapped  by  demographic  and  politico-institutional  factors  to 
redress their public fmances. 
Given profiles of the five  Member States, the study charts policy options available to each of 
them to  take corrective action  against excessive deficits in  the run-up to  the third stage of 
the  EMU.  Two  matrices  identify,  country  by  country,  various  options  to  increase  taxes 
and/  or to cut back public outlays respectively. All in all, ten revenue options are considered, 
which  have  been  ranked  in  table  0.2  according  to  the  sensitivity  of  their  base  to  tax 
competition. To facilitate the analysis, outlays are broken down into ten separate expenditure 
categories (table 0.3). 
The columns in both tables summarize policy options which are explained and discussed in 
much  greater  detail  in  the  final  paragraph  of each  country  chapter.  Detailed  tables  in 
Chapters 7-11  confront tax and spending options with crucial factors determining the degree 
of control that a particular government can exercise over individual items, and over tax and 
spending  levels  as  a  whole.  Political  factors,  institutional  set-up,  budgetary  rules  and 
procedures,  possible  impacts of tax competition  and  other relevant  factors  are - whenever 
possible - included in our discussion. 
Based on these detailed analyses we  have tentatively pencilled in plusses and minuses in 
tables  0.2  and  0.3,  so  as  to  summarize  future  general government  budget  flexibility.  More 
detailed  discussions  by  major  tax  and  expenditure  category  may  be  found  in  the country 
chapters. 
The scope of our study and a lack of sufficiently detailed data explain that in  most cases 
no  item-by-item  discussion  is  offered.  Nevertheless,  the  data  collectel:l  allows  for  a  clear 
picture  of overall  policy  options  available  to  national  governments  to  bring  their  public 
finances in line with the Maastricht criteria. 
Table  0.2  considers  the  potential  contribution  of  various  revenue  sources  to  budget 
consolidation. 
Given the mobility of private assets and increasing tax competition, in the absence of fiscal 
coordination  or harmonization  taxes  on  portfolio  income  of individuals  offer  little  or no 
revenue potential. Increased  taxation  of corporate profits,  especially  by  broadening the tax 
base and eliminating special,  reduced rates,  may contribute to redress budgetary imbalances 
in Belgium, Italy and Ireland respectively. -V-
A broader VAT-base (Ireland) or an improved administration of VAT (Italy) can produce 
additional  revenue. Italy and Belgium may increase the rates of a number of excise duties. A 
more  effective  administration  would  substantially  raise  revenue  from  social  security 
contributions in Italy. 
Taxes  on  individual  income,  taxes  on  property  and  various  non-tax  revenues  may  all 
potentially  contribute  to  improve  the  budget  position  of most  Member  States  considered 
here,  notably  through  a  policy  mix  including  broadening  tax  bases,  setting  higher  rates, 
attacking tax fraud, and the successful privatization of public enterprises. 
Table  0.3  considers  the potential contribution to  budget consolidation  by  reducing various 
spending categories. 
In  most  of  the  selected  countries,  outlays  relating  to  general  public  services  can  be 
reduced by increasing efficiency; in some Member States, notably in Italy, public sector wage 
restraint may  contribute to  budget consolidation.  Defense spending shows  some downward 
flexibility,  resulting from 'peace dividends'. 
Outlays relating to public order and safety offer a mixed picture. While in a few countries 
some reduction can be achieved as a result of wage restraint, in other countries there clearly 
is a need for higher outlays due to additional demand. 
Educational  spending  may  fall  somewhat  as  a  result  of  demographic  change.  Health 
expenditure, for the same reason, tends to increase. However, in some countries wages in the 
health sector could be moderated and incentives to restrict demand might be introduced or 
strengthened. 
In most Member States social security and welfare outlays, being quantitatively the single 
most  important  functional  spending  category,  show  some  downward  flexibility,  although 
demographic  trends  call  for  additional  expenditure.  Downward  flexibility  may  result  from 
policies that reduce volume and/  or benefit rates. The flexibility  of this·~xpenditure category 
is strongly correlated with the growth performance of national economies and general wage 
trends. Since the growth rate of the economy is positively correlated with private sector wage 
restraint, this is  a very important policy variable.  The same holds  true for  the participation 
rate, which is especially low in Belgium and the Netherlands. An increase in the participation 
rate can turn benefit recipients into net contributors to public sector financing, which makes 
the knife cut both ways. 
Cuts in outlays for housing and community amenities can contribute to downward budget 
flexibility in Italy and the Netherlands. Spending on recreational, cultural and religious affairs 
is in itself only a small category, characterized by generally little downward flexibility. 
Spending on economic services offers more scope for  spending cuts,  since some Member -VI-
States provide for rather substantial amounts of state aid and business subsidies, which can 
not easily be defended in an open market. 
The spending category 'other functions'  mainly consists  of interest payments on general 
government  debt.  This  is  an  inflexible  item  by  defmition.  The interest-to-GOP  ratio  only 
reacts very slowly  to deficit reduction schemes and is heavily  dependent on changes in  the 
real  interest  rate,  which  in  itself is  no  policy  instrument.  Moreover,  countries where  the 
urgency  to  reduce  outlays  is  most  manifest,  are  exactly  those  with  the  highest  interest 
payments-to-GOP ratio (Belgium and Italy). 
From the preceding analysis it follows that options to cut public outlays will in many respects 
closely  conform  to  policies  that  were  initiated  during  the  1980s.  However,  some  trends 
should  be reversed.  In the past decade,  public investment  declined  in  the majority of EC 
countries. Given new priorities (cleaning up the environment and improving infrastructure) 
by  now  the bottom line for public investment  might well  have  been reached.  Transfers to 
families and industry are a prime target for further reductions in public outlays. In the 1980s 
bene{it levels were cut in most Member States already, but a marked rise in the number of 
benefit recipients ('volume') in some countries outweighted the effect of cuts in benefit levels 
('price'),  resulting  in  higher  spending relative  to  GDP.  In  countries with  declining  public 
spending (relative to GOP) most cuts were targeted against typical welfare programs, such as 
housing subsidies, health care and government outlays for  education. Generally, expenditure 
for defence slightly fell, whereas outlays for internal safety (police) increased somewhat. 
Table  0.4  summarizes  the  revenue  and  expenditure  flexibility  of the five  EC Member 
States  reviewed  in  tables  0.2  and  0.3.  Italy  and  Denmark  are  most  flexible  in  terms  of 
reducing  outlays.  The  Netherlands  and  Denmark  have  hardly  any  option  to  increase  tax 
revenue. Italy, on the other hand, might consider to raise its taxes. 
0. 4 Outline of  study 
The study is organised as follows.  Part I describes in some detail the methodology used here, 
while  Part II provides a  broad overview of trends in  public finances  of all  Member States 
during the 1980s and of progress as to sustainable fiscal policy achieved thus far.  Next, Part 
III seeks to explain national spending and revenue trends of the 1980s as the combined result 
of a set of both macroeconomic, political and institutional variables. 
Results of the analyses in Parts II and III respectively may be useful in assessing the room 
of manoeuvre for policymakers who are trying to bring budget deficits and the public debt of 
their country in line with targets set in the Maastricht Treaty. -VII-
Finally,  Part IV comprises of five  country studies.  Results  from  these case studies  have 
already been summarized in tables 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. T
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Table  0.4  Fiscal  policy  structures  (1992)  and  flexibility of  expenditure 
and  revenue  instruments 
Expenditure  Revenue 
Current  Interest  Expenditure  Current  Revenue 
(exclusive  payments  flexibility  receipts  flexibility 
interest  index•>  indexb> 
payments) 
%GOP  %GOP  \leigh ted  Unweighted  %GOP  \leighted  Unweighted 
Belgiun  39.7  10.9  +0.7  +0.6  44.3  +0.4  +0.4 
Denmark  49.5  7.3  +1.1  +0.7  55.3  -0.7  -0.6 
Ireland  36.3  8.3  +0.2  +0.4  40.4  +0.1  +0.2 
Italy  43.2  10.6  +1.1  +1.2  44.4  +1.7  +1.0 
Netherlands  50.4  6.2  +0.6  +0.1  52.5  -0.3  -0.2 
EC  averagec>  42.4  5.0  n.a.  n.a.  43.3  n.a.  n.a. 
•>  The  unweighted  expenditure  flexibility  index  is calculated  by  simply  adding  the  number  of  'plusses• 
and  'minusses•  from  the  individual  country  sunnary  tables  regarding  the  contribution  to  budget 
consolidation,  and  dividing  the  outcome  by  the total  number  of  entries (12).  As  the maximum  score  for 
each  entry can  be  a  double  'plus•  or  'minus•,  the  index  varies  between  +2  and  -2.  To  calculate  the 
weighted  flexibility  index,  the  'plusses•  and  'minusses•  from  the  summary  tables  are weighted  by  the 
shares  of  the  functional  expenditure  categories  in  total  outlays  as  indicated  (between  brackets)  in 
the  individual  country  tables.  Once  again  the  index  has  a  maximum  value  of  +2  and  a  minimum  value 
of  -2. 
t~>  The  flexibility  index  for  revenues  is  calculated  analogously  to  the  expenditure  index  and  has  the 
same  upper  and  lower  limits. 
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1. Introduction: take ofT for EMU 
In  the  1990s  Member States of the European Community will  meet with  the challenge  to 
prepare their  economies  for  the arrival  of a  truely  Common  Market.  &  Member  States 
progress  towards  the  completion  of the  Common  Market,  policymakers  concerned  have 
become acutely aware of the urgent need that their various countries be able to compete in 
terms of - notably - relative costs levels, effective tax levels and the mix of provisions offered 
by the public sector. 
As from July 1,  1990 the European Community has embarked upon Stage I of the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). During Stage I a high degree of convergence 
of economic policies and performance is  strived for.  Regarding public finances,  the conver-
gence  aimed  at implies  greater  budgetary  discipline  in  that  excessive  deficits  have  to  be 
avoided.
1 Excessive deficits may threaten a common monetary policy. 
At its meeting in  Maastricht at December  10,  1991  the European Council agreed that 
the European Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and the 
stock  of government  debt  in  all  Member  States.  Compliance  with  targets  of budgetary 
discipline will be judged according to two criteria: 
- the ratio of general government deficit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
- the ratio of general government debt to GDP. 
The Protocol  on  the  excessive-deficit procedure  specifies  both  reference  values.  With  some 
qualifications, net borrowing of general government should not exceed 3 percent of GDP at 
market prices.  Total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year should 
amount to no more than 60 percent of GDP. 
If a  Member  State does  not  fulfill  the  requirements  under  one ·6f these  criteria,  the 
Commission shall prepare a report. It was  also  agreed upon that such report will  take into 
account whether the government deficit exceeds public investment expenditure, and all other 
relevant factors, including the medium term economic and budgetary position of the Member 
State concerned. 
If the  Council  agrees with  the  Commission  that some  Member  State has  an  excessive 
deficit,  the Council shall make ·recommendations to that Member State so  as  to bring that 
Apart  from  the  absence  of  excessive  deficits,  budgetary  discipline  also  implies  no 
monetary and compulsory financing of government budget deficits, and no bailing-out. -6-
situation  to  an  end  within  a  given  time  period.  This  peer group  pressure  should  move 
Member States to redress their budgetary policy whenever deemed necessary, which in tum 
will facilitate the passage to the final stage of EMU, since absence of excessive government 
deficits is one of the four criteria on which the Council shall assess whether a Member State 
fulfills the necessary conditions for adoption of the single currency. 
By  the end of 1991,  the public finances of only three Member States - i.e.  France, Luxem-
bourg  and  the  United  Kingdom  - fully  respected  the  reference  values.  The  remaining 
Member States will have to increase taxes and/or cut public spending to a various degree, in 
order to (gradually)  bring their deficit-to-GOP ratio and/or debt-to-GOP ratio down  to or 
below the reference levels agreed upon in Maastricht. 
2.  Aim, scope and methodology of study 
2.1 Aim and scope of  study 
This study  aims to analyse  the flexibility  of national government revenue and expenditure 
instruments in  the context of economic and monetary union, while  not taking a  particular 
view on the optimal size of the public sector. Moreover, the analysis assumes a status quo on 
tax harmonization in the EC (e.g.  that the 1989 proposal for a minimum withholding tax  of 
15% will not be accepted). Building upon relevant theoretical notions and taking into account 
historical experience since the early  1980s,  the study provides an empirical basis  on which 
policy recommendations could be formulated to Member States, as regards their options in 
achieving and maintaining sustainable budgetary positions in the successive stages of EMU. 
To this end, the study frrst provides a broad review of trends in theiJublic finances of all 
Member States and of progress as to sustainable fiscal policy achieved thus far (chapter 3). 
Next,  chapters  4  and  5  offer  a  detailed  analysis  of government  outlays  and  revenues, 
respectively. 
Recent theoretical and empirical literature examines the variation in political and institutio-
nal  arran~ements which  may  affect  outcomes  of the  national  policy  formation  process. 
Building  upon  this  literature,  chapter 6  examines  how  cross-country  differences  in  public 
sector size and debt accumulation among Member States during the 1980s can be explained. -7-
Results of this analysis may be useful in assessing the room of manoeuvre for policymakers 
who try to bring budget deficits and the public debt in line with targets set in Maastricht. 
Separate country studies (chapters 7-11) discuss the scope for increasing tax revenues and/or 
reducing  outlays,  given  economic,  legal,  institutional  and  political  factors  typical  of the 
Member State concerned. The study also considers the merits of alternative ways to cut back 
public  spending,  given  - for  example  - the level  of public  investment  and  present defense 
spending. 
2.2  A note on budget flexibility 
In years to come,  most  Member States will  have  to adjust their public fmances  in  order to 
comply with reference values for their public debt and deficit, as specified by the Maastricht 
Treaty.  To  assess  the task  ahead,  it is  important to  establish  the flexibility  of general go-
vernment  budgets  in  terms  of legal,  socio-economic  and  political  constraints.  The  term 
budget flexibility refers to options available to policymakers to manipulate the budget deficit 
or surplus. The flexibility of tax instruments and outlays by category is looked into, so as to 
determine the scope for policy action to redress annual deficits and the debt-to-GOP ratio in 
Member States concerned. 
Tax  systems  still  differ  considerably  between  Member States of the Community.  The free 
circulation  of capital,  goods  and  individuals  may  invoke  tax  competition  among  Member 
States.  The  most  direct  way  of tax  competition  is  through  differences  in  tax  rates.  Tax 
competition also  occurs,  at similar tax  rates,  through variation in  the definition  of the tax 
base.  Even  with  similar  tax  rates  and  defmition  of the  tax  base,  ta:x:-rompetition  can  still 
occur  through differences in  enforcement. The flexibility  of the revenue side of the budget 
may  be limited because of possible constraints from  tax  competition.  Tax  competition - as 
partly induced  by  the internal market,  and  further  strengthened by  growing  integration  of 
goods and services markets as well as enhanced cross border mobility of assets,  enterprises, 
workers and consumers - may in some Member States seriously limit the scope for future tax 
increases. Emerging tax competition could hamper the tax intake at a time when  a number 
of Member States need  to  undertake painful  efforts  to  redress imbalances  in  their public 
finances,  in  order to  bring  down  their  public  debt-to-GOP  ratio  towards  the  Community -8-
average. 
The flexibility  of public spendin& will  depend on, inter alia, commitments made in the past 
(interest  due,  transfer payments  to  international organisations,  multi-year  investment  pro-
jects),  institutional  arrangements  (automatic  cost-of-living  adjustment  of  transfers  to 
households,  linkage of public wages  to  private sector salaries),  and  the number  of 'open-
ended' programs (with no cap on spending). Also,  government stability, the effectiveness of 
rules to draw up  and control the annual budget,  and political preferences may  importantly 
contribute to the relative degree of flexibility of the expenditure side of the budget. Due to a 
lack  of data,  in  this  study  spending  items  are not classified  according to  their  degree  of 
flexibility, but by major functional category. 
Overall budget flexibility can be characterised by  a singular property, i.e.  automatic or built-
in flexibility  and discretionaty flexibility.  Since we  are especially interested in  policy options 
to reduce budget deficits, we will  concentrate on the upward flexibility  of tax  revenues and 
the downward flexibility of outlays. 
The built-in flexibility  of budget items indicates  the "automatic"  change in  receipts  and 
expenditures when government programmes remain unchanged. With regard to the revenue 
side  of the  budget  this  implies  constant  tax  bases  and  tax  rates.  Normally,  the  built-in 
flexibility  of receipts is  positive,  as a result of growing  incomes in combination with  an on 
average  slightly  progressive  tax  structure.  Applied  to  the expenditure side  of the  budget, 
built-in flexibility is defined as the change in outlays, keeping constant both existing eligibility 
criteria and indexation mechanisms of income maintenance programmes, and the setting of 
government wages as well. 
Apart from  an automatic reaction  to changes  in  national income and  employment,  the 
built-in fleXIbility of outlays can be the result of demografic, social or culfural changes. 
Discretionary flexibility indicates possibilities to change government receipts and expendi-
tures by  discretionary  policy  action.  With  regard  to  the revenue  side  of the budget  such 
actions may  include changes in the tax  mix  (through revised  tax rates and/or changing the 
tax base of separate taxes) which, inter alia, can also lead to changes in the built-in flexibility 
of receipts. Analogously, policy actions can also change the built-in flexibility of expenditures, 
when coverage and benefit ratio's are affected. 
Normally,  it takes time  to  implement  discretionary  policy  changes,  therefore it will  be 
clear  that  discretionary  fleXIbility  increases  rapidly  with  time.  Discretionary  flexibility  is -9-
especially limited by third party contracts (e.g. interest payments) and, moreover, by political 
and economic considerations. 
2.3 Methodology and data 
As  has  been  pointed  out  in  chapter  1,  the  excessive  deficit  criterion  relates  to  ceneral 
government, which includes central government, state, regional and local authorities and the 
social security system. General government covers most of public sector activity; it is also the 
sector  for  which  the  most  comparative  data  are available.  Throughout  this  study we  will 
therefore focus on general government. 
The analysis of fiscal policy in the past is primarily confined to the period 1981-1990 and 
three subperiods  thereof,  i.e.:  1981-1983,  1984-1986  and  1987-1989.  These  sample  periods 
have been selected on the basis of two criteria: 
- the business cycle; and 
- general trends in public finance. 
As  is  well  known,  the  government  budget  is  sensitive  to  cyclical  fluctuations  and  it  is 
therefore important to select periods which are from a cyclical point of view as homogeneous 
as possible.  By  1984  the level of economic activity in  the Community had definitely picked 
up,  after  some  years  of sluggish  economic  performance.  Over  the years  1987-1989  fiscal 
consolidation policies were helped by higher than average GDP growth rates. 
The data used in the analysis has mainly been collected and published by the EC Directora-
te-General for  Economic and Financial Affairs.  Howev~r, sometimes data provided  by  the 
Organisation for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Developmen~ (OECD)  and  the International 
Monetary  Fund  (Il\1F)  are  used.  The  OECD  provides  detailed  statutics  on  government 
revenues  of  Member  States  which  are  employed  throughout  chapters  3  and  5.  OECD 
National Accounts and IMF's Government Finance Statistics contain useful information as to 
the functional classification of government outlays. These data are used in chapters 3 and 4. PART II 
TRENDS IN TAXES AND PUBLIC SPENDING -11-
3. Trends in public finances of EC Member States 
Introduction 
Over the last three decades public fmances in Member States of the European Community 
underwent major changes. Three fairly distinct phases may be identified:
1 
1. The phase of balanced expansion of the public sector. During the 1960s, in the Community 
general government expenditure as a proportion of GOP rose rapidly everywhere, with tax 
receipts  and  other public  revenues  expanding  more  or less  at  the same pace.  The main 
driving force behind higher government spending levels was the expansion of social protecti-
on schemes, reflecting both more generous individual benefits and an extension of program-
me coverage as well.  The balanced expansion of the public sector reflected a widely shared 
belief in the effectiveness of government involvement in the economy, and political preferen-
ces to redistribute personal incomes. 
2.  The phase of stron~y deteriorating budgetary positions.  During the 1970s  and the early 
1980s the public expenditure ratio increased further in all Member States. Although the level 
of taxes and social security contributions also  rose sharply,  revenues did  not keep up  with 
additional  spending.  Consequently,  net  borrowing  grew  rapidly,  especially  so  during  the 
second  half of the  1970s.  After  1975  the government  debt  ratio  started  to  rise  sharply, 
following  its  earlier gradual decline between  1960  and  1975.  The contraction in  economic 
growth and rising unemployment contributed to the worsening of budgetary positions. 
3.  The phase of corrective steps towards  more sound  public finances.  During the 1980s  a 
fundamental  reorientation of fiscal  policy  dominated  the agenda  of policymakers  in  most 
Member States.  This policy  reorientation was. inspired  by  growing  concern  about possible 
adverse effects of too large a public sector, about the sustainability of budgetary positions in 
many countries and about the increasing inflexibility of budgets due to the expansion of the 
relative share of interest payments and current transfers. 
2 
2 
Public finances and fiscal policy in the Community, European Economy, No.  42,  Novem-
ber 1989,  137-160. 
Budgetary policies in Stage I of EMU, European Economy, No.  46,  December 1990,  163-
178. -12-
Also,  awareness grew that budgetary policies should be steadily pursued and be framed in a 
medium-term perspective. Now, the three major objectives of fiscal policy became
3
: 
a. Containing the growth of public debt 
The rapid  expansion  of public debt implies increasing budgetary inflexibility  as a  result of 
higher debt-servicing and greater vulnerability to changes in interest rates.  Moreover,  there 
exists  widespread  concern  that government  budget  deficits  might  put upward  pressure on 
interest rates, which  may  hamper privare investment and economic growth.  Such pressures 
were enhanced by the restrictive monetary policy stance after 1979. 
b.  Reducing the share of public outlays 
The objective to cut back general government spending was motivated by two considerations. 
First,  a leaner government budget would  allow  for  smaller tax  wedges, which  might  encou-
rage  moderate wage  trends,  thus  restoring business  profitability.  Larger  retained  earnings 
would  produce resources needed for an  expansion  of private investment and thus improve 
perspectives for private sector employment. Such was  the second consideration of policyma-
kers. 
c. Changing the structure of public revenue and expenditure 
A major goal of the tax reforms which took place in many countries was  to broaden the tax 
base  and  to  lower  marginal  tax  rates,  generally  with  the  restriction  that  such  reform 
measures should be broadly neutral in their impact on total tax revenue. On the expenditure 
side of the budget a reduction of especially subsidies and transfer payments became a major 
policy target. 
The growth of public debt 
The record so far with respect to containing the growth of public debt is clearly mixed. Two 
groups of countries may be distinguished here (figure 3.1):
4 
3 
4 
Public finances and fiscal policy in  the Community, European Economy, No.  42,  Novem-
ber 1989, 137-160. 
It should be noted that not all data refer to consolidated gross debt of general govern-
ment, valued in nominal terms on a calender year basis. In Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg  the  debt  of social  security  funds  is  excluded;  data  for  Portugal  are for 
central government only, while figures for Italy also include the debt of public enterprises. 
In France and  the UK debt is valued  at market prices.  Debt has not been consolidated -13-
Member States with public debt below or very close to the EC average {1990): Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, France and Luxemburg. 
Member States with public debt above the EC average (1990): Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Greece and Portugal. 
Figure 3.1 General government gross debt (% GOP), 1970-1990 
10  12  74  78  78  80  82  ~  88  88  90 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
for  Denmark,  Greece,  Spain,  France  and  Luxembourg,  while  in  Denmark  and  Spain 
short-term liabilities are not included. - 14-
Table 3.1 Government deficits in the Community, 1981-1990 •> 
Net  borrowing  (X  GOP) 
1981·1983  1984·1986  1987·1989·  1981·1989  II)  1990 
level  level  level  change  level 
(X  point)  c) 
Luxembourg  ·0.8  4.1  2.8  4.7  4.7 
United  Kingdom  ·2.8  -3.1  0.3  4.6  -0.7 
Denmark  -7.7  -0.9  0.8  2.8  -1.5 
France  ·2.6  ·2.8  ·1.6  ·1.2  ·1.  7 
Germany  -3.1  -1.4  -1.2  3.0  ·1.9 
Ireland  ·13.0  -10.7  -5.9  9.2  -3.6 
Spain  -4.7  -6.1  -3.1  -0.1  ·4.0 
Netherlands  -6.3  -5.7  -5.7  -1.2  ·5.3 
Belgiun  -11.7  ·8.9  -6.9  2.5  -5.7 
Portugal  ·9.6  -9.8  ·5.2  5.9  ·5.8 
Italy  -11.1  -11.9  -10.7  ·1.5  ·10.7 
Greece  -9.0  -12.1  -15.0  -7.3  -20.4 
COIIIII.In i ty  -5.2  -4.9  -3.3  1.2  ·4.1 
Primary  balance  (X  GOP) 
Denmark  -1.3  8.5  8.7  6.2  5.7 
Luxembourg  0.2  5.1  3.7  4.6  5.4 
Belgiun  -2.8  1.8  3.7  6.9  5.2 
Ireland  ·4.4  ·0.9  3.5  11.7  4.8 
United  Kingdom  2.1  1. 7  4.2  3.4  2.7 
Portugal  ·3.9  ·1.  7  2.4  7.9  2.4 
France  ·0.4  0.0  1.2  0.1  1.4 
Germany  ·0.4  1.6  1.5  3.8  0.7 
Netherlands  -1.2  0.5  0.4  1.0  0.6 
Spain  -3.6  -3.0  0.4  2.5  ·0.5 
Italy  -4.2  -3.8  -2.3  2.0  ·1.0 
Greece  -5.9  -7.0  -7.2  -2.3  ·8.4 
COIIIIUl i ty  ·1.1  0.0  1.3  2.7  0.9 
•>  Countries  are ranked  according  to deficits in  1990. 
11> For  Portugal  and  Greece  cumulative  change  over  1982·1989. 
c)  +  indicates  improvement  of  budgetary situation. 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance - 15-
Table 3.1  (in  conjunction with  figure  3.1)  shows  the progress achieved  with  respect  to  the 
reduction of budget deficits. Table 3.1  demonstrates that many countries have succeeded in 
reducing their deficit position in the second half of the 1980s. Indeed, the primary balance of 
most  countries  (i.e.  deficits,  net of interest payments)  turned  positive  again.  However,  in 
1990-1991  budgetary policies in the Community relaxed.  Notably,  due to the detoriation of 
the German budgetary position following unification, and to a lesser extent as a consequence 
of slower economic growth, net borrowing in the Community shot up again from 2.9 percent 
of GDP in 1989 to 4.6 percent in 1991. 
Regardless  of progress  achieved  thusfar,  budgetary  problems  persist  in  at  least  six 
countries.  In Italy  and  Greece the public  debt-to-GOP  ratio  is  rapidly  rising  and  nearing 
(Greece) or breaching (Italy) the 100 percent threshold. In both countries net borrowing in 
proportion to GDP is expected to stay at unsustainable high levels. In Belgium, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Portugal public indebtedness remains at high to very high levels. In Belgium 
and  Ireland  public  debt  exceeds  GDP,  but in  the  latter country  net borrowing  has  been 
reduced considerably, followed  by  a steep decline in the debt-to-GOP ratio. In Belgium the 
debt  ratio  has  been stabilized  at by  far  the highest  ratio  in  the  Community  (almost  130 
percent of GDP). In the Netherlands the debt ratio has also been stabilised, however with 
the debt ratio significantly above the EC average. In Portugal the public debt ratio is decli-
ning,  but it is also  still above  the EC average.  Denmark,  Germany, Spain,  France, Luxem-
bourg and the United Kingdom  all  have reasonably sound budgetary positions,  although  in 
recent years net borrowing has increased considerably. In Germany this was  a consequence 
of high government outlays related to the unification process. 
Figure 3.2  breaks down  the cumulative change  in  government  net  borrowing over  the 
years  1981-1989  into  its  cyclical  component  (vertical  axis)  and  a  residual,  which  may  be 
interpreted as the discretionary component (horizontal axis ).
5  Countries~  to the right (left) of 
the vertical  axis  took  'discretionary'  measures  to  reduce  (increase)  the deficit.  Countries 
above (below)  the horizontal axis  experienced a cyclically related decrease (increase) in  the 
deficit. Substantial discretionary improvements of the budgetary position have been achieved 
in Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
5  The data on the cyclically adjusted deficit were provided by the OECD. In constructing 
figure 3.2 the OECD data on government budget deficits  have also  been used,  so  as  to 
enable comparison with the cyclically adjusted deficit. -16-
Figure 3.2 Fiscal stance over the period(% GOP), 1981-1989 
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An  interesting  question  is  whether  progress  achieved  so  far  has  mainly  been  caused  by 
reducing outlays or increasing revenues. Figure 3.3a shows that during the period  1981-1983 
deficits  increased  in  the  majority  of  EC  Member  States,  because  expenditure  growth 
exceeded revenue growth. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal trimmed the 
government budget deficit. It is noteworthy, that at that time some of the countries which are 
currently classified as having an excessive deficit were able to reduce net borrowing. 
Figure 3.3a Changes in government spending and revenues (percent points), 1981-1983 
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Figure 3.3b Changes in government spending and revenues (percent points), 1984-1986 
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Over the years  1984-1986 government net borrowing increased sharply in Greece and,  to a 
lesser  extent,  in  Italy  and  Spain.  This  was  because  expenditure growth  exceeding  revenue 
growth.  The budgetary position  in  Denmark and,  to  a lesser extent,  in  Portugal,  improved 
substantially,  due  to  higher  receipts  and  reduced  outlays.  In  Belgium  the position  of the 
budget was also eased somewhat through higher revenue and lower spending levels.  Despite 
lower  receipts,  Germany,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg  and  the United  Kingdom 
were also able to improve upon their budget situation. 
Figure 3.3c Changes in government spending and revenues (percent points), 1987-1989 
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Over the years 1987-1989 most Member States were successful in bringing down government 
spending levels,  often in conjunction with a somewhat reduced tax-take out of GOP. Ireland 
substantially improved upon its budgetary situation, despite an almost 3 percent point cut of 
its tax level, while in Portugal revenues were raised and outlays reduced. In Denmark govern-
ment net borrowing increased as  a result of lower receipts and higher spending.  The same 
factors contributed to a higher deficit in Greece. In Spain the deficit was reduced by raising 
revenues and in Italy revenue increases exceeded spending growth. 
Share of public outlays 
The  record  with  respect  to  reducing  the share of public  outlays  in  GOP is  highly  mixed 
(figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 Total government expenditure (%GDP), 1970-1990 
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In a large number of countries total government  expenditure expressed as a percentage of 
GDP decreased in  the second  half of the 1980s.  However,  Greece, Spain and Italy further 
expanded  their  public  sector  during  the  whole  decade.  In  Portugal  government  spending 
remained around 45 percent of GDP. 
Tax reform 
Over  the  past  decade,  tax  reform  became  a  major  policy  issue  in  most  OECD  member 
countries.  Broad  interest  in  options  to  reform  national  tax  systems  originated  in  growing 
concern that taxes not only imposed large costs on society by distorting economic decisions, 
but also that taxes were unnecessarily complex and unfair (Hagemann et al.,  1988). Undoub-
tedly, the prospect of fiercer tax competition has also motivated policymakers in some coun-
tries  to  critically  inspect  their  tax  systems.  Fear  among  policymakers  of increased  tax 
competition may  in part explain why  in  the 1980s  many countries lowered  the rates of the 
personal and the corporate income tax. 
As national economies within  the EC become more closely integrated, and with  formal 
restrictions on capital transactions removed,  it may be presumed that overall tax levels and 
rates of major taxes will tend to gradually converge, since the removal of all kind of barriers 
to trade and factor movements will intensify competition, which may in turn enhance rivalry 
in taxation. 
Seen in broad perspective, tax reform efforts in a number of EC Member States seem to 
have concentrated  on two  major sources  of government  revenue:  the personal income  tax 
and the value added tax.  In  addition, in some EC countries the corporate income tax was 
fundamentally overhauled. Only a few  countries also scrutinised the role and rates of social 
security contributions. 
In line with the approach taken by the authorities in the USA (TaX ~eform  Act of 1986), 
most of the EC countries sought to broaden the tax base of the personal income tax, while at 
the same time reducing the level  and  flattening  the structure of rates.  In several Member 
States, lower income tax  rates were also  achieved  by  increasing the share of other taxes in 
national tax mixes. Such revisions were largely the result of a un-coordinated policy process, 
since up till now the Commission has not declared the harmonisation or coordination of the 
personal income tax (and social security contributions) to be an urgent target for Community 
policies. 
'  '  ......  ,,  •  •  ••  l'  ,..  ;  '  ,  ,·  ~  '  ~ 
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Likewise, a number of Member States have reduced the rate of the corporate income tax, 
in  many cases by as much as ten points or even more. Again, such rate reductions reflect in 
part a 'spontaneous' adjustment of national tax systems,  in order to level effective tax rates 
on  the  use  of capital.  To  recoup  resulting  losses  to  the budget,  the  tax  base  was  often 
expanded, mainly by reigning in tax incentives for private investment. 
The  creation  of a  single  integrated  market,  free  of restrictions  on  the  movement  of 
goods,  requires that product taxes are closely coordinated. To that end, in the 1980s Greece, 
Portugal and Spain have introduced the value added tax.  In itself,  this move constituted a 
major reform. By now, the tax base of VAT is nearly fully harmonised across Member States. 
During  the  past  decade  VAT-rates  were  slightly  increased,  reflecting  growing  budgetary 
needs. In October 1992, the Council adopted measures introducing a minimum VAT rate of 
15% as from 1 January 1993, also imposing minimum excise rates. 
Taxing and spending: levels and mixes 
During the  1980s  general government  spending levels  in  Member  States of the European 
Community did not converge. In 1981 the 'spread' between spending levels amounted to 15.5 
percent points  of GOP,  to  increase  to  18.5  points  by  1990.  A  closer  look  at government 
outlays reveals their widely varying mix among Member States. Some common trends may be 
discerned,  however.  The share of interest payments grew  in  nearly all  States,  whereas the 
share of public investment dropped. Transfers dominate government outlays in  most or all 
Member States.  Interestingly enough,  the spread  in  the part of GDP that Member States 
(  re  )distribute through  transfer  payments  has  slightly  contracted,  from  17.4  percent  points 
(1980)  to  15.1  points. Transfers expanded markedly in  the 1970s,  and it seems unavoidable 
that this spending category bears the brunt of necessary budgetary adjustments. 
The area of taxation offers a rather diverse picture. In the course of the 1980s the spread 
in  tax levels  of Member States has been reduced somewhat.  On the· other hand, successive 
changes  of the  tax  legislation  seem  to  have  increased  the  already  existing  variation  of 
national tax mixes. The relatively limited share of the personal income tax in the Dutch and 
French tax  mix  fell  even  further,  whereas  Member States that already  heavily  relied  upon 
consumption taxes expanded the role of such taxes in the national tax mix.  Chapters 4 and 5 
will discuss trends in spending and taxation, respectively, in greater detail. -21-
4. Analysis of government expenditure, 198o-1989 
In this chapter government outlays are disaggregated so as to examine the change of major 
spending categories during the 1980s. Two classifications of government outlays are conside-
red: a breakdown by economic classification and, as far as possible, a breakdown by function. 
4.1 Economic classification 
Five categories of government outlays are distinguished here: 
1.  current transfers; 
2.  interest payments on government debt; 
3.  government consumption; 
4.  net capital transfers; 
5.  gross fiXed capital formation. 
Table 4.1 details the development of government expenditures over the period 1981-1989 and 
in  1990.  Trends in  current transfers  differ  in  the various  Member States.  In six  countries 
(Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands) current transfers rose during 
the 1980s, whereas in the remaining Member States this category of spending was cut back. 
It  is  noteworthy,  that  three  out  of four  Member  States  where  current  transfers  already 
absorbed the largest share of GOP (the Netherlands,  Denmark and France) belong to  the 
group of countries with rising transfer spending. 
Government consumption has increased over the years  1981-1989 in Greece, Spain, Italy 
and  Portugal.  It  may  be noted,  that  Greece  has  already  one of the  highest  government 
consumption ratios in the Community. -22-
Table 4.1 Government expenditure, economic classification, 1981-1990  a> 
current transfers  cons~tion  interest payments  capital  transfers  capital  formation 
1981-1989  1990  1981-1989  1990  1981-1989  1990  1981-1989  1990  1981-1989 
change  level  change  level  change  level  change  level  change 
Denmark  1.9  23.5  -1.6  24.8  3.5  7.2  0.1  0.2  -1.4 
Netherlands  1.4  31.9  -2.6  14.9  2.2  5.9  -0.5  1.6  -0.9 
Greece  5.3  17.1  4.1  21.4  5.8  12.0  0.7  0.9  -0.5 
Italy  3.7  21.2  2.1  17.4  3.6  9.7  0.1  1.4  0.1 
Luxenilourg  -2.0  27.4  -0.7  16.4  0.0  0.7  -0.5  0.7  -1.7 
Belgiun  -0.9  21.8  -3.1  15.3  4.5  10.9  -0.1  0.8  -2.2 
France  2.3  25.1  0.0  18.1  1.3  3.1  -0.2  0.4  0.0 
Germany  -0.4  21.4  -1.4  18.3  0.8  2.6  -0.7  1.0  -1.3 
Portugal  -0.1  15.3  1.5  16.3  4.0  8.2  0.4  1.3  -1.0 
Ireland  -0.1  16.4  -4.5  16.1  2.5  8.4  -1.2  0.2  -4.0 
Spain  1.9  18.0  1.8  15.1  2.6  3.5  0.1  1.1  2.5 
United  Kingdom  -1.3  13.0  -1.9  19.6  -1.0  3.3  -0.4  0.9  -0.7 
EC  1.0  20.6  -0.3  17.9  1.6  5.0  -0.3  1.0  -0.2 
a) Countries are ranked according to total spending in 1990. 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
Interest  payments  on  government  debt  have  increased  in  all  Member  States,  with  the 
exceptions of Luxembourg and the UK.  Note, however,  the considerable differences in  the 
growth  of interest payments, largely depending,  of course,  on the rise of the debt-to-GOP 
ratio.  In  Greece and Italy,  for  instance,  interest payments  ballooned  by  5.7  percent points 
and 3.6 points, respectively, whereas in Germany this category of government spending rose 
by only 0.8 percent points. 
Net capital transfers have  been reduced in  many  Member States.  It is  often maintained 
that in periods of fiscal consolidation capital formation outlays are among the first  items to 
be cut,  often quite drastically so,  given that they are perceived by  policymakers as the least 
rigid component of total outlays. The experience of the European Community corroborates 
this view.  Only  in  Spain and,  to lesser extent,  Italy capital expenditures increased over the 
years  1981-1989.  In some countries the fall  of government investment  has  been  so  drastic 
that it might prove necessary to increase this category of government spending in  the near 
future ('catch-up'). 
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4.2 Functional classification 
For  the  analysis  of  trends  in  outlays  by  various  functional  groups,  seven  expenditure 
categories  are  distinguished.  Following  Saunders  and  Klau  {1985)  these  categories  are 
grouped into four separate policy areas: the traditional domain, the welfare state, the mixed 
economy and other functions. 
The traditional domain 
- general public services, public order and safety; 
- defense; 
The welfare state 
- education; 
- health; 
- social security, welfare and housing (including community amenities, recreational, cultural 
and religious affairs); 
The mixed economy 
- economic services  (including  fuel,  energy,  agriculture,  fishing,  mining,  hunting,  manufac-
turing, construction, transportation and communication); 
Other functions. 
Figure 4.1  charts trends in  outlays by  function  for  most  Member States.  Unfortunately not 
every year of the past decade could be included. Since as many years have been taken into 
account  as  our data bases
6  permit,  the period covered varies  among countries.  All  figures 
used are expressed as a percentage of GDP and changes therefore refer to percent points. 
Lack of data compelled us to exclude Greece. Figures for the Netherlands and Ireland refer 
to consolidated central government instead of general government. 
6  OECD National Accounts,  except the figures  for  the Netherlands and Ireland which  are 
from  IMF  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook;  figures  for  Spain  are  based  on 
Eurostat. -24-
Figure 4.1  Cumulative change in government expenditure, functional classification  (percent 
point of GDP) 
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Ireland, cumulative change, 1983-1987 
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Legend: 
1.  Total government expenditure 
2.  Government services, public order and safety 
3.  Defense 
4.  Education 
5.  Health 
6.  Social security, welfare and housing 
7.  Economic services 
8.  Other functions (incl. interest payments) 
9.  Correction -28-
General trends 
In Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal total government spending increased 
in the period considered here. Especially Italy ( + 10.1) and Portugal ( +8.3) showed a marked 
growth  of outlays.  In the  other Member States  government  spending was  reduced.  It is 
interesting to see which functional spending categories bore the brunt of these reductions. In 
countries with rising spending levels the increase of outlays can largely be attributed to the 
category 'other functions', which includes interest payments on government debt. 
In  countries with  decreasing  spending levels  expenditures  relating  to  the welfare  state 
(especially  education  and social security, welfare and housing)  and to the mixed  economy 
were cut  back relatively  most.  Expenditures relating  to the welfare  state form  exactly  the 
category which  showed the biggest expansion in the seventies.' Apparently, governments in 
the 1980s  tried to roll back the expenditure trends of the 1970s.  Due to the high  share of 
welfare spending in total outlays, relatively small budget cuts in this area lead to a substantial 
reduction of the share of total government spending in GDP. 
This result of decreasing welfare state spending in  many EC Member States is  perhaps 
surprising, given the findings of a recent OECD study by Oxley and Martin (1991). For a set 
of eleven OECD countries, of which  only four countries are included  in our sample,  these 
authors conclude that "excluding debt interest payments, the main increase in the spending 
ratio,  as in  the 1970s,  has been in the area of 'welfare state' activities  .. " (Oxley and Martin 
1991, p.  161). 
In the EC Member States spending in the traditional domain generally showed very little 
dynamics.  A  slight  increase  in  expenditures  on  general  public  services,  public  order and 
safety was compensated for by a small decrease in defense spending. 
Development of separate functional categories 
In the traditional domain,  expenditures on general public services,  pu61ic  order and safety 
only increased by  about 1 percent point in  Portugal, Italy and Spain. In the Netherlands this 
increase was somewhat smaller.  Other countries show  a  small decrease, generally less than 
0.5  points. Defense expenditures mostly decreased. Only  in  Spain, Italy and Portugal there 
was a very limited increase. 
Of the welfare  state expenditure categories  spending  on  education was  generally  on a 
downward  trend; in Germany and the UK a little less than 1 percent point, in the Nether-
lands,  Belgium  and Spain slightly  more. Health expenditures decreased in eight out of the 
7  See: Saunders and Klau (1985), p. 49. -29-
eleven countries from our sample. The Netherlands (·3.1), Ireland (·0.8), Denmark (-0.5) and 
Portugal  (  ·0.4)  showed  the  biggest  drop  in  health  spending.  On  the  other  hand,  health 
spending went up in France, Germany and Italy. Expenditures on social security, welfare and 
housing  decreased  in  six  countries.  In Belgium,  Spain  and  Luxembourg  the decrease  was 
about 2 percent point. 
The  single  category  distinguished  here  among  the  expenditures  relating  to  the  mixed 
economy,  'economic services', generally showed  a decline,  rather substantially so  in Luxem-
bourg  (-2.8),  Portugal  (-1.4),  the  UK  (-0.9),  the  Netherlands  (-1.4)  and  Ireland  (-1.7). 
Denmark showed a more moderate trend (  -0,6). 
'Other  expenditures'  increased  in  most  countries,  the  most  extremely  so  in  Portugal 
( +5.2),  Italy  ( +2.8),  Denmark ( +2.8),  Spain  ( +2.1),  Belgium  ( + 1.5)  and  the  Netherlands 
( + 1.4). -30-
S. Analysis of tax receipts, 198o-1989 
In  this  chapter  government  receipts  are  disaggregated  so  as  to  examine  which  revenue 
categories  have changed  during the  1980s.S  Efforts to reduce tax  rates and  the wedge  not 
withstanding, in the 1980s total tax revenue as percentage of GDP increased in the EC area 
as a whole by 3.5 percent points (unweighted average). A breakdown by subperiod (table 5.1) 
shows that tax rises were largely concentrated in the years 1981-1983  (2.9 percent points). In 
the late 1980s the average tax level in the EC even declined ever so slightly (by -0.2 points). 
During this subperiod the tax level fell  markedly in Greece (-3.8),  Belgium  (-2.8), Ireland (-
1.5) and the United Kingdom (  -1.1 ). 
Over  the  period  as  a  whole,  Spain  (10.6),  Italy  (7.6),  Portugal  (6.4),  Greece  (4.8), 
Denmark (4.4) and Ireland (3.6) all witnessed an above average increase of their tax-to-GDP 
ratio.  France (2.1),  Luxembourg (1.4)  and the United Kingdom  (1.2)  saw  a smaller rise of 
the tax-take out of GDP. In the Netherlands (0.2), Germany (0.1), and Belgium (-0.1) the tax 
ratio  more or less  stabilised.  In  fact,  by  1989  no  single  Member  State had  succeeded  in 
reducing its tax-to-GDP ratio to below the 1980-level. 
Table  5.1  also  shows  EC Member States at the end of the  1980s  to  move  in  two  'tax 
convoys', with Denmark way ahead. In the frrst convoy national tax levels are typically in the 
42-46 percent of GDP range. Countries in the second convoy are characterised by tax levels 
in  the  33-38  percent  of GDP  range.  In  the  1980s  some  convergence  of tax  levels  has 
materialised, since the rise of tax levels in  all countries of the first convoy was clearly below 
the EC average.  Only  Denmark speeded ahead,  in  a  forceful  effort  to  drastically curb its 
deficit.  All  southern  Member States are in  the second  convoy,  and  their tax  levels  haven 
clearly been catching up.  In this group,  Germany and the United Kingdom  experienced an 
only (very) moderate hike of the tax-to-GDP level 
8  Since the Revenue Statistics  of the OECD provide the most detailed figures on taxes our 
analysis is based upon OECD data. -31-
Table 5.1 Change of tax levels (percent points of GOP), 1981-1989  •> 
tax  level  1989  change  of  tax  level  (percent  points of  GOP) 
(X  of  GOP)  1981·89  1981-83  1984-86  1987-89 
Dennark  49.9  4.4  1.0  4.3  -0.9 
First  convo~: 
Netherlands  46.0  0.2  0.9  -0.9  0.2 
Belgiun  44.3  -0.1  2.0  0.7  -2.8 
France  43.8  2.1  1.9  0.4  -0.2 
Luxembourg  42.4  1.4  3.9  -2.6  0.1 
EC  average  39.9  3.5  2.9  0.8  -0.2 
Second  convo~: 
Germany  38.1  0.1  -0.7  0.3  0.5 
Italy  37.8  7.6  5.6  0.3  1.  7 
Ireland  37.6  3.6  4.3  0.8  -1.5 
United  Kingdom36.5  1.2  2.1  0.2  -1.1 
Portugal  35.1  6.4  4.2  0.5  1.  7 
Spain  34.4  10.6  3.8  3.0  3.8 
Greece  33.2  4.8  5.5  3.1  -3.8 
•>  Countries are ranked  by declining tax-to-GOP  ratio. 
Source: OECD 
The tax structure of any country may  be characterised by  the tax  mix  by  sector of eovern-
ment,  or by  the relative share of various tmes of tax.  Besides total tax levels,  table 5.2  dis· 
plays the tax mix by type of tax for  all EC Member States. Following. t~  OECD classificati-
on of taxes, all national taxes have been grouped into one of six categories: 
1. taxes on income and profits, including capital gains (1000); 
2. social security contributions (2000); 
3. taxes on payroll and workforce (3000); 
4. taxes on property (  4000); 
5. taxes on goods and services (5000); 
6. other taxes (6000). 
In table 5.2 social security contributions and payroll taxes have been lumped together. Taxes 
under code 6000  have  been  omitted from  the table,  as  they  are relatively  unimportant in -32-
revenue terms. 
In  1989  countries clearly  had  different  tax  prof.tles.  In  France (  44  percent of total tax 
revenue),  the Netherlands (  41 ),  Germany {36)  and Spain  (35)  social security contributions 
and payroll taxes are the single most important source of government revenue. Receipts from 
this source vary strongly among Member States, reflecting both varying degrees of coverage 
and generosity of programs,  and different methods of financing social security transfers as 
well. 
In Denmark (60  percent), Luxembourg {41  percent), the United Kingdom  (39  percent), 
Belgium (38 percent), and Italy (37 percent) income and profit taxes head the list of national 
revenue  sources,  whereas  Greece  (  45  percent),  Portugal  (  45  percent)  and  Ireland  (  44 
percent) rely mainly on taxes on goods and services. 
Reading the columns of table 5.2, the spread in the share of income and profit taxes is 43 
points, ranging from 60 percent in Denmark to only  17 percent in France and  18 percent in 
Greece.  Social  security  contributions  show  a  spread  in  the  same  order of magnitude  (  41 
points), their share ranging from 44 percent in France to only 3 percent in Denmark. 
After  lumping  together  all  taxes  on  income,  profits  and  wages  (codes  1000-3000),  to 
correct  for  the  varying  degree  to  which  social  security  transfers  are  financed  through 
separate  contributions,  the  spread  of these  taxes  across  Member  States  is  considerably 
narrowed.  Still,  a wide gap  remains between Belgium,  Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
(70-72 percent of total tax revenues) on the one hand, and Ireland, Greece and Portugal (51-
52 percent) on the other hand. Of course, consumption taxes (code 5000)  dominate the tax 
mix of the latter Member States. 
The share of property taxes (code 4000) also varies considerably, from 2-3 percent (Italy, 
Portugal, Belgium, Germany and Greece) to 13 percent in the United Kingdom. -33-
Table 5.2 Tax mix of Member States (tax shares in % of total tax), 1989 
tax  level  total  1000  2/3000  4000  5000 
Dervnark  49.9  100  60  3  4  33 
Netherlands  46.0  100  29  41  4  26 
Belgiun  44.3  100  38  34  3  26 
France  43.8  100  •)  17  44  7  29 
Luxembourg  42.4  100  41  26  8  24 
Germany  38.1  100  35  36  3  26 
Italy  37.8  100  37  34  2  27 
Ireland  37.6  100  35  16  5  44 
United  Kingdom  36.5  100  39  18  13  31 
Portugal  35.1  100  26  26  2  45 
Spain  34.4  100  33  35  4  29 
Greece  33.2  100  18  33  3  45 
Memorandun  i tern: 
EC  average It)  39.9  100 
•>  France  gathers 3%  from  'other taxes•  not  included here. 
•>  Unweighted. 
Source: OECD 
Table 5.3 Change of tax mix (change in percent points of GDP), 1981-1989 
tax  level  1989  income  profits  social  property  consunption 
(%  of  GDP)  (1100)  (1200)  (2/3000)  (4000)  (5100) 
Dervnark  49.9  2.5  0.6  0.7  -0.4  -0.4 
Netherlands  46.0  -2.3  0.5  1.5  0.1  0.2 
Belgiun  44.3  -2.0  0.5  1.6  0.2  -0.3 
France  43.8  -0.2  0.3  1.3  0.7  -0.4 
Luxembourg  42.4  -1.1  0.7  -1.2  1.2  1.5 
Germany  38.1  -0.1  0.0  0.6  0.0  -0.4 
Italy  37.8  3.1  1.4  1.0  -0.2  0.6 
Ireland  37.6  1.0  -0.2  0.9  0.0  3.1 
United Kingdom  36.5  -0.9  1.5  -1.0  0.4  1.1 
Portugal  35.1  n.a.  n.a.  0.0  0.1  2.5 
Spain  34.4  3.1  1.8  0.2  0.2  3.4 
Greece  33.2  0.0  0.4  0.9  -0.2  4.7 
Source: OECD -34-
Although the 1980s witnessed an increase of aggregate tax levels in all Member States (by 3.5 
percent points on  average),  the share of separate taxes  showed  a somewhat more dynamic 
pattern, as may be illustrated by table 5.3. 
Revenue from  the personal  income  tax fell  in  the Netherlands  (by -2.3  percent points), 
Belgium (  -2.0), Luxembourg (  -1.1) and the United Kingdom (  -0.8). On the other hand, Spain 
and Italy (3.1 ),  and Denmark (2.5) recorded a relatively significant increase in revenue from 
the personal income tax. 
Although the rate of the corporation income tax was reduced in most EC Member States, 
revenue from this source grew in all jurisdictions (Ireland excepted), sometimes markedly so, 
at least in relative terms. 
Social  security  contributions  demonstrated  more  variation,  increasing  most  in  Belgium 
(1.6)  and  the  Netherlands  (1.5),  and  falling  most  in  Luxembourg  (-1.2)  and  the  United 
Kingdom  (  -1.0).  The share of property taxes  notably went up  in  France (  1.2)  and Luxem-
bourg (0.7), to drop in only three Member States. 
Finally, proceeds from taxes on consumption showed a slow but persistent upward trend in 
some  Member States,  and  were  reduced  in  some  other countries.  Revenue  from  general 
consumption  taxes  strongly  increased  in  Member States that introduced  VAT  only  in  the 
1980s,  i.e.  Greece (4.9),  Spain (3.4)  and Portugal (2.5).  Revenue from  VAT also rose quite 
substantially in  Ireland (3.1)  and the United Kingdom  (1.1).  Variation in  VAT-revenues in 
the  original  founding  Member  States  remained  between  -0.4  (France,  Germany)  and  0.6 
(Italy), Luxembourg (1.5) being an outlyer here. 
Table  5.3  serves  to  illustrate  the  impression  that  in  the  1980s  changes  in  tax  shares 
sometimes  tended  to  enlarge  the  already  existing  variation  in  national  tax  mixes.  For 
example, the rather limited role of the personal income tax in the Dutch and French tax mix 
was further reduced, whereas some countries with a high share of regressive taxes increased 
consumption taxes most. -34 Q-
Under conditions favoring possibly increasing tax competition, especially tax rates require 
close attention. Table 5.4 displays rates of selected taxes of EC Member States (at 
1991/1992levels). The information in table 5.4 should be interpreted cautiously, since a 
number of caveats apply. For example, the impact of local income taxes (Belgium, 
Denmark) and temporary tax increases (Germany) has been omitted. Moreover, the 
corporate income tax rate may differ. for retained earnings and profits paid out to 
shareholders respectively (Germany, France). Only the standard rate of value added tax has 
been included in table 5.4. Excise rates (expressed in ECU; rounded) are approximate, 
because a certain variation by product characteristics has been neglected. In short, tax rates 
presented in table 5.4 are primarily intended to illustrate relative country positions in a 
general way, and should be interpreted accordingly. 
The spread in the top rate of the personal income tax (1992 data) amounts to twenty 
percent points, Denmark, Portugal and the United Kingdom (all 40%) and the Netherlands 
(  60%) being located at both extremes of the tax spectre. The gap between national 
corporate income tax rates (1991 data) is thirteen points. Here Luxemburg (33%), Greece 
(46%) and Germany (50%, aplies to retained earnings only) take extreme positions. The 
spread of the standard rate of the value added tax is still twelve points (Spain 13%, 
Denmark 25%). However, as from January 1993 all Member States will have to observe a 
minimum rate of 15%, reducing the spread to ten points at most. Rates of selected excises 
taxes show wide variation. 
The spread in present rates, as is illustrated in table 5.4, stresses the scope for 
increased harmonization of tax rates. Harmonization may result from market pressures or 
political effort. T
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IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS -36-
6. Impact of political and institutional factors on fiscal policy in the 1980s 
6.1  Introduction 
Previous chapters have documented considerable cross-country differences in the EC as  to 
both the size of the public sector and the public debt-to-GOP ratio of Member States. This 
chapter in turn examines which factors may help to explain such cross-country variation. 
Explaining the size of the public sector has been an important issue on the public finance 
research agenda,  ever since Wagner (1883)  published his 'Law of Increasing State Activity'. 
According to Wagner the demand for increases in the scope of public sector activity was  to 
be  considered  as  a  natural  consequence  of  higher  living  standards  which  accompany 
economic  industrialisation.  There  are  surprisingly  few  studies  which  attempt  to  explain 
country variation in the share of government expenditure in GOP. Wagner's law has received 
almost  no  empirical support from  cross-section  studies  (Saunders  and  Klau  (1985)).  More 
recent  analyses  of public  expenditure  growth  have  focused  on  supply-side  influences.  The 
'plateau theory'  of Peacock and  Wiseman  (1961)  and  the 'unbalanced productivity growth' 
model of Baumol (1967) are well-known examples. 
In  explaining  public  sector  growth,  the  public  choice  approach  focuses  on  the  role  of 
voting behaviour and decision-making in mixed  economies.  Much  of this literature attempts 
to  show  an  inherent bias towards overproduction of public sector goods.  This bias  towards 
excessive government size may be a consequence of voter coalitions (Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962)),  bureaucratic behaviour (Niskanen (1971))  or it may be the result of the impact of 
public employee voting patterns. According to the public choice approach modern democra-
cies  also  have a  bias towards deficit  financing  of government expenditure. As Tollison and 
Wagner argue: "there exists a bias towards the use of deficit finance, because deficit finance 
can  increase  a  governing  party's  support  over  what  it  would  be with  tax  finance.  In  the 
absence  of borrowing  and  inflation  as  methods  of finance,  a  governing party can  increase 
expenditures only by increasing taxes. While increased expenditures increase political support 
for  the governing party, increased taxation reduces it...  Deficit finance,  however,  allows  the 
governing party to offer some combination of lower taxes and higher expenditures" (Tollison 
and Wagner, 1987, 376-377). 
In  recent  theoretical  and  empirical  research  the  variation  in  political  and  institutional 
arrangements which  may  affect  the process of national policy  formation  is  hypothesized  to 
explain  cross-country  differences  with  respect  to  fiscal  policies  pursued.  A  first  class  of 
models investigates how the political system affects the behaviour of policy-makers (see Grilli -37-
et al.  (1991)). According to these models two  features of the political system  are especially 
relevant:  instability  (i.e.  the  chance  that  policymakers  will  be  thrown  out  of office)  and 
polarization  (i.e.  how  strong  is  the  disagreement  between  alternating  governments).  For 
instance,  Persson and  Svensson  (1989)  have shown  that  a  conservative government,  which 
favours a low level of government spending but knows that it will probably be replaced by a 
government that prefers higher spending levels, will borrow more than when it was certain to 
stay in  office.  For a two  party system, Alesina and Tabellini {1990)  show that public debt is 
positively correlated with  the degree of polarization between  alternating governments, with 
the time between government changes, and with the chance that a government will not be re-
elected.  Basically,  these  models  imply  that  more  unstable  and  polarized  political  systems 
behave more myopically and have, therefore, higher public debt-to-GOP ratios. Indeed, Grilli 
et  al.  (1991)  found  a  strong  negative  correlation  between  debt  accumulation  and  the 
frequency  of government changes in  their sample  of eighteen  OECD countries.
1  Saunders 
and K.lau {1985) report that the number of elections, reflecting opportunities for competitive 
fJ.Scal  bidding  by  political parties,  is  significantly  positive  in  their cross-country  regression 
which tries to explain the growth of the public sector. 
A second class of models focusses on disagreement between various decision makers (see 
e.g.  Alesina  and  Drazen {1991)).  The greater the conflict,  the more difficult  it  will  be  to 
enact on deficit reduction measures. It is likely, that such policy conflicts are more important 
in  countries with  coalition  governments.  Game  theory  suggests  that cooperation  is  harder 
when  the number of players  is  large.  In  this view,  coalition  governments will  have  a  hard 
time closing budget deficits after adverse shocks, since individual parties in the coalition will 
each veto spending cuts or tax increases that would impinge on their constituencies (see also 
Corsetti and Roubini (1991)).  Roubini and Sachs  (1989a)  and  Corsetti and  Roubini {1991) 
found that their index of political power dispersion, which measures the type of government 
in power, helps explain government debt growth in their sample of fifte~n OECD countries: 
large coalition governments have higher deficits, other things being equal, than do one-party, 
majoritarian  governments.  Edin  and  Ohlson  {1991)  argue,  however,  that  the  political 
cohesion variable used by  Roubini and Sachs captures the effects of minority governments, 
rather  than  majority  coalition  governments.  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989b)  also  stress  that 
coalition governments will have a bias towards higher levels of government spending relative 
1  There  is  also  some  evidence  concerning  developing  countries.  See  Cukierman  et  al. 
(1989), Edwards and Tabellini (1991),  Roubini (1991)  and De Haan and Siermann (1992). 
All  these  studies conclude  that the number  of government  changes  help  explain  cross-
country variation in fiscal policy. -38-
to majority-party governments, as various parties in government make logrolling agreements 
so  as  to  ensure  higher  outlays  benefitting  their  individual  constituencies.  They  report 
evidence in support of this view. 
A third class of models, which antedates the models outlined above, focuses on ideological 
differences  (see e.g.  Hibbs  (1977)  and Frey and Schneider (1978)).  It is  often maintained 
that left-wing governments aim  for  a higher share of government spending in  total output, 
and are perhaps even more willing to accept rising government budget deficits, than do right-
wing governments. Cameron (1985) and Roubini and Sachs (1989b) found some support for 
this hypothesis, but DeHaan and Zelhorst (1992) conclude that government debt growth in 
Germany is not influenced by the 'political colour' of government. 
Finally,  some authors have argued that budgeting procedures, i.e.  the rules according to 
which  budgets are drafted by  the government, amended and passed by  the parliament, and 
implemented by  the government may have important consequences for the sustainability of 
fiscal  policy  (see  e.g.  Von  Hagen  (1991)  (1992)).  According  to  Von  Hagen  a  budgeting 
procedure enabling a government to commit itself to fiscal discipline is an essential condition 
for  fiscal  stability.  Indeed, .Von  Hagen  (1992),  using  data from  the European  Community 
countries  during  the  1980s  and  characterizations  obtained  from  an  assesment  of national 
budget procedures, has found strong empirical support for the view that a budgetary process 
that  gives  the prime minister  or the finance  minister  a  dominant  position  over  spending 
ministers,  that  limits  the amendment power of parliament,  and  that leaves  little  room  for 
changes in the budget during its implementation, is conducive to fiscal discipline. 
In this section we will build upon the literature indicated above and examine whether cross-
country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size can be explained using, inter 
alia, the following variables:
2 
- the number of government changes; 
- the share of cabinet portfolios held by social democratic and other leftist parties; 
- the Roubini and Sachs political power dispersion index; 
- a variant of the Von Hagen budgetary process variable. 
2  The position  of the central bank,  i.e.  whether it  is  autonomous  or not,  may  also  be of 
relevance. In the present study we do not take up this line of inquiry. In a previous paper 
we  have  shown  that  countries  with  an  independent central  bank generally  have  lower 
budget deficits. See DeHaan and Sturm (1992). -39-
6.2 The data 
We describe three main features of the political systems of EC Member States: (a) the type 
of government; {b) the stability of governments; and (c) the share of cabinet portfolios held 
by social democratic and other Ieftist.parties. 
Various authors have argued that the kind of government (coalition, majority government 
or minority  government)  may  influence  both  government  debt  accumulation  (Grilli  et al. 
(1991))  and  the level  of government  spending  (Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989b)).  To  capture 
possible effects of divided versus single party governments, and following  Roubini and Sachs 
(1989a,b), we have constructed an index of power dispersion (POL) which measures the size 
of the governing coalition, ranging from 0 (smallest coalition) to 3 (minority government)
3
: 
Index  0 one-party majority parliamentary government; 
1 coalition parliamentary government with two-to-three coalition partners; 
2 coalition parliamentary government with four or more coalition partners; 
3 minority government. 
Our second variable CHANGE traces the frequency of government changes. A government 
change  occurs  after  each  election  and if a change  takes place with  respect  to  the parties 
participating in  the governing  coalition.•  For example,  when  the social  democrats left  the 
three-party coalition in  the Netherlands in  1982 and the remaining parties formed a minority 
government, we consider this event to constitute a change of government. After the elections 
took place, a new centre-right government was formed, and this event we consider as another 
change of government. 
Our th~d variable is  the share of cabinet portfolios held by social democratic and other 
leftist  pa~ies (LEFT).  This  variable  is  constructed  following  the  approach  outlined  by 
Cameron/ (1985).  The  total  number  of  months  that  left-wing  politicians  held  cabinet 
I 
portfolio' is divided by the total number of cabinet members, multiplied by twelve. For their 
! 
sample  ff fourteen  industrial  countries  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989b)  concluded  that  this 
3  Note,  wever,  that for  some countries some minor differences exist  between our index 
and the  ower dispersion index as presented by  Roubini and Sachs  (1988). The Roubini 
and Sach  index  for  the Netherlands for  the period  1983-85  (2)  is,  for  instance,  clearly 
wrong as  t  government coalition consisted of two  parties during that period.  See the 
Appendix for . ' rther details.  / 
4  This variable· ipt~_ds to measure the chance of being thrown out of office and therefore 
all elections ar~'included even if the government is re-elected. 
i, -40-
variable  helps  explain  cross-country  differences  in  government  spending.
5  The  Appendix 
contains detailed information on our political variables. 
Our final institutional variable is based upon the work of Von Hagen (1992). On the basis 
of an assessment of national budgeting procedures, Von Hagen has constructed a number of 
budgetary process indexes.  He distinguishes various characteristics which are grouped under 
five large items: the structure of negotiations within government; the structure of parliamen-
tary process;  the informativeness of the budget draft;  the flexibility  of the budget execution 
and the existence of long-term planning constraints. For each characteristic numbers ranging 
from  zero  to  four  are used  to  describe  its  quality,  with  a  low  number indicating a  quality 
conducive  to  little  fiscal  discipline.  In  case  of missing  information  a  number equal to  the 
average of the available numbers for the other characteristics of the same item is  assigned. 
In  our  empirical  analysis  we  will  use  an  index  (BUDGET),  which  is  based  upon  the 
characteristics distinguished by Von Hagen.
6 
5  Roubini  and Sachs  (1989b)  have  used  Cameron's (1985)  variable in their regressions on 
the growth of government spending. Note, however,  that Cameron's period of observation 
(1965-81)  is  rather different  from  the one used  by  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1973-85),  which 
raises considerable doubt as regards the value of their results. 
6  With respect to the structure of negotiations the following characteristics distinguished by 
Von  Hagen  are included  in  BUDGET:  a)  existence  of general constraints  (like  golden 
rule); b) agenda setting for budget negotiations; c) scope of budget norms in the setting of 
the agenda and d)  the way cabinet members are involved in the negotiations. Concerning 
the structure  of the parliamentaty process  the following  characteristics  are included:  a) 
possibility of amendments; b) whether it is required that they are offsetting; c) whether all 
expenditure is passed in one vote and d) whether there is an initial global vote on budget 
size.  With  respect  to  the informativeness  of the budget  the following  characteristics are 
taken  into  account:  a)  are  special  funds  included?;  b)  are  government  loans  to  non-
government entities included in the budget? Concerning flexibility of budget execution the 
following  characteristics  are included:  a)  minister  of finance  can  block  expenditures;  b) 
spending  ministries  are subject  to  cash  limits;  c)  disbursement  approval  required  from 
minister of finance;  d)  are transfers of expenditures between chapters allowed?; e) chan-
ges  in  budget law during execution and t) carry-over of unused funds  to next year. As to 
longterm  planning constraints  the following  characteristics  are covered:  a)  multi-annual 
target; b)  length of planning horizon; c)  the nature of the forecasts and d)  the degree of 
commitment implied by  the forecasts. Three characteristics that Von Hagen distinguishes 
have been omitted in constructing BUDGET:  1)  whether parliamentary amendments can 
cause the fall of the government, because Von Hagen himself indicates that this issue does 
not  unambiguously  strengthen  the  budgetary  process;  2)  the  assessment  of  budget 
transparency,  and  3)  the link  of the budget  draft  to  the national  accounts,  since  that 
information is of little use from the viewpoint of fiscal discipline. -41-
6.3 Explaining government debt growth in the EC 
This section presents the estimation results of a pooled time-series regression in which  the 
growth  of the debt-to-GOP  ratio is  the dependent variable.  Our basic  model is  borrowed 
from  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989a).  As these  authors have  pointed out,  the specification  of 
their  model  is  consistent  both  with  ·elements  of optimizing  approaches  to  budget  deficits 
(such as the tax smoothing model of Barro (1979)) and with traditional Keynesian models of 
fiscal  deficits  as  well.  Indeed,  both  theories imply  that budget  deficits  are countercyclical. 
Suppressing time indices the estimated equation is: 
(1)  DBY  = a0+ a1 DBYL +  a2 DUB +  a3 DRB +  a4 DGR +  a, P + v 
where the dependent variable (DBY) is  the change in the public debt-to-GOP ratio and the 
explanatory variables are:  the lagged  change in  the debt-ratio  (DBYL  ),  the change  in  the 
unemployment rate (DUB),. the change in debt-servicing costs (DRB)' and the change in the 
GDP growth rate (DGR), and our political variables (P).S Finally, v denotes the error term. 
The lagged deficit is included to allow for slow adjustment of budget deficits. The adverse 
shocks of slow growth and high unemployment resulted in increasing deficits; a process which 
was  aggrevated by  the rise in  real interest rates, which  significantly and  often unexpectedly 
raised  most  governments'  costs  of debt  servicing.  See  Roubini  and  Sachs  ( 1989a)  for  a 
further discussion of the model. 
Table 6.1  contains our estimation results. The frrst row of table 6.1  presents the outcomes 
of the basic Roubini and Sachs model. All coefficients have the right sign and most of them 
are significantly  different  from  zero.  Row  2 of table 6.1  shows  the outcomes when  power 
7  This variable is defined as d(i - p - n  )BY,.~t where i denotes interest payments on govern-
ment debt divided by government debt, pis the rate of inflation and n is the GDP growth 
rate. Our variable is very similar to the one used by  Roubini and Sachs (1989a). We have 
also  experimented  using  actual  interest  payments  in  nominal  terms,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of GDP  instead  of DRB.  This  approach  yielded  very  similar  results  (not 
shown). 
8  In contrast to Roubini and Sachs we have used data on gross government debt, which are 
more reliable than those on net debt. Our interest rate variable also differs from the one 
used by  Roubini and Sachs. In our regressions this variable consists of the change in total 
interest  payments  on  gross  debt,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of GDP.  We  have  also 
experimented with the interest rate variable proposed by Roubini and Sachs, and variants 
thereof, but this does not affect our conclusions regarding the influence of political factors. -42-
dispersion  index  POL is  added as an  explanatory variable.  In sharp contrast to the results 
reported  by  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989a,b),  we  find  that  the  coefficient  of POL  is  not 
significantly different from zero. As Edin and Ohlin (1991) have pointed out, the constructi-
on of POL places a very restrictive form  on its effects.  Why  should the increase of public 
debt  under a  minority government  be three times  as  large  as under a  two-party  majority 
coalition? Row 3 of table 6.1  therefore reports the results when POL is replaced by a dummy 
variable  for  each  'political  class'.  In  contrast  to  the  results  reported  by  Edin  and  Ohlin 
(1991),  the  coefficient  of the  POL3  dummy  (minority  governments)  is  not  significantly 
different from zero. Closer inspection of fiscal policy in individual countries indeed suggests 
that minority governments are often able to reduce budget deficits, as the Danish experience 
clearly demonstrates. The coefficients of POLl and POL2 are also not significantly different 
from zero. 
Next,  we  have  examined whether the number of government changes  may  help  explain 
cross-country  variation  in  the  growth  of public  debt.  Row  4  of table  6.1  presents  the 
outcomes adding CHANGE as explanatory variable. It is very interesting, that the frequency 
of  government  changes  apparently  does  matter.  This  result  is  in  accordance  with  the 
conclusions of Grilli et al.  (1991). Our conclusion does not change when the constant term is 
replaced by country dummies (not shown). We have also experimented with a variable which 
has the value of one only in case of substantial government change and is  zero otherwise.
9 
The coefficient of this variable is  not significantly different from  zero (row 5 of table 6.1), 
which is also in accordance with the results of Grilli et al. (1991). 
The next variable included in  the model is LEFT (row 6 of table 6.1 ).  It follows  that the 
coefficient of this variable is not significantly different from zero, which is in accordance with 
the results DeHaan and Zelhorst (1992) found for Germany. 
9  When  a  government  is  not  replaced  after elections  this  dummy  has  the value  of one. 
Similarly,  when  the  same  coalition  of political  parties  remains  in  power  after  some 
political crisis, this dummy is also one. -43-
Table 6.1 Explaining cross-country differences in public debt growth in the EC, 1981-1989  •> 
DBYL  DUB  ORB  DGR  POL  POL1  POL2  POL3  CHANGE  LEFT  BUDGET  R
2(adj) 
(1) 0.59  1.19  0.24  -0.33 
(7.7)  (4.5)  (1.2)  (1.6) 
(2)  0.60  1.19  0.24  -0.34  -0.14 
(7.5)  (4.5)  (1.2)  (1.6)  (0.4) 
(3)  0.57  1.24  0.25  -0.29  -0.16  0.79  -0.78 
(7.0)  (4.6)  (1.2)  (1.4)  (0.2)  (0.7)  (0.7) 
(4)  0.59  1.12  0.25  -0.33  1.19 
(7.8)  (4.3)  (1.2)  (1.6)  (2.4) 
(5) 0.58  1.13  0.26  -0.35  0.86 
(7.5)  (4.2)  (1.3)  (1.  7)  (1.2) 
(6)  0.58  1.15  0.25  -0.31  1.13 
(7.5)  (4.3)  (1.2)  (1.5)  (1.5) 
(7)  0.56  1.22  0.25  -0.31  -0.03 
(7.1)  (4.6)  (1.2)  (1.5)  (1.5) 
(8) 0.48  1.25  0.27  -0.21  -0.06 
(5.4)  (4.8)  (1.4)  (1.0)  (2.4) 
•>  Absolute values of  t-statistics in parentheses.  A constant  is included  in all  regressions. 
Finally, we have added the variable BUDGET to our model. The outcomes are shown in row 
7  of table  6.1.  Although  the coefficient  of BUDGET has  the  'right'  sign,  it  is  not  very 
significant.  So  at  first  sight  there  is  only  limited  support  for  the  view  that  budgetary 
procedures matter.  Closer  inspection  of the  data suggests,  however,  that  the inclusion  of 
Luxembourg severely influences the outcome. Luxembourg not only has the lowest value for 
BUDGET, but also the lowest government deficit of all EC Member Countries.
10  Reestima-
ting the model with a dummy included for Luxembourg reinforces this impression (row 8 of 
table  6.1):  the  coefficient  of BUDGET  is  now  significantly  differefit  from  zero.  Note, 
however, that the significance of the coefficient of the economic growth variable is reduced. 
Although maybe not a sufficient condition for stable fiscal policy, there are strong indications 
that  budgetary  procedures  are  relevant  in  explaining  cross-country  differences  in  fiscal 
10  This low value of BUDGET for Luxembourg does not seem to be influenced so much by 
the budgetary process as well  as by the absence of information on the elements on which 
the index is based. 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0.54 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.54 -44-
policies actually pursued.11 
6.4 Explaining government spending in the EC 
This section reports the estimation results of a model to explain the change in  the share of 
total  government  spending  in  GDP  (DGY).  Apart  from  our  political  variables  POL, 
CHANGE  and  LEFf,  the  explanatory  variables  in  our basic  model  are:  (1)  DGYL,  the 
lagged  dependent variable;  (2)  the change in  the unemployment  rate (DUB);  and  (3)  the 
change in the GDP growth rate (DGR). A very similar set of explanatory variables has been 
used by  Roubini and Sachs (1989b).  Row  1 of table 6.2  shows  the estimation outcomes for 
the basic model in which LEFf is included as a political variable. Previous studies (Cameron 
(1978),  Roubini and Sachs (1989b))  concluded that the political orientation of governments 
may  help  explain  cross-country  differences  in  public  sector  size.
12  All  variables  have  the 
expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Row 2 of table 6.2 reports the results 
when  POL is  added as  an explanatory variable.  Its coefficient  is  not significantly  different 
from  zero.  This conclusion  is  also  reached when  POL is  the only  political variable  in  the 
regression (not shown). As follows  from  row 3 of table 6.2  it also does not make much of a 
difference if POL is  replaced by  dummies for  each different 'political class'.  Row 4 of table 
6.2  yields  the conclusion  that,  in contrast to  the results for  government debt accumulation, 
the coefficient  of the frequency  of government  changes  is  not  significantly  different  from 
zero. The same conclusion is reached with respect to the impact of the number of significant 
government changes and the strength of the budgetary process (not shown). 
11  This conclusion is also  reached when the basic model is estimated adding four interaction 
variables, constructed by  multiplying the explanatory variables by  the variable BUDGET. 
The motivation for  this approach is  to examine whether budgetary institutions determine 
the strength of the effects  of other variables  on  the  deficit.  Our estimation results  (not 
shown) suggest that the budgetary procedures variable is especially important for the effect 
of the interest payments variable. 
12  Solano (1983) did not fmd  support for the view that the number of seats of leftist parties 
in the central legislature may account for cross-country variation in government spending. -45-
Table 6.2  Determinants of the change in  the ratio of government spending to GDP in  EC 
Member Countries, 1981-1989 •> 
DGYL  DUB  DGR  LEFT  POL  POL1  POL2  POL3  CHANGE  R
2(adj) 
(1)  0.25  0.50  -0.38  0.94  0.49 
(2.8)  (4.0)  (5.5)  (2.8) 
(2)  0.24  0.49  -0.38  1.07  0.15  0.49 
(2.6)  (3.9)  (5.4)  (3.0)  (1.1) 
(3)  0.22  0.49  -0.38  1.16  -0.46  0.11  0.15  0.49 
(2.5)  (3.9)  (5.4)  (3.2)  (1.3)  (0.2)  (0.3) 
(4)  0.23  0.50  -0.38  0.96  0.21  0.49 
(2.6)  (4.0)  (5.5)  (2.8)  (0.9) 
DGYL  DUB  DGR  LEFT  TRADE  POP  PCY  R
2(adj) 
(5)  0.24  0.50  -0.38  0.79  -0.005  0.50 
(2.7)  (4.0)  (5.5)  (2.3)  (1.8) 
(6)  0.24  0.56  -0.38  0.99  -0.04  0.49 
(2.8)  (4.4)  (5.5)  (2.9)  (1.1) 
(1)  0.25  0.50  -0.38  0.90  -0.001  0.48 
(2.8)  (4.0)  (5.5)  (2.5)  (0.4) 
•>  Absolute  values of  t-statistics in parentheses.  A constant  is included  in all  regressions. 
Finally,  we  have  experimented  with  a  number  of other  explanatory  variables  which  have 
frequently been used in the literature explaining government growth, to examine whether our 
conclusions  are  dependent  upon  the  variables  included  in  our  basic  model.
13  The  first 
variable  is  TRADE,  which  is  defined  as  the  total  share  of export  and  imports  in  GDP. 
Cameron (1978)  was  the first  to propose this variable.  His argument is  that a highly  open 
economy  is  more  susceptible  to  fluctuations  in  effective  demand,  leading  strong  labour 
unions to press governments to take ,appropriate countermeasures, the·  ultimate effect being 
a larger government sector. Like Cameron {1978), Saunders and Klau (1985)  found  support 
for  this point of view.  However,  as follows  from  row  5 of table 6.2,  in  our regressions the 
coefficient of TRADE has the 'wrong' sign. The significance of LEFf is somewhat reduced. 
13  See Lybeck (1988) for a review of the state of the art. Lybeck describes twelve theories on 
the growth of government and attempts to clarify what support the various theories have 
received  from  recent studies.  Some variables which  have been found  in  this literature to 
add  explanatory power are not included  in  our regressions.  Although  it  is,  for  instance, 
found  that federal systems have lower spending levels we have not included a dummy  to 
capture this effect by lack of sufficient federal countries in our sample of countries. -46-
The second variable included is POP, the percentage of the population under 15 and aged 
65 and over. As explained by Lybeck (1988), this variable is often included to test the version 
of Wagner's  Law  which  rests  upon  the  transformation  of the  traditional  society  into  the 
industrialized  society.  Like  most  previous studies  (see  e.g.  Saunders  and  Klau  (1985)  and 
Solano (1983)), we find no support for this hypothesis (row 6 of table 6.2). 
The third variable is per capita income (PCY). The rationale for this variable folios from a 
second interpreation of Wagner's Law (see Lybeck (1988)) in which the public sector's share 
of total resources has risen, because many goods and services traditionally produced by  the 
government  have  a  high  income  elasticity  of demand,  so  that  higher  per capita  income 
implies more government. Like Saunders and Klau (1985),  but unlike Solano (1983), we find 
that  the  coefficient  of PCY is  not  significant  (row  7 of table  6.2).
14  The coefficients  and 
significance levels of the variables in our basic model hardly change. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The Maastricht  Treaty spells  out a  prohibition  on  excessive  deficits  based  on criteria  for 
public debt and deficit,  and details procedures and  penalties to  deal with  violations of this 
prohibition so as to induce EC Member States to pursue sustainable fiscal policies. All other 
things being equal, a violation of the criteria is  more likely to occur if the basic reason for 
missing sustainable fiscal policies is to be found in a weak political and institutional setting of 
fiscal  policy.  In recent theoretical and  empirical research political and institutional aspects, 
which  may  affect  the process  of policy  formation,  are scrutinised  to  explain  cross-country 
differences with  respect to fiScal  policies  pursued.  In  this  chapter we  have  built upon  this 
literature to  examine how  cross-country differences in  debt accumulation  and public sector 
size of Member States of the European Community during the 1980s· dn be explained. It is 
concluded  that  government  debt  growth  is  positively  correlated  with  the  frequency  of 
government changes. This implies that countries with  unstable governments may have more 
difficulties  to  satisfy  the  Maastricht  criteria  for  fiscal  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
introduction  of these budgetary criteria may  constitute  an  important  external  incentive  to 
14  Ram (1987)  has examined this version of Wagner's Law for a sample of 115 countries for 
the period 1960-80 and found that in  43  cases the share of government in GDP increases 
as  per capita  income  increases.  For the period  1950-80  24  out  of 63  countries  exhibit 
significantly  positive  relations.  This  result  is,  however,  compatible with  our conclusions, 
since the analysis of Ram is confined to a different sample period. -47-
policymakers concerned, which may compensate for the lack of internal political stability. We 
also  find  evidence that improved budgetary procedures may  strengthen attempts to pursue 
stable fiscal policies. A final conclusion is  that in countries having left-wing governments the 
share of government spending in total output generally tends to grow faster. -48-
Appendix to section 6 
This appendix provides detailed statistics underlying our estimates presented in sections 6.3 
and  6.4.  The source is:  Keesing Archives,  various years. The data on BUDGET are based 
upon Von Hagen {1992). See the main text for a further explanation. 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Belgiun  POL  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
CHANGE  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0 
LEFT  0.45  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.32  0.47 
BUDGET  21.53 
Dennark  POL  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
CHANGE  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0 
LEFT  1.00  0.67  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
BUDGET  48.73 
France  POL  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
CHANGE  2  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  0 
LEFT  0.59  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.25  0  0.67  1.00 
BUDGET  61.20 
Germany  POL  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
CHANGE  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0 
LEFT  0.76  0.57  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
BUDGET  53.60 
Greece  POL  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  3 
CHANGE  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2 
LEFT  0.17  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.61 
BUDGET  25.60 
Ireland  POL  3  3  1  1  1  1  3  3  1 
CHANGE  1  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
LEFT  0.13  0.04  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.02  0  0 
BUDGET  33.00 
Italy  POL  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
CHANGE  1  1  1  0  0  1  2  1  1 
LEFT  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.18  0.26  0.28 
BUDGET  30.66 
Luxembourg  POL  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
CHANGE  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
LEFT  0  0  0  0.15  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.45 
BUDGET  (15.00)  a) 
Netherlands  POL  1  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
CHANGE  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
LEFT  0.38  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.04 
BUDGET  53.66 
Portugal  POL  1  1  1  1  1  3  3  1  1 
CHANGE  2  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  0 
LEFT  0  0  0.26  0.53  0.35  0  0  0  0 
BUDGET  34.66 
Spain  POL  3  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
CHANGE  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
LEFT  0  0.17  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
BUDGET  28.80 
UK  POL  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
CHANGE  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0 
LEFT  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
BUDGET  59.40 
a)  The  low  value of  BUDGET  for  Luxembourg  is due  to partial  lack  of  information PART IV 
FIVE COUNTRY (CASE) STUDIES 
(5) -50-
7. Belgium 
7.1.  Introduction 
During the first half of the 1980s the Belgian economy was in serious trouble. Macroecono-
mic  performance  was  characterized  by  sluggish  real  growth  of national  income,  a  rising 
unemployment rate, high inflation, a substantial (although decreasing) current account deficit 
and a very high government deficit (see tables 7.1  and 7.2). This situation gradually improved 
in the second half of the 1980s when economic growth picked up,  to exceed the EC average 
both in 1988 and 1989. 
Unemployment peaked at 13.2 percent in both 1983 and 1984, to drop in later years to the 
still high  level of 8.7  percent in  1989.  Employment creation mainly resulted from  increased 
private sector  activity.  The labour force  grew  only  moderately as  a  result  of demographic 
developments and the introduction of early retirement schemes. However,  the sharp growth 
in  the  number  of  unfilled  vacancies  through  geographical  and  occupational  mismatches 
between  demand  and  supply,  and  the rising  share of long-term  unemployed  still  indicate 
major labour market imbalances. 
Inflation gradually decreased to 6 percent in the mid 1980s,  falling sharply in  1986 to less 
than  1 percent,  mainly  as  a  consequence of external factors  in  combination  with  a  strong 
exchange rate. By  the end of the 1980s the inflation rate accelerated somewhat, to stay well 
below  the  EC  average.  Inflation  picked  up  in  spite  of wage  restraint,  as  a  result  of  a 
substantial improvement of profit margins combined with external factors (dollar and energy 
prices), rising government prices and the introduction of higher excise duties. 
The interest rate remained high over the 1980s. The real interest mainly remained in  the 
5-7% range, substantially above the real GDP growth rate. 
Nominal unit labour costs fell sharply in  the beginning of the 1980s tb roughly stabilize in 
later years. 
The current account of the balance of payments has improved significantly  in  the  1980s. 
The high  deficits of around 4 percent of GDP in  1980-1982 turned into small deficits of less 
than  1 percent in  1983  and  1984,  following  the 1982  devaluation of the Belgian franc.  Ever 
since 1985 the current balance has been in surplus, averaging more than 1 percent of GDP in 
the  second  half  of the  1980s.  Initially,  this  turning  point  was  passed  because  of weak 
domestic demand, soon complemented and later on substituted by improving terms of trade 
and increased export market shares. -51-
The dependency ratio  (individuals aged  0-14  and 65+  divided  by  individuals aged  15-64) 
fell  in  the  1980s  by  about  three  percent  points.  At  the  same  time,  as  from  1983,  the 
participation  rate of men  dropped  by  four  points,  while  the  participation  rate of women 
increased by the same number. 
In  1991  the  economy  softened  appreciably,  in  line  with  the  experience  of most  other 
OECD countries. The GOP growth rate fell back to 1.5 percent, after an average growth of 
about 4 percent as from  1988. Domestic demand weakened and growing exports simply could 
not fully compensate for the  drop in domestic demand. As a result, unemployment rose (for 
the  first  time  since  1984)  and  the  general  government  deficit  increased  substantially, 
reversing a trend set after the mid  1980s.  Inflation declined further, helped by lower energy 
prices. The interest rate declined as a result of the apparently successful hard currency policy 
which reduced the interest rate differential with Germany. 
For  1992  and  1993  a  modest  recovery  is  expected,  with  economic  growth  possibly 
increasing  to  2.3  percent  in  1993,  depending  on  a  more  favorable  international  climate. 
Unemployment is  expected to stabilize at 9.7 percent and inflation is projected to decrease 
gradually to 3 percent in  1993.  The latest OECD projections (different from  the figures  in 
table 7.1) show a further reduction of the general government deficit from 6 percent of GOP 
in 1991 to 5.5 percent in  1992 and 5 percent in 1993.
1 
The  new  government  has  announced  a  package  of  corrective  measures  to  reduce 
government debt.  Effective measures are required in  the short run,  as the success of longer 
term plans  may  be in  doubt  given  elections  coming  up  in  1994.  The coalition  Agreement 
from  March  1992  makes  the  commitment  to  spread  the deficit  reducing  measures  evenly 
over the spending and the revenue side of the budget.  The socialist vice-president recently 
pleaded for a special temporal tax levy on income and profits. 
1  OECD Economic Outlook 51, June 1992, pp. 90  and 91.  According to the latest (October 
1992) forecasts the international economic recovery is more hesitant than expected, which 
will result in lower economic growth and higher deficits. -52-
Table 7.1  Main economic indicators, 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
GOP  growth  4.2  -0.9  1.5  0.4  2.0  0.8  1.6  2.3  4.9  3.8  3.7  1.5  1.6  2.3 
Unenf>l oyment  7.9  10.2  11.9  13.2  13.2  12.3  11.6  11.3  10.3  9.3  8.7  9.3  9.7  9.6 
Inflation  6.2  8.7  7.9  7.0  6.0  6.0  0.7  1.5  0.8  3.4  3.5  3.3  2.9  2.9 
Interest rate  12.2  13.8  13.4  11.8  12.0  10.6  7.9  7.8  7.9  8.7  10.1  9.3 
Nominal  unit  labour  costs•>  100  91.2  80.8  79.0  78.1  79.5  84.3  85.7  81.8  79.9  83.4  81.7 
Current  account  (X  GOP)  -4.3  -3.8  -3.7  -0.8  -0.6  0.3  2.1  1.4  1.5  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1 
Dependency  ratio  52.4  51.5  50.8  49.7  48.6  48.6  48.4  48.4  48.6  48.8  49.3 
Participation rate men  78.9  78.1  n.1  76.8  75.6  74.5  73.6  73.0  72.2  72.4  72.7 
Participation rate women  47.0  47.7  48.3  48.7  48.9  49.3  49.9  50.6  51.2  51.6  52.4 
o>  Relative to 19  industrial  countries,  double  export  weights  (USO  1980=100) 
Source: OECD and EC
2 
Table 7.2.  General government budget indicators, 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Current  receipts  43.9  44.7  46.5  45.8  47.1  47.3  46.6  46.9  45.8  44.5  44.7  44.5  44.3  44.1 
Total  expenditures  53.1  57.5  57.5  57.1  56.1  55.8  55.7  54.0  52.7  51.2  50.4  50.9  50.6  50.0 
Net  borrowing- -9.2  -12.8  -11.0  -11.3  ·9.0  -8.5  ·9.1  ·7  .1  -6.9  -6.7  ·5.7  ·6.4  -6.3  ·5.9 
Gross  public debt  n.3  89.7  97.4  107.3  112.6  119.8  124  131  132.4  128.4  127.3  129.4  129.6  128.9 
Source: EC
3 
2  GDP growth, unemployment and inflation data are taken from OECD, Economic Outlook 
51, June 1992, pp. 91,  175,  185 and 193; interest rate, labour costs and current account are 
from European Economy 50, December 1991, table 48, pp. 247, 256 and 260. 
3  Current receipts, total expenditures and net lending are derived from European Economy 
50,  December 1991,  pp.  264,  265,  and 266.  Gross debt is from  Tables on Public Finance, 
January 1992, table 21B. -53-
7.2 General outline of  economic policy in the 1980s 
Until  the  late  1970s,  economic  policy  was  more  aimed  at  limiting  the  damage  done  by 
various structural imbalances typical  of the Belgian  economy,  than at remedies to improve 
the functioning  of the Belgian  economy.  Imbalances were  mainly  attributed  to  insufficient 
demand,  instead  of to  excessive  wage  increases.  Government  sought  to  uphold  household 
incomes.  Relatively  generous social welfare  mechanisms were introduced,  and  many  public 
sector jobs created. A steep increase in income tax revenues and social security contributions 
could not prevent a rapid deterioration of the government deficit and debt position and had 
harmful consequences for business profitability. Moreover, the policy of maintaining a stable 
nominal exchange rate resulted in an increasing interest rate differential with third countries 
and  an  appreciable  increase  of the real  effective  exchange  rate.  This  in  turn  aggravated 
Belgium's competitiveness problems and further burdened the public sector budget. 
The policy response to the vicious circle of loss of competitiveness, rising unemployment 
and growing government deficits was  to devaluate the franc  (by  8.5  percent)  and to  freeze 
real wages.  As from  1984, priority has been given to fiSCal consolidation. A program adopted 
in  1984  provided for  the introduction of an  additional 2%  levy  on wages  and  transfers for 
each of the years 1984-1986. A new program in 1986 turned attention to the expenditure side 
of the budget and substantially reduced outlays.  At the same time incentives  for  part-time 
work were expanded and work-sharing was  organised  to alleviate the negative  employment 
effects of corrective measures taken.  This policy caused a steady decline  of the purchasing 
power of average wages (-10 percent) between 1981 and 1985. Wage restraint in combination 
with the deteriorated terms of trade made company profits pick up rapidly between 1981 and 
1986.  Companies gross operating surplus  in  1986 was  back at the level  before the first  oil 
shock. Since the investment ratio only improved slightly,  the private saving surplus widened 
to over 10 percent of GNP in 1986. As a result of the accompanying narrowing of the public 
sector deficit, the current account of the balance of payments sharply improved to show a big 
surplus in 1986 (2.1 percent of GDP). This surplus was more than offset by a sharp upturn in 
capital outflows, so that the public sector was obliged to continue borrowing abroad. 
The costs of adjustment policies pursued in  terms of economic output foregone  seem to 
have been relatively modest,  relative to the scale of the actions taken. The openness of the 
Belgian economy reduced negative multiplier effects of budgetary restraint. An  active labor 
market policy moderated unemployment effects (early retirement, labor cost  reduction and 
especially work-sharing agreements). -54-
Helped by high GDP growth in  1988 and 1989, the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio started 
to decline somewhat as from  1989. 
7.3 Detailed analysis of  government spending 
The share of public spending rose from 38  percent of GDP in  1970  to 57.5  percent in  1981 
and 1982. Then the relative spending level started to fall to stabilise slightly above 50 percent 
of GDP in  the early  1990s,  in  spite of steeply rising interest payments on government debt 
(table 7.5).  The volume  of government  investment  strongly contracted from  3.9  percent of 
GDP in  1980  to  1.6  percent in  1991  and the growth  of public consumption slowed sharply 
(table 7.5).  Real public sector wages declined and the growth of government employment was 
reduced substantially,  although  it  still  remained positive.  The share of government  employ-
ment in  total employment increased by  1 percent point over the 1980s.  The rise in relative 
government wages in 1980-1984 turned into a decline in the years 1985-1990 (table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 Employment in the public sector (x 1,000), 1980-1990 
1980 
1.  Government  employment  701 
2.  as X of  total  employment  18.9 
3.  Growth  of  government 
real  wages 
4.  Growth  of  relative 
government  wages 
•>  Average  for  the period 1980-1984. 
b>  Average  for  the period 1985-1990. 
Source: OECD
4 
1981 
707 
19.5 
1982  1983  1984  1985 
714  707  715  727 
19.9  19.9  20.2  20.4 
-o.2•> 
0.4•> 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
747  725  736  737  735 
20.8  20.1  20.2  19.9  19.5 
-0.1b) 
-o.~> 
4  Lines 1 and 2 are taken from OECD, 1\'ational Accounts 1977-1989, table 15, p. 346; lines 
3 and 4 from  Oxley and Martin (1991); line 5 from  OECD, Labour Force  Statistics 1968-
1988, Employment Outlook, July  1991  and  Quarterly Labour Force  Studies 1991-4;  lines 6 
and 7 from OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1991, p. 256. -55-
Table 7.4 General government spending(% GDP), 1980-1987 
OUtlays  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
1.  General  public services  2.80  2.99  3.02  2.79  1.77  1.73  1.63  1.57 
2. ·Defense  2.82  3.01  2.84  2.83  2.48  2.65  2.62  2.49 
3.  Public order and  safety  na  na  na  na  0.80  0.79  0.80  0.81 
4.  Education  7.49  7.91  7.64  7.31  6.n  6.64  6.60  6.26 
5.  Health  0.82  0.93  0.91  0.83  1.43  1.30  1.05  0.91 
6.  Social  security and  welfare  21.04  22.89  22.46  22.97  20.79  20.93  20.45  21.27 
7.  Housing  and  conm.  amenities  1.25  0.90  0.96  0.26  2.53  2.31  1.56  1.29 
8. Recreational,  cultural 
and  religious affairs  0.37  0.47  0.42  0.41  0.96  0.83  0.60  0.51 
9.  Economic  services  7.96  8.44  7.80  8.07  8.87  7.55  5.83  4.38 
10.0ther functions  5.31  7.49  8.81  10.12  11.61  11.70  12.17  11.62 
11. Total  outlays  49.87  55.02  54.85  55.60  54.94  54.05  53.30  51.12 
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991, p.  149 
Table 7.5  General government spending in Belgium, economic classification(% GDP) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Government  consumption  18.6  19.5  18.9  18.4  17.9  17.9  17.7  17.1  16.2  15.5  15.3  15.4  15.4 
compensation  of  employees 13.7  14.3  14.0  13.5  13.1  13.1  12.9  12.3  11.6  11.2  11.1  11.2  11.2 
Current  transfers  23.5  25.5  25.2  25.7  25.1  24.3  23.9  24.0  23.3  22.6  21.8  22.2  22.0 
transfers to households  21.3  23.1  22.9  23.3  22.8  22.3  21.9  21.9  21.0  20.3  20.0  20.2  20.1 
Interest payments  6.1  8.0  9.3  9.5  10.0  10.8  11.4  10.7  10.3  10.6  10.9  10.9  10.9 
Capital  transfers  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7 
Government  investment  3.9  3.8  3.5  3.0  2.6  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6 
Total  expenditure  53.1  57.5  57.5  57.1  56.1  55.8  55.7  54.0  52.7  51.2  50.4  50.9  50.6 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance -56-
Table 7.6  Detailed analysis of social welfare expenditure(% GDP), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Health  9.17  9.49  9.48  9.77  9.44  9.17  9.39  9.38  8.98  8.81 
1a  Sickness  5.79  6.02  5.98  6.12  5.91  5.69  5.99  6.12  5.83  5.85 
1b  Invalidity, disability  2.54  2.62  2.70  2.90  2.79  2.80  2.76  2.64  2.57  2.41 
1c  Occupational  accidents 
and  diseases  0.85  0.85  0.80  0.75  0.74  0.69  0.65  0.62  0.59  0.55 
2.  Pension schemes  11.02  11.89  12.02  12.12  12.11  11.62  11.95  11.73  11.43  10.92 
2a  Old  age  7.58  8.27  8.41  8.75  8.54  8.13  8.51  8.42  8.26  7.93 
2b  Survivors  3.44  3.62  3.60  3.37  3.57  3.49  3.44  3.32  3.17  2.99 
3. Maternity and  family  3.01  3.15  3.10  2.94  2.n  2.n  2.64  2.55  2.40  2.25 
3a  Maternity  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.13 
3b  Family  2.85  2.99  2.93  2.78  2.55  2.56  2.49  2.41  2.27  2.13 
4.  Uneq:>loyment  3.09  3.73  3.65  3.79  3.79  3.71  3.74  3.39  3.11  2.88 
4a  Placement,  vocational 
guidance,  resettlement  0.65  0.62  0.55  0.53  0.64  0.75  0.86  0.55  0.50  0.46 
4b  Uneq:>loyment  2.44  3.12  3.10  3.26  3.15  2.96  2.89  2.84  2.62  2.42 
5.  Housing 
and  miscellaneous  0.25  0.27  0.42  0.44  0.42  0.41  0.36  0.34  0.32  0.29 
Sa  Housing  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
5b  Miscellaneous  0.25  0.27  0.42  0.44  0.42  0.41  0.36  0.34  0.32  0.29 
6.  Total  26.54  28.53  28.67  29.35  28.47  27.96  28.08  27.40  26.25  25.15 
Source: EC, Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts 1980-1989, 1991 
Transfer  payments  showed  somewhat  less  flexibility.  Subsidies  to  business  declined  as  a 
percent of GDP only after 1986. Social security benefits fell  from over 29 percent of GDP in 
1983  to about 25  percent in  1989. All main spending items in  table 7.6,  which  breaks down 
social welfare expenditure, contracted in relative terms. Spending on health, pension schemes 
and unemployment went down by 1 percent point each.  · 
Per capita  purchasing  power  of retirement  and  survivors'  pensions  fell  more  than  per 
capita  real  wages  in  both  the  private  and  the  public  sector.  The  replacement  ratio  of 
unemployment  benefits  dropped  sharply.  Demographic  trends  led  to  reduced  outlays  for 
family  allowances.  From 1985-1987  the rise of the consumer price index stayed  behind the 
GDP deflator (relative price effect) causing an automatic reduction of spending ratios. 
The social security system, which is managed by the government and the social partners on a 
consultative  basis,  is  to  a  large  extent  responsible  for  Belgiums  public  debt  problem. 
Although  primarily  financed  by  contributions,  the  social  security  funds  received  large 
subsidies  from  central government, which  in tum financed  its  deficit  by  borrowing.  These 
subsidies  from  central government  rose from  3 percent of GDP in  1970  to  8.4  percent in 
1982  and  by  1989  still amounted to 4.7 percent of GDP.  At that time transfers constituted -57-
more than half of all  non-interest public spending. The Belgian government was  one of the 
few  to accommodate a strong growth of public transfers to households until the beginning of 
the 1980s. Ever since that time the growth of transfers in Belgium has been checked by  the 
growth  of employment,  and  by  policy  efforts  to  restrain  public  spending.  The growth  of 
benefits in general was curbed by three index skips between 1983 and 1987. 
Moreover,  statutory  unemployment  and  early-retirement  benefits  were  trimmed  at the 
beginning of the 1980s.  Benefits for  individuals living together were reduced and provisions 
and options regarding early retirement were tightened. 
Outlays related to old age pensions were succesfully restrained by several measures, which 
was one of the causes of the erosion of the purchasing power of pensions. 
Government  actions  to  restrain  the growth  of health care spending have  met with  less 
success,  although the introduction of the benefit principle (user fees)  probably has reduced 
the growth of some medical demand components, at least as far as demand can be determi-
ned by the consumer.  From 1982 on government also tried to curb the growth of health care 
supply.  The  number  of hospital  beds  in  the  1980s  annually  decreased  with  1.5  percent. 
However, the number of doctors per 1000 inhabitants increased with 3.6 percent a year,  and 
their absolute number  in  1989  was  relatively very  high  (Belgium  3.3;  the Netherlands 2.4; 
France 2.6 and Germany 3.0).5 
Interest payments increased from  6.1  percent of GDP in  1980  to  10.6  percent in 1989, 
about double the EC average. Accumulated interest payments of the 1980s  are responsible 
for more than half of the actual debt. Small wonder, that authorities try to reduce the debt-
to-GDP ratio.  Nevertheless,  it  is  evident that the current dual-target strategy  (explained in 
section  7.5)  - although  a  prerequisite for  fiscal  consolidation  - is  not sufficient  in itself to 
guarantee a substantial reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
6 
Gross fiXed capital formation has been severely cut in the 1980s, from 3.9 percent of GDP 
in 1980 to  1.6 percent in 1989. By now the public investment level is lower than in Germany 
(2.4)  and  the Netherlands  (2.3),  and  much  lower  than  in  France  (3.4)  where  the general 
government investment share was remarkably stable over the 1980s. 
5  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 79. 
6  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 89. -58-
7. 4 Detailed analysis of  government revenues 
Table 7.7  shows  that the share of public  receipts in  GOP increased from  43.5  percent  of 
GOP in  1980  to 47.6  percent in  1985,  somewhat declining to 44.3  percent in  1989.  The 4.1 
percent point rise in the first half of the 1980s, was mostly (for 2.5 percent points) explained 
by higher social security contributions. The remainder of the revenue increase stemmed from 
taxes on corporate profits and taxes on income of individuals. 
The total tax take out of GOP (44.3 percent) in 1989 was almost one point above the EC 
average. In 1990  total current receipts in Belgium came to 44.7 percent of GOP (table 7.2), 
whereas the EUR12 average then stood at 43.3 percent of GOP. 
The composition  of the Belgian tax  mix  (in  1989)  deviates from  the EC average in two 
respects.  Social  security  contributions  (15.1  against  11.3  percent)  and  taxes  on  income  of 
individuals {13.6 against 10.4 percent) are much higher than the EC average.  Revenues from 
taxes  on  goods  and  services  and  on  property  remain  somewhat  below  the  European 
'standard'. 
The withholding tax  on  income from  savings was raised  to 25%  in  1984.  In March  1990 
the withholding tax on interest (not on dividends) charged on new issues of financial  assets 
(bonds  and  certificates  of deposit)  and  on  bank  deposits  was  lowered  to  10%  to  make 
Belgian-franc investments more attractive (particularly for residents). 
Taxes on corporate profits bring in  3.0  percent of GDP, which  corresponds with  the EC 
average. The statutory rate of the corporation income tax is 39% {1991).  This is well below 
the German level  (58.5%  for  retained profits and 36.5%  on distributed profits)  but  higher 
than the French (34% for retained profits and 42% for distributed profits) and the Dutch tax 
rate (35%) for corporations. However, it should be noted that the effective tax rate is most 
probably much lower, due to  avoidance possibilities and a badly functioning tax administra-
tion.7 Much base erosion is explained by exemptions and deductions  ~traduced in the 1980s, 
primarily  to  promote employment  creation,  investment  and  regional  development,  and  to 
alleviate double  taxation.
8  There is  evidence that - taking tax allowances into account  - the 
tax treatment of the corporate sector in  Belgium in  1983 was  by  far the most favourable in 
7  OECD Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 65. 
8  OECO, Economic Surveys,  1991, pp. 66 - 70. -59-
the OECD area.
9 The December 1988 tax reform included some base-broadening measures. 
Taxes on goods and services, expressed as a percent of GDP, are 1.3 percent points below 
the EC average. This can be attributed to low excise duties which  (in 1989) were 1.6 points 
below  the average  EC level.  It is  striking,  that  the  relative  share  of taxes  on goods  and 
services  has  not  been  enlarged  during  the  1980s.  Probably  government  was  afraid  to 
stimulate inflation,  which  is  quite obvious  in  a  system  with  complete indexation  of wages, 
salaries and transfers. The standard ·vAT rate of 17/19% is close to  the French and Dutch 
level but 3-5 points above the German rate and even 5-7  points above the standard rate in 
Luxembourg.  Excise  duties  are  rather  different  from  those  in  neighbouring  countries. 
Luxembourg has substantially lower rates on  alcoho~ wine and fuel.  The December 1988 tax 
reform  included  increases in  excise  duties  (and induced  VAT increases)  in  anticipation  of 
EC tax harmonisation. 
Taxes bearing on the use of labor are high (in terms of GDP ratio) when compared to the 
EC  average,  especially  social  security  contributions  of employers.  But  in  comparison  to 
France and the Netherlands these taxes  are still  about four  percent points lower  and  only 
slightly higher than German rates. 
Taxes  on  income of individuals in  1989  (GDP ratio)  ranked three percent points above 
the  EC average,  and  these  taxes  also  account  for  a  greater  share  than  in  neighbouring 
countries (Germany 11.2, the Netherlands 9.7 and France 5.2 percent of GDP). 
The top rate of 59.9% (55% plus 4.9%, at most, in local income tax) is not much different 
from  that  in  neighbouring  countries,  but  the  effective  average  burden  - measured  as  a 
percent of taxable income - is  extremely high  (32  percent). This high  average burden partly 
results from the absence of any automatic inflation adjustment mechanism of tax brackets in 
the first  half of the 1980s.  Tax burdens as  a percent of income are less  extreme,  due to a 
myriad  of artfully  exploited  tax  expenditures  and  an  inadequate  tax  administration.  The 
Belgian  tax  syste:m  is  very  complex.  The tax  reform legislated  in  Deiember  1988  granted 
large  income  tax  reductions  covering  a  wide  range  of changes  (including  an  extension  of 
indexation) and a reduction in both the number of tax brackets (from thirteen to seven) and 
of marginal tax rates. The lowering of marginal tax rates (the top rate was lowered from 72% 
to 55%) and a revised tax treatment of couples were meant to positively affect work incenti-
ves.  At the same time additional revenue was  raised by a variety of base-broadening moves 
(including the corporate income tax and some increases in  excise  duties),  in  order to make 
the tax reform neutral in revenue terms. 
9  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1988, p. 22. -60-
Property taxes are fairly modest compared to the situation in other Member States. 
Table 7.7 Breakdown of taxes according to the degree of mobility of the tax base(% of GDP) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Taxes  on  corporate profits  2.5  2.3  2.7  2.6  2.8  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.0 
2.  Taxes  on  goods  and  services  11.4  11.7  11.8  11.9  11.6  11.7  11.4  11.8  11.6  11.3 
2.1  VAT  7.3  7.7  7.5  7.5  7.4  7.5  7.2  7.4  7.4  7.2 
2.2 Excise duties  3.4  3.3  3.6  3.6  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.3  3.2 
2.3 Other  taxes  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
3.  Taxes  bearing on  use of  labour  13.2  13.5  13.6  14.1  14.9  15.7  15.9  16.0  15.5  15.1 
3.1  Soc.  sec. contr.  employees  3.8  4.1  4.6  5.0  5.2  5.2  5.3  5.2  4.9  4.7 
3.2 Soc.  sec.  contr.  employers  8.4  8.3  7.7  8.0  8.5  9.2  9.4  9.6  9.4  9.3 
3.3 Soc.  sec.  contr.  self-empl.  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1 
3.4 Other  taxes  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4.  Taxes  on  income  of  individuals  15.3  15.4  16.4  15.7  16.0  16.2  15.8  15.4  14.7  13.6 
5.  Taxes  on  property  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2 
6.  Miscellaneous  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
7.  Total  tax  revenue  43.5  43.9  45.4  45.3  46.3  47.6  47.1  47.2  46.1  44.3 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1990, Paris 1991 
Z5 Budgetary process 
Or&anisation 
Belgium  is  a  unitary  state.  At  the  central  (state)  level  the  nation  comprises  of  three 
Communities  (Francophone, Flemish  and  Germanophone)  and  Regions  (Flemish,  Walloon 
and  Brussels).  Provinces  and  municipalities  constitute  the  lower  ·levels  of  government, 
together with  the social  security  organisations.  Parliament  has  two  Chambers.  Every  four 
years  direct  parliamentary  elections  are held.  Usually,  coalition  governments  are formed, 
which  operate on the basis of a coalition Agreement including detailed budgetary guidelines 
relating to the budget deficit,  the tax burden and public debt. Both the minister of Finance 
(entrusted with  financial  and  tax  policy)  and  the minister  of the Budget  (accountable  for 
expenditure policies) are involved in budgetary matters. 
Central government has, as from  1980, transferred many of its tasks and responsibilities to 
Communities and Regions in order to transform Belgium into a more federal type of state. -61-
Total  expenditures  involved,  represent  over  30  percent  of  the  Treasury's  1989  budget. 
Following  these  reforms  (in  1989)  the  financing  of Communities  and  Regions  has  been 
fundamentally  restructured.
10  Although  this  federalisation  process  probably  has  many 
budgetary implications, it is difficult to assess its exact impacts.  The newly created financial 
relationships are very complex because of the multiplicity of authorities (the three Regions 
and  three linguistic  Communities  do  not  have  the  same  geographic  boundaries).  Central 
government transfers to local entities are adding to the inflexibility of the central government 
budget. Moreover, the new financing system puts no limits to local deficits. Fortunately, the 
resource transfers involved are calculated on a relatively restrictive basis (during a transition 
period  transfers  are kept  constant  in  real  terms)  and  it  can  be hoped that broader local 
responsibilities  resulting  from  the  federalisation  will  lead  to  greater  economic  efficiency. 
Nevertheless, there is  a real danger that the regional devolution in  Belgium will slow  down 
the process of budgetary consolidation. 
Social security contributions and rates of benefits are determined by central government. 
Budgetaty rules and procedures 
In 1988 a 'dual target' (national government; excluding social security and local government) 
budget strategy was formulated for  1990  and beyond. The strategy included to have no real 
non-interest expenditure increase and no increase in the nominal deficit. 
Although their introduction has been planned, Belgium as yet has no multi-annual budget 
plans or projections. There are no reserve funds;  special funds are almost all included in  the 
budget.  No  specific policy  exists in case of expenditure overruns, except that supplementary 
budget  laws  are  required.  The  minister  of Finance  monitors  the  implementation  of the 
budget.  Regions and Communities are allowed  to borrow on  domestic financial  markets in 
Belgian Francs. Regional and local government have a 55  percent share in total government 
spending (excluding interest payments). 
In  1990  several  budgetary  reforms  have  been  announced.
11  Zero  base  budgetting  is 
introduced on a broader scale in order to increase downward  pressure on spending, a large 
number of off-budget accounts is  to be eliminated,  and public services will  be screened for 
efficiency. 
10  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1989, pp. 63-64. 
11  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 51. -62-
Z  6 Flexibility of  fzscal policy 
Policies pursued in the recent past have resulted in remarkable budgetary adjustments. Table 
7.1  illustrated  that the deficit  has  been reduced from  12.8  percent of GOP in  1981  to  6.7 
percent in  1989. But this is  only part of the story, because the deficit reduction was realised 
in  a period with fastly  rising interest payments.  In the period under review the interest-to-
GOP ratio  increased  by  2.6  percent points.
12  So  the reduction  of the primary  deficit  over 
that period has even been about 9 percent, which is equivalent to trimming public outlays by 
1 percent point a year. In practice - taking political, technical and other relevant factors into 
account and compared with  other countries - this appears to be the highest feasible figure, 
especially when extended over such a prolonged period. Of course, the realization of deficit 
targets in 1988 and 1989 was helped by unexpectedly high GOP growth rather than by strict 
consolidation efforts. On a cyclically-adjusted basis,  the deficit reduction has been somewhat 
less impressive and further moves to reduce the deficit in the next few years (with substanti-
ally  reduced  GDP growth) will  be very  difficult  to achieve  indeed.  Moreover,  many of the 
recently attained budget cuts had a one-off character (revenue anticipations, spending delays, 
and  sale  of assets
13
)  not  entailing  any  fundamental  consoli~ation,  thus  hampering  future 
consolidation  efforts  ('backlash'  effect).  Finally,  it  might  be  noted  that  the  elasticity  of 
revenues with respect to GOP has fallen in recent years. 
This section lists factors influencing the flexibility  of revenue and spending items by  main 
category. The results are summarized in tables 7.8 and 7.9 respectively. 
Scope to increase tax revenues 
Generally speaking,  in  the Belgian case it  is  difficult  to  find  much  opportunity to  raise tax 
rates, consistent with  EC harmonisation, which  does not seriously endanger competitiveness 
and which will also substantially increase revenue. Nevertheless there are some suggestions. 
Taxes  on  portfolio  income  of individuals  have  recently  (March  1990)  been  reduced  to 
make  savings  denominated  in  Belgian  francs  more  attractive.  Although  no  EC directives 
could  be agreed  upon  in  this  area,  increased  tax  competition  may  eventually  lead  to  a 
12  The Belgian  case has  clearly  demonstrated  the  'snowball  effect'  caused  by  the internal 
dynamics  of interest accumulation. If the primary balance is  negative,  the public debt-to-
GOP ratio will keep rising if the average interest rate exceeds GDP growth. 
13  Note  that  such  measures  do  not  affect  the  deficit  according  to  the Maastricht  Treaty, 
which is not on a cash basis and which excludes the proceeds from asset sales. -63-
complete abolition of withholding taxes on income from savings. For the time being, Belgium 
should not consider to further take the lead in this area. 
Broadening the corporate income tax  base,  reducing  high  marginal rates and closing of 
loopholes  will  probably  have  beneficial  revenue  effects,  since  the corporate  tax  system  is 
plagued  by  substantial tax  evasion.  Even with  some increase in effective tax  rates,  the tax 
treatment of the corporate sector in Belgium will remain relatively favourable. 
Harmonisation of the value added tax  has  required  elimination of both top  rates (25% 
and  33.3%  respectively)  which  in  revenue  terms  implies  a  budgetary  loss  equal  to  0.25 
percent of GDP. As the standard rate (19%) is rather high compared with rates in neighbou-
ring countries (especially Luxembourg), there is no case to increase rates here. On the other 
hand,  the continuing need  to consolidate  the budget  makes  a  VAT  rate reduction  hardly 
feasible. 
Although  recent  reforms  have  narrowed  the  gap,  Belgium  has  low  excise-tax  rates 
measured by EC standards. EC harmonisation will imply increases in rates on some mineral 
oil products and beer, but will  also lead to cuts in rates on other alcoholic beverages.  Full 
harmonisation of indirect taxes will  also swell  revenue by  the amounts that are now lost  to 
Luxembourg, due to the latter country's low rates. 
The  room  of manoeuvre  to  change  the level  and  rates  of social  security  contributions 
greatly  depends  on  successes  achieved  in  curbing  social  security  spending.  Since  social 
partners and the government  have agreed to  freeze  the central government subsidy  to  the 
employees' social security system in nominal terms until the end of 1995,  higher contributi-
ons  are  to  be  expected.  The  relatively  high  tax  wedge  for  private  sector  workers  is  an 
argument against  any  increase in contributions,  and  forms  an  additional argument to  scale 
down benefit levels. 
As  is  the case with  the corporate  income  tax,  increased  personal  income  tax  revenues 
could be attained by  tax  reform aimed at broadening the tax  base, combined with reducing 
marginal rates, and closing of loopholes. 
Taxes  on property may  offer a  final  option to increase  revenue.  Such  taxes  have  some 
advantages in an environment which is more and more prone to tax competition. 
It is  not clear, if there is  much room for privatisation which  could lead to one-off increases 
in  non-tax  revenue.  Application of the benefit  principle can  also  produce some  additional 
revenue. -64-
Scope to reduce expenditure 
As  it  seems  difficult  to  increase  tax  revenues  sufficiently  for  a  successful  continuation  of 
present and past consolidation efforts, in the Belgian case substantial expenditure reductions 
must be considered to be the only way  to further redress unbalanced public finances.  Since 
investment spending has already been cut drastically, the burden will  have to fall on current 
outlays,  especially transfers (social security,  subsidies to business). Although there may also 
be some options to reduce government employment (especially at the Ministry of Defence), 
which could reduce salary payments, it may also be necessary to offer better pay at least to 
part of the civil service in order to attract better qualified civil servants. 
In  Belgium  the costs  of tax  collection  as  a  percent of tax  receipts  are very  high  when 
compared to the situation in other countries. Especially the complexity and lack of transpa-
rancy of corporate and individual  income taxation  may explain  present high  administrative 
costs.  Tax  reform may  thus induce some reduction of outlays in  the field  of general public 
services. 
Defense spending is not higher than is the case in other countries. Reductions in line with 
recent international trends seem to be feasible. 
Although  the  pressure  on  education  expenditure  will  subside  somewhat  as  a  result  of 
demographic developments, no substantial gains are to be expected here. 
Demand  and  supply  of  health  care  could  be  made  more  sensitive  to  the  financial 
implications  of health-care  consumption.  Introduction  of financial  incentives  to  consumers 
could reduce demand. Supply could be regulated by extending the system of block appropria-
tions and by limiting the number of doctors and hospital beds. 
Demographic  trends  and  equity  arguments  restrict  the  scope  to  limit  the  growth  of 
pension  benefits. Ageing is  expected  to  induce a  1 percent annual increase of retirement-
pensions in real terms. But there are several other factors that will boost (unfunded) pension 
payments such  as the maturation of pension  schemes,  drift  related  to~the trend growth  in 
real incomes and an increase in  the number of female  individuals qualifying for a pension. 
Furthermore, much depends on the real increase in pensions per capita that will be granted. 
Savings could be realised by increasing the number of years that are required for women in 
order to  qualify for full  pension from  40  to 45,  i.e.  the same number as for  men.  It will be 
much  easier  to  realize  savings  by  cutting  unemployment  insurance  and  early  retirement 
schemes. Various income-maintenance schemes for  unemployed were set up  to limit labour 
supply,  and benefits have increasingly come to be disbursed regardless of the availability of 
unemployed for the labor market. In 1989 nearly a quarter of all recipients of unemployment (6) 
-65-
benefits  withdrew  from  the  labour  market  in  return  for  a  benefit.  It  may  be  useful  to 
consider  a  reorientation  of these  programs  in  order  to  encourage  beneficiaries  to  make 
themselves  available  to  the  labour  market  again.  A  further  reason  for  winding  down 
programmes which aim to reduce labour supply, is the expected shrinking of the labour force 
in the medium  and  long term  due to  demographic change.  In  1987  participation  rates  in 
Belgium were much lower  than in its main partner countries.
13  It would  thus be wise  policy 
to eliminate early retirement incentives. 
Government aid to the private sector (3.2 percent of GDP) is about one point above the 
EC average. This is  mainly due to significant subsidies to retirement and medical insurance 
programmes in the railroad and coal-mining sectors. The closing of the last two  coal mines, 
scheduled to take place in 1992, will reduce outlays. 
Since  the volume  of government  debt is  given  in the short  run,  total  interest payments 
depend  on  the interest rate actually  paid  on  that debt.  Interest payments  are volatile  and 
thus a risk to the budget since about a quarter of total debt has a maturity of less than one 
year.  Moreover,  about  one fifth  of the debt is  in  foreign  currency which  makes for  strong 
dependency on international interest rate movements. Fortunately, the hard currency option 
of monetary authorities together with  increased credibility of consolidation efforts have led 
to a  narrowing of the interest rate differential with  Germany, which  - other things  equal -
reduces the overall interest bill for the government. The reduction of the withholding tax  on 
interest  income  from  savings  denominated  in  Belgians  francs  positively  affected  capital 
market supply  and  hence  also  contributed  to  lower  interest  rates.  Reforms  of the  money 
market which have been in progress since 1989,  by creating greater competition, can lead to 
lower interest rates on Treasury certificates. 
On the other hand the possible regionalisation of the Belgian debt burden resulting from 
further federalisation  might push  up  interest rates,  because of the lower  rating of regional 
debt on international capital markets. 
13  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 84. T
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8. Denmark 
8.1 Introduction 
In the early 1980s  Denmark witnessed a steep climb of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
From almost 40 percent of GDP in  1980 government debt rose to a top of almost 80 percent 
in  1984,  to  decline  to  66.7  percent of GDP in  1991.  In  tandem,  the share of government 
spending in GDP increased to peak in  1983  (table 8.2). This development initially implied a 
continuation  of  trends  from  the  1970s.  Looking  back  upon  that  decade,  virtually  all 
components of public spending expanded.  Transfer payments  showed  the strongest  growth 
(from 14.9 percent of GDP in  1970 to 22.6  percent in  1980).  Public sector employment also 
increased rapidly. From 1967,  when the first  labour market survey was  undertaken, to  1979 
public sector employment doubled,  increasing its share in the total labour force from  16  to 
27 percent. In fact,  public employment grew by 30.000-35.000  persons annually. The number 
of pension recipients and unemployed also  increased sharply.  Moreover, legislation ensured 
that real incomes of transfer recipients stayed in line with those of wage earners. In addition 
to indexation - where only pensioners received full compensation - living standards of benefit 
recipients have been protected by clauses linking certain transfers directly to trends in wages. 
The replacement ratio of an  unemployed  relative to  that of an  industrial worker increased 
from  40  in  1960  to  66  in  1980.  Similar  schemes  existed  for  public  sector  employees,  but 
despite the link of public wages  to average wage drift,  public sector wages did  not keep up 
with private sector wages late in  the 1970s. During 1975-80 real disposable income of public 
employees decreased on average by  3.3  percent; on  the other hand wage  earners saw  their 
income during this period increase by 5.0 percent. 
8.2 General outline of  economic policy in the 1980s 
The most important factor behind the rapidly deteriorating situation of the public finances in 
Denmark at the beginning  of the  1980s  was  the second  oil  shock,  which  caused  a  severe 
downturn in  1980/81 with rapidly rising unemployment and inflation rates (table 8.1). Due to 
its strong dependence on imported energy, Denmark was relatively more affected by the rise 
in  oil prices than the average EC country. It was  against the background of persistent large -69-
current  external  deficits,  causing  a  high  level  of  external  debt,  in  combination  with  a 
relatively  narrow  industrial base  (due to  the decline  of gross  investment),  a  rapidly  rising 
government deficit and a rather rigid institutional setting
14  that the government taking office 
in September 1982 proposed a new medium-term stabilization programme. The new strategy 
consisted of the following elements: 
1.  income policy aiming at improved competitiveness through wage guidelines; 
2.  tight fiscal policy (expenditure cuts and revenue raising measures); 
3.  stabilising the exchange rate and liberalisation of capital controls; 
4.  flexible monetary policy aimed at narrowing interest differentials; 
5.  structural policies  directed at reducing rigidities  in  the economy and promoting savings 
and technological innovation. 
Table 8.1  Main economic indicators, 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
GOP  growth  -0.4  -0.9  3.0  2.5  4.4  4.3  3.6  0.3  0.5  1.2  2.1  2.0  2.5  3.1 
Uneq>l oyment  7.0  9.2  9.8  10.4  10.1  9.0  7.8  7.8  8.5  9.2  9.5  10.3  10.2  9.6 
Inflation  10.7  12.0  10.3  6.7  6.4  4.3  2.9  4.6  4.9  5.1  2.5  2.7  2.7  2.8 
Interest rate  14.1  11.6  10.5  11.9  10.6  10.2  11.0  10.1 
Nominal  unit  labour 
costs (1980=100)  100  91.2  80.8  79.0  78.1  79.5  84.3  85.4  81.8  79.9  83.4  81.7 
Current  account  <X  of  GOP)  -3.7  -3.2  -4.0  ·2.1  ·3.0  -4.6  -5.4  -2.9  -1.1  -0.8  1.2 
Dependency  ratio  35.3  34.8  34.4  34.0  33.7  33.5  33.4  33.1  32.9  32.8 
Participation rate: 
- men  89.0  88.3  88.0  87.6  86.7  87.4  88.4  88.2  89.8  89.5  89.6 
- women  71.4  71.8  72.6  74.2  73.8  74.5  76.5  76.8  77.6  77.3  78.4 
Source: OECD 
14  Wage increases had been running at two-digit figures  throughout the 1970s, influenced by 
the indexation system and labour market rigidities like high minimum wages, resistance to 
tax increases, and high unemployment benefits. -70-
This is not to say that previous governments had not tried to improve the external and fiscal 
outlook  of the  Danish  economy.  For  a  long  time,  economic  policy  has  been  aimed  at 
restoring  external  and  internal  balances.  Measures  taken  included  a  devaluation  of the 
Kroner in September 1979,  and a further unilateral devaluation in November of that same 
year. In December 1979 parliament agreed on a modification of the wage indexation scheme, 
in  that the  direct  energy components were removed  from  the wage-regulating price-index. 
Further measures of this package included freezing most  prices and rents,  a hike of direct 
personal taxes, and an increase in the tax rate on corporate profits from 37% to 40%. 
In May 1980  parliament enacted another economic package, which included, inter alia,  a 
rise of the general VAT-rate from  20~%  to 22%,  a direct-tax hike of Kr.  1 billion,  a Kr.  1 
billion increase in various excise taxes and a Kr.  8 billion (  41h  percent) cut in public outlays 
(especially  government  investment  dropped  in  1980/81).  The  May  1981  economic  policy 
package included:  a continuation of employment creation programmes in  1982-83,  new job 
creation plans  and  a  further  Kr.  2  billion  increase  in  excise  taxes  in  1982.  Despite these 
measures, the deficit ballooned due to strong automatic stabilizers on both the expenditure 
(unemployment benefits) and the revenue side of the budget.  However,  a large part of the 
--oeficit  was  of a  non-cyclical  nature due to  the  rapid growth  of public employment
15  (table 
8.3  and  figure  8.1 ),  the fact  that budgetary  outlays  were  more  affected  by  inflation  than 
public sector receipts, the large debt servicing burden, and the generosity of social schemes. 
The deterioration of the public sector's financial  balance can primarily be attributed to  an 
increase  in  the  central  government  deficit.  Until  1982  local  government  ran  only  small 
deficits and the social security funds even mounted surplusses. 
15  Labour  supply  increased  very  rapidly  in  Denmark  due  to  demographic factors  and  an 
increasing participation rate of women. The participation rate of the population aged  15-
64 is among the highest in the Community (table 8.1). The increase in female employment 
at the beginning of the 1980s can primarily be attributed to the public sector. The rising 
tax  burden  and  the  increased  risk  of  unemployment  may  have  reinforced  the  trend 
towards two bread-winners per familiy (OECD, Economic Surveys, 1982, p. 27). -71-
Table 8.2 General government budget(% GDP), 1980-1991 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Current  receipts  52.9  52.9  52.0  54.4  56.2  57.3  59.1  59.7  59.5  58.2  56.1  55.9 
Total  expenditure  56.2  59.8  61.2  61.6  60.3  59.3  55.7  57.3  59.0  58.7  57.6  57.5 
Net  borrowing  -3.3  -6.9  -9.1  -7.2  -4.1  -2.0  3.4  2.4  0.5  -0.5  -1.5  -1.7 
Gross  public debt  39.9  53.3  68.1  75.5  79.8  76.8  69.0  65.8  66.1  65.6  66.4  66.7 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
The  mix  of measures  taken  by  the  Government  which  took  office  in  September  1982 
included: suspension of indexation until 1985,  a maximum  of four percent for pay increases 
in  the  public  sector,  abolishment  of linking  public  wages  and  benefits  to  market  wages, 
freezing of the maximum amount of unemployment and sickness benefits, introduction of a 
tax on wealth of pension schemes
16 and higher social security contributions. 
Table 8.3 Employment in the public sector, 1980-1990 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Government  employment  (* 1000)  691  719  746  753  747  752  758  763  770  776 
2.  As  X of  total  employment  28.3  29.8  30.8  31.0  30.2  29.7  29.2  29.1  29.4  30.2 
3. Growth  of  government  real  wages  -6.4  -2.5  0.5  -2.0  -2.2  0.5  •> 
4.  Relative growth  of government  wages  -1.7  -1.8  1.2  0.8  0.7  -0.8 •> 
•>  Average  for  the peri•xl 1985-1990. 
Source: OECD 
16  In 1984 replaced by taxing the yield of pension funds, exceeding 3.5 percent in real terms. 
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Figure 8.1 Cyclically adjusted primary balance(% GDP), 1980-1992 
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Through  credibility  and  wealth  effects  the  new  policy  has  no  doubt  contributed  to  the 
economic recovery in subsequent years.
17  Price and wage inflation dropped sharply. Also the 
interest rate fell  considerably in  1983, due to lower international interest rates, less exchange 
rate  uncertainty,  reduced  inflationary  expectations  and  the  improvement  of the  current 
account. As a consequence of better export performance and higher private consumption and 
residential construction,  reflecting increased consumer confidence, output growth picked  up 
(table 8.1 ). The growth process took on a self-sustaining character early during the recovery. 
The  situation  of the public  finances  improved  remarkably  fast.  The annual  growth  of 
nominal  government  expenditure  slowed  down  to  5.5  percent  in  the period  1983-86.  The 
share of total government expenditure in GDP declined by 6.1  percent points in these years. 
The brunt of the adjustment on the expenditure side has fallen on government consumption 
and  on  public  investment.  Section  8.3  presents  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  trends  in 
government spending.  The main  contribution to the improved  budgetary outlook,  however, 
17  The credibility of the new hard currency regime was evident in falling interest differentials 
vis·a-vis the Dmark. Lower interest rates reinforced optimistic expectations on the part of 
investors and consumers. See: EC, Country study on Denmark, 1991, for further details. 
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came from  the  revenue side of the budget,  following  a  strong growth  of the  tax  base and 
swollen tax rates. Section 8.4 presents a more detailed analysis of government revenues. 
A major deficiency of the economic recovery was,  however, the failure of the current account 
deficit  to  fall  as  envisaged  by  the  1982  recovery  programme  (table  8.1).  After  some 
improvement in  1983  the current account  performed  poorly in  1984-86,  reaching a  record 
deficit of over 5 percent of GDP. In part this development reflected the success of policies 
pursued:  imports increased due to higher private investment and consumption.  However,  it 
also  demonstrated  inherent structural weaknesses  of the Danish  economy,  i.e.  a  relatively 
small size  of the tradeable goods sector,  and a low  and falling  national savings  ratio.  Over 
the period 1980-84 Denmark has been exporting to slowly growing markets both in terms of 
country destination and in terms of products. At the end of 1985 it became clear that, due to 
high  capacity-utilisation  rates  and  bottlenecks  at  the  labour  market,  the  room  for  an 
additional export drive was limited and that the brunt of external adjustment would have to 
be borne by domestic demand. 
In view  of the poor performance of the current account  the authorities,  therefore,  took 
additional restrictive measures. Public investment programmes were cut back further so as to 
relieve pressure on the building sector. In March 1986 energy taxes and some other indirect 
taxes were raised. The full-year revenue effect of the package was estimated at Kr.  10 billion. 
In May  an  agreement was  reached with  local  governments to freeze the level  of their real 
current spending in  1987/88  at the average level  of the two  preceeding years.  In  October 
1986 the so called 'Potato diet' was introduced, designed to reduce private consumption. The 
measures  included,  inter alia,  higher  indirect  taxes  (increase  of energy  taxes
18  and  higher  1 
stamp duties) and a 20% tax on interest expenses for consumer loans (with the exception of  / 
loans related to housing, business and education). These measures were important as Danish 
tax  rules  strongly  favoured  credit-financed  consumption.
19  At  the:- end  of  1986  the 
government  policy  brought  the expansion  of domestic  demand  to  a  halt  and  imports  fell 
accordingly. 
A  comprehensive  tax  reform  was  introduced  early  in  1987.  Its  aim  was  to  reduce 
inconsistencies  in  the  tax  system  and  to  encourage  private  savings.  The  reform  also 
18  The  increase  in  energy  taxes  prevented  lower  oil  prices  to  reach  Danish  consumers. 
However, higher energy taxes also contributed to push up consumer prices (table 8.1). 
19  Interest on  loans  for  business  purposes,  home purchases  (both  principal and secondary 
residence) and for consumption and other purposes are fully deductable. 
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broadened the tax base. 
The  deceleration  of demand  through  fiscal  measures  came  too  late  to  prevent  labour 
market pressures from  spilling over into wage rises,  which  together with an appreciation of 
the effective  exchange  rate reduced  international competitiveness of the Danish  economy. 
The  current  account  of the  balance  of payments  improved  considerably  due  to  stagnant 
economic  growth.  The  export  performance  was,  however,  much  worse  than  originally 
projected in the 1982 medium-term scenarios. 
The restrictive fiscal  stance was continued in  1987.  However,  spending increased due to 
higher  child  benefits,  high  pay  increases  of  civil  servants  (seven  percent)  and  local 
governments breaking through their expenditure ceilings, while shortening of working hours 
translated into a rise in personnel (table 8.3).  Public investment also expanded due to,  inter 
alia, higher spending on environmental protection. 
In  1988  economic  growth  picked  up,  led  by  growing  exports.  The  current  account 
improved  substantially:  in  1990  it  showed  a  surplus  for  the  first  time  since  1963.  The 
government has stated that the recent swing into current-account surplus does not warrant an 
easing of policies and that it will aim at keeping the current account in surplus.  There is a 
good economic reason for this:  as a result of past external deficits, Denmark's foreign  debt 
level is one of the highest in the OECD area. 
By  1988  the  government  surplus  shrank  and  in  1989  it  turned  into  a  deficit  due  to 
automatic stabilizers  and  expansionary  public policies  (higher  income  transfers,  reform  of 
educational grants and a change in the system of social security contributions). In the budget 
for 1989 is was  agreed that wealth taxation would be reduced by stepwise bringing down  the 
rate from  2.2%  to  1.5%  in  1989,  to  1.2%  in  1990  and to  1%  in  1991.  In  1990  the tax  on 
consumer interest payments was abolished. The corporate income tax rate has been reduced 
from 50% to 40% and in  1991 to 38%. 
Although  the  1990  Budget  aimed  at  a  lower  deficit,  it  turned  ..()ut  that  the  central 
government  deficit  increased  in 1990,  since  revenues  fell  well  short  of expectations.  This 
deterioration was not offset in other areas of the general government budget and was largely 
caused by non-cyclical factors. The 1991 Fiscal Budget included the following measures: 
- reduction of excise taxes; 
- increased benefits to families with children; 
- more financial assistance for housing in the private sector; 
- higher taxes on tobacco; 
- reduced outlays for benefits to jobless persons in the frrst week of unemployment; -75-
- reduction of State employment by 6300 labour years, of which 4100 were to go  as a result 
of privatisation; 
- reduction of State subsidisation of employers' contributions to unemployment insurance. 
Some initial proposals were, however, not part of the final budget, including the abolition of 
the 20% interest tax,  the introduction of a tax on diesel fuel and a substantial reduction in 
housing subsidies. 
8.3 Detailed analysis of  government spending 
Total outlays (excluding interest payments) have fallen in real terms in the period 1983-86 as 
the  combined  effect  of  booming  economic  activity  and  strong  efforts  to  reduce  public 
spending.  Apart from  relatively low wage  increases,  a  new  expenditure control system  was 
introduced  and  ad  hoc  measures  aimed  at  curbing  local  government  spending  were 
implemented (section 8.5). However, in 1987 when GDP growth was very limited and salaries 
of public employees were raised  significantly,  public spending  relative  to  GDP rose  again. 
This development continued in  1988.  From 1989 to 1991  the share of government spending 
in GDP has slightly declined again. 
During the period  1983-86  the share of government spending in  GDP was  considerably 
reduced. Budget cuts affected all major expenditure components, except interest payments. 
As explained  in the previous section,  government fmal  consumption  expenditure bore a 
considerable part of the burden of ftscal  adjustment. The upper part of table 8.5  presents a 
detailed analysis  of government fmal  consumption outlays for  the period  1980-89  using  ten 
different functional categories. Over  1983-1986 all categories of consumption have been cut. 
The  cumulative  reduction  amounted  to  fifteen  percent  points.  Outlays  for  defense  (  -23 
percent), education (-18 percent), housing (-64  percent) and economic  s~rvices (-20 percent) 
were cut above average. During 1987-89 consumption spending rose by  7 percent.  Spending 
on general public services (10 percent), social security and welfare (10 percent), recreational, 
cultural and religious affairs (10 percent), and housing (21 percent) increased above average. -76-
Table  8.4  Volume  of recipients  of unemployment,  early  retirement  and  disability  benefits 
( 1000 persons), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Unemployed  194  231  239  258  235  198  186  187  236  234 
Early retirement  and  disability  788  807  819  837  878  893  905  916  933  945 
Source: Statistical Office 
Over the years 1983-86 the cumulative change in transfers amounted to  +0.52 percent point. 
The  categories  that  were  responsible  for  this  growth  in  outlays  were  interest  payments 
(increase of 47  percent) and general public services (increase of 20  percent). Also note the 
strong  reduction  of  transfers  for  social  security  and  welfare  in  the  period  1983-86 
(cumulative:  -2.4  percent points)  and  the subsequent  rise  in  1987-89  (by  sixteen  percent). 
Strong  increases  ocurred  also  in  education  (42  percent)  and  economic  services  (fifteen 
percent),  whereas  transfer  spending  on  other  functions  (interest  payments)  decreased  by 
fifteen  percent  during  1987-1989.  The recent  increase  of spending  on  social  security  and 
welfare is  at least partly caused by  the rise in  the number ('volume') of beneficiaries (table 
8.4). 
The average  reduction  of capital  expenditure  during  1983-86  amounted  to  38  percent. 
Strong  reductions  took  place  in  spending  on  economic  services  and  education.  Capital 
expenditure increased slightly  in  the period  1987-89  (by  two  percent),  capital spending on 
housing rising most. -77-
Table 8.5 General government spending(% GOP), 1980-1989 
1.  Final  cons~tion expenditure: 
1.  General  public services 
2.  Defense 
3.  Public order and  safety 
4.  Education 
5.  Health 
6. Social  security and  welfare 
7.  Housing  and  cOI'II'IU1ity  amenities 
8. Recreation,  culture,  religious affairs 
9.  Economic  services 
10.  Other  functions 
11.  Total  final  cons~tion 
11.  Transfers and  property income: 
1.  General  public services 
2. Defense 
3. Public order and  safety 
4.  Education 
5.  Health 
6. Social  security and  welfare 
7.  Housing  and  community  amenities 
8.  Recreation,  culture,  religious affairs 
9.  Economic  services 
10.  Other  functions 
11.  Total 
of which  subsidies: 
111.  Capital  expenditure: 
1.  General  public services 
2. Defense 
3. Public order and  safety 
4.  Education 
5.  Health 
6.  Social  security and  welfare 
7.  Housing  and  community  amenities 
8. Recreation,  culture,  religious affairs 
9.  Economic  services 
10.  Total  capital expenditure 
- of which  capital  formation: 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
2.03  2.16  2.20 
2.53  2.58  2.52 
0.98  1.04  1.06 
6.03  6.26  6.31 
5.49  5.52  5.56 
5.34  5.71  5.86 
0.36  0.39  0.39 
2.14  2.03 
2.47  2.30 
1.05  1.01 
6.06  5.70 
5.33  4.98 
5.68  5.36 
0.35  0.35 
1.00  1.05 
2.09  2.24 
1.05  1.01 
2.47  2.53 
0.97 
2.39 
1.98  1.91  2.03  2.11 
2.09  1.94  2.02  2.13 
1.00  0.99  0.99  1.01 
5.47  5.16  5.42  5.53 
4.89  4.71  4.90  5.00 
5.44  5.35  5.76  5.88 
0.33  0.14  0.15  0.16 
0.97  0.91 
2.27  1.99 
0.93 
2.11 
1.02 
2.04 
2.11 
2.03 
1.01 
5.43 
4.92 
5.89 
0.17 
1.00 
2.07 
0.78  0.80  0.81  0.79  0.77  0.80  0.81  0.86  0.88  0.91 
26.65  27.75  28.22  27.42  25.86  25.24  23.91  25.18  25.75  25.53 
1.70  1.66  1.78  1.81  1.83 
0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
0.69  0.76  0.78  0.81  0.81 
1.92  2.14  2.15 
0.02  0.02  0.02 
0.01  0.01  0.01 
0.79  0.76  0.81 
2.27  2.28 
0.02  0.02 
0.01  0.01 
0.93  1.09 
0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
15.92  16.97  17.06  16.78  16.14  15.46  14.66  15.34  16.34  17.07 
0.44  0.43  0.47  0.44  0.41  0.41  0.40 
0.29  0.30  0.31  0.30  0.29  0.27  0.24 
2.50  2.38  2.71  2.75  2.69  2.38  2.43 
3.90  5.23  5.96  8.03  9.55  9.84  8.79 
25.47  27.80  29.14  31.0  31.79  31.15  29.5 
0.41  0.44  0.44 
0.25  0.26  0.26 
2.54  2.85  2.80 
8.25  7.97  7.47 
29.82  31.13  31.47 
3.11  3.00  3.17  3.27  3.29  2.99  3.01  3.14  3.46  3.41 
0.45 
0.01 
0.05 
0.42  0.40  0.31 
0.01  0.01  0.01 
0.06  0.06  0.06 
0.29  0.35 
o.or  ... ~o.o2 
0.05  0.05 
1.13  0.83 
0.30  0.28 
0.29  0.44 
0.53  0.51 
0.39  0.37 
1.60  1.84 
4.76  4.77 
3.47  3.00 
0.71 
0.25 
0.40 
0.40 
0.31 
1.77 
4.32 
2.82 
0.56  0.54 
0.23  0.25 
0.29  0.30 
0.40  0.19 
0.24  0.27 
1.66  1.36 
3.  77  3.25 
2.36  2.08 
0.48 
0.27 
0.38 
0.19 
0.28 
1.48 
3.49 
2.37 
0.26 
0.01 
0.06 
0.44 
0.25 
0.25 
0.13 
0.22 
1.04 
2.66 
1.97 
0.19  0.20 
0.02  0.01 
0.06  0.05 
0.49 
0.25 
0.30 
0.15 
0.22 
1.02 
2.70 
2.11 
0.48 
0.28 
0.32 
0.29 
0.25 
1.04 
2.93 
2.18 
0.17 
0.02 
0.05 
0.43 
0.26 
0.27 
0.27 
0.27 
0.94 
2.70 
2.09 -78-
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Total  expenditure: 
1.  General  public services  4.18  4.24  4.38  4.26  4.15  4.24  4.30  4.38  4.59 
2.  Defense  2.56  2.60  2.55  2.50  2.33  2.13  1.97  2.06  2.16 
3.  Public order and  safety  1.04  1.11  1.14  1.13  1.07  1.06  1.06  1.05  1.07 
4.  Education  7.84  7.86  7.79  7.44  7.05  6.75  6.37  6.73  6.94 
5.  Health  5.84  5.84  5.85  5.61  5.28  5.20  5.00  5.20  5.32 
6.  Social  security and  welfare  21.55  23.12  23.32  22.75  21.80  21.28  20.27  21.40  22.54 
7.  Housing  and  community  amenities  1.32  1.33  1.25  1.19  0.94  0.92  0.67  0.71  0.89 
8.  Recreation,  culture,  religious affairs  1.68  1.  71  1.67  1.55  1.53  1.52  1.38  1.40  1.53 
9.  Economic  services  6.18  6.46  6.95  6.94  6.43  6.12  5.46  5.67  5.94 
10.  Other  functions  4.68  6.03  6.77  8.82  10.33  10.65  9.61  9.10  8.85 
11.  Total  expenditure  56.87  60.31  61.68  62.19  60.91  59.87  56.07  57.70  59.81 
Source: OECD, National Accounts 
Table 8.6  presents an alternative analysis  of social  security spending,  with  a  breakdown of 
this  type  of  outlays  by  five  categories:  health,  pension  schemes,  maternity  and  family, 
unemployment and housing. 
Spending  on  sickness  benefits  in  Denmark  is  not  excessively  high  in comparison  with 
other EC Member States and has been declining very rapidly until 1987; in 1988-89 spending 
on sickness has slightly increased. 
Although Denmark has  a high  participation rate,  spending on old  age pensions is  quite 
high in comparison with other EC countries. 
Spending on health in  Denmark is  not out of line with  the experience in the other four 
EC Countries that are analysed in the current study. As is apparent from table 8.5,  spending 
on health declined until  1986;  from  1987-1989  spending climbed again but it did  not reach 
the peak level of the early 1980s. 
Spending on unemployment is relatively high  in  Denmark and started rising again at the 
end of the decade. Unemployment benefits are generous in terms of bolb size and maximum 
duration  (up  to  ten  years).  Unemployment  compensation  can  be  obtained  after  twelve 
months of paying contributions into an unemployment scheme. The employer only pays the 
first day of unemployment (as from mid-1993  the employer will also have to pay the second 
day). There is also a large element of discretion for unemployed persons to reject job offers, 
although the 1991  Budget limited the right to reject a 'reasonable' job offer after more than 
one year of unemployment. 
Subsidisation of owner-occupied housing has  mainly  taken place via  the tax system.  The 
State  subsidizes  housing  associations.  The  1991  Budget  included  a  temporary  housing 
1989 
4.57 
2.07 
1.07 
6.95 
5.22 
23.22 
0.87 
1.53 
5.81 
8.39 
59.71 (7) 
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package to limit forced sales of household property, and stimulate the housing market. 
Table 8.6 Detailed analysis of social welfare expenditure(% GDP), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Health  10.01  9.76  9.73  9.16  8.53  8.49  8.37  8.37  8.85  8.98 
1a  Sickness  7.48  7.21  7.15  6.55  6.04  5.98  5.80  5.75  6.08  6.25 
1b  Invalidity, disability  2.35  2.36  2.39  2.39  2.27  2.27  2.24  2.34  2.48  2.46 
1c  Occupational  accidents 
and  diseases  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.22  0.21  0.24  0.33  0.27  0.29  0.28 
2.  Pension  schemes  9.99  10.25  10.32  10.34  10.13  10.07  9.89  10.05  10.39  10.49 
2a  Old  age  9.84  10.11  10.19  10.21  10.11  10.05  9.86  10.03  10.36  10.46 
2b  Survivors  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.13  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
3. Maternity and  family  3.03  3.14  3.12  2.92  2.84  2.85  2.80  3.23  3.54  3.45 
3a  Maternity  0.26  0.32  0.31  0.31  0.33  0.42  0.45  0.47  0.49  0.48 
3b  Family  2.78  2.83  2.82  2.62  2.51  2.43  2.35  2.75  3.04  2.97 
4.  Unemployment  3.62  4.67  5.03  5.36  4.83  4.15  3.44  3.43  3.88  4.19 
4a  Placement,  guidance, 
resettlement  0.59  o.n  0.97  1.27  1.13  0.98  0.79  0.74  0.94  1.02 
4b  Unemployment  3.03  3.94  4.06  4.09  3.70  3.17  2.65  2.69  2.94  3.17 
5.  Housing  and  miscellaneous  1.34  1.52  1.61  1.56  1.51  1.49  1.46  1.67  1.  73  1.68 
i 
Sa  Housing  0.40  0.42  0.43  0.46  0.48  0.48  0.49  0454  0.58  0.59 
Sb  Miscellaneous  0.94  1.09  1.18  1.10  1.03  1.00  0.98  1  ~\13  1.15  1.08 
6.  Total  28.00  29.33  29.82  29.34  27.84  27.05  25.97  26.75  28.39  28.79 
Source: EC, S()cial Protection Expenditure and Receipts,  1991 
8. 4 Detailed analysis of  government revenues 
As  has  been  exp1ained  in  section  8.2,  the  revenue  side  of  the  ~u~get has  importantly 
contributed to the budget consolidation achieved in Denmark, notably in the period 1983-86. 
Total tax  revenue increased from  44.5  percent of GOP in  1982  to  52.1  percent of GOP in 
1988. This section considers some trends in major taxes in greater detail. Table 8.7 presents 
an analysis of government revenue according to the mobility of the tax base. -80-
Table 8.7 Breakdown of taxes according to degree of mobility of the tax base(% of GDP), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Taxes  on  corporate profits  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.4  2.5  2.4  3.1  2.3  2.3  2.1 
2.  Taxes  on  goods  and  services  17.0  17.0  16.4  16.6  16.7  16.8  17.9  17.4  17.4  16.5 
2.1  VAT  10.1  10.4  10.0  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.9  9.7  9.9  9.7 
2.2 Excise duties  6.1  5.8  5.8  6.2  6.3  6.3  7.4  7.1  6.2  5.6 
2.3 Other  taxes  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  1.3  1.2 
3.  Taxes  bearing on  use  of  labour  0.8  1.0  1.3  1.8  2.0  2.7  2.0  2.6  1.4  1.8 
3.1  Soc.  security contributions employees  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1 
3.2 Soc.  security contributions employers  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.8  1.2  1.8  0.2  0.2 
3.3 Soc.  security contributions self-employed  -
3.4 Other  taxes  0.2  0.8  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.6 
4.  Taxes  on  income  of  individuals  23.5  23.8  23.6  24.2  23.7  24.6  24.4  25.4  26.2  26.0 
5.  Taxes  on  property  2.6  2.3  2.0  2.4  2.0  2.1  2.4  2.6  2.4  2.2 
6.  Miscellaneous  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.4  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.3 
7.  Total  tax  revenue  45.5  45.3  44.5  46.5  47.6  49.0  50.8  51.5  51.1  49.9 
Source:  Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1989, Paris, 1990 
Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1990, Paris, 1991 
As  regards taxes on portfolio income of individuals (not shown  in  table 8.7) and inter/intra 
company  remittances,  it is  important to note that Denmark has  a 30% withholding tax  on 
dividends (on the first Kr 30,600 (1992); for the excess the rate amounts to 45%) and certain 
types of royalties. The country has an extensive network of fifty  double taxation agreements, 
which  generally reduce tax  to be withheld to  0-25%.  The scope for  further improvement in 
this  area  seems  to be limited,  unless  the country  should  decide  to  unilaterally  reduce  its 
withholding tax. 
In  1984  revenue from  the corporate income  tax  almost  doubled  in-~terms of GDP,  as  a 
consequence of the increased tax rate (from 40%  to 50%) and the improved overall perfor-
mance of the Danish economy. This tax hike was intended to offset a reduction in employers 
social security contributions by 2 percent point. As from  1987 employers must pay a special 
Labor Market Tax ("arbejdsmarkedbidrag"), which amounts to 2.5%. The tax base consists of 
total  sales  of  the  enterprise  (exclusive  of exports)  less  total  purchases  of the  enterprise 
(exclusive  of  imports).  In  later  years  the  corporate  income  tax  rate  has  been  reduced 
stepwise, to the present 38%. 
Another source  of additional  revenues were  the  energy  taxes  (not  seperately shown  in -81-
table 8. 7),  which  were introduced as  part of the extraordinary fiscal  tightening measures of 
December  1985  and both March  and October 1986.  Energy taxation in Denmark shows  an 
exceptional disparity in  that only households are heavily taxed,  which  is probably motivated 
by considerations of international competitiveness (table 8.8). 
Table 8.8 Effective rates of energy taxation in selected countries(% of energy prices in 1990) 
petrol  diesel  fuel  fuel  oil  electricity 
households  industry  households  industry 
Belgium  65.4  46.6  14.5  0.0  n.a.  n.a. 
Demark  69.1  0.0  62.0  0.0  50.0  0.0 
Ireland  67.1  51.4  24.0  20.7  9.9  n.a. 
Italy  75.0  60.5  69.7  64.0  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  66.0  44.5  33.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 66 
Rates of indirect taxes are (considerably) higher in Denmark than in most other EC Member 
States. The rate of the value added tax  (VAT) was  raised from  20.25%  to 22% in 1980,  to 
remain at that level throughout the 1980s. During the decade revenues from  VAT constantly 
amounted to about ten percent of GDP. The financial sector is not subject to VAT and news 
papers are zero-rated. 
Although  there  is  as  yet  no  formal  agreement  on  the  harmonization  of VAT rates,  it 
seems likely that from the viewpoint of fiscal harmonization Denmark can retain the present 
rate of 22%  for  the major part of private consumption.  Pressure to  reduce the VAT rate 
may  especially result from the large gap with VAT rates in  Germany (15% as· from January 
1993). 
Taxes  on  income  of individuals  presently  bring  in  slightly  more  than  half of total  tax 
revenues. During the 1980s the aggregate income tax burden has gradually increased by over 
three percent points of GDP, to peak at 26.6 percent of GDP by  1988. The basic rate of the 
state income tax comes to 22%,  the toprate is 40%.  The basic rate applies to total taxable 
income;  on personal income exceeding Kr 231,800  (1992)  an additional  12%  is  due; on the 
part of aggregate personal and capital income that exceeds Kr 162,300 a further 6% is levied. 
In addition to state income tax,  municipal and church taxes are levied on taxable income of -82-
individuals.  These  taxes  vary,  but the average  rate is  28%  of taxable  income.
20  Given  this 
combined tax rate in the 50-68% band, it seems hardly possible to push up income tax rates 
in  Denmark  any  more,  without  possibly  serious  damage  to  the  functioning  of labor  and 
capital markets. 
21 
As in  most  other industrialised countries,  the personal income tax  base in  Denmark is 
partly eroded by deductions and allowances, especially because of the unlimited deductibility 
of interest  payments.  Premiums  paid  for  ordinary pensions are also  fully  deductible.  The 
OECD has estimated that government foregoes revenues equal to 4.5 percent of GDP due to 
the favourable  treatment of interest payments in the tax system.  However, it may be noted 
that such  base erosion  (by  23  percent of income-subject-to-tax in  1987)  is  not out of line, 
when compared to base erosion in most other EC Member States. For example, in  1987 the 
erosion of the personal income tax base in  neighbouring Germany amounted to 22  percent, 
in the Netherlands erosion was estimated to come to 21  percent (OECD, Economic Surveys, 
1990, p. 42). 
As  a  consequence of high  rates and  an  only  'average'  erosion  of the tax  base,  by  1987 
Danish taxpayers  effectively paid 41  percent of their aggregate  taxable income in  personal 
income tax.  This  effective  burden considerably  exceeded  the burden  on  German taxpayers 
(on  average  25  percent  of taxable  income)  and  the  personal  income  tax  burden  in  the 
Netherlands {17 percent). However, it should be stressed that social security in Denmark is 
almost  exclusively  financed  out  of  general  tax  revenue,  whereas  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  heavily  rely  on  specific  social  insurance  contributions  to  finance  their  social 
security system. 
During the 1980s,  property taxes brought in a constant 2.0-2.5  percent of GDP. Denmark 
has a wealth tax.  The rate is  1.2% on that part of the taxpayer's net wealth which exceeds Kr 
1,482,000  for  single  tax  payers  and  twice  that  amount  for  married  couples.  Taxation  of 
motorvehicles is the heaviest in the EC. 
20  Municipal taxes are imposed at flat  rates, which vary from one municipality to the other. 
For 1992  they vary between 22.6%  and 32.1 %.  The church  tax  is  also  imposed at a flat 
rate, varying from municipality to municipality, between 0.42% and 1.63%. 
21  The  aggregate  burden  of national  and  municipal  income  taxes  on  any  part of the  tax 
payer's taxable income may not exceed  68  percent. If the aggregate burden exceeds this 
percentage, the national income  tax  is  reduced  accordingly.  Similarly,  income  taxes,  the 
dividend  tax  and  the national wealth  tax  taken together,  may  not  exceed  78  percent of 
taxable income and dividends received. -83-
8. 5 Budgetary process 
Oq~anization 
The Danish public sector consists of the State, counties, municipalities, social security funds 
and  public enterprises. The State is  responsible  for  the provision  of public goods  and for 
income  support, which  is,  however,  administered by  the municipalities.  The latter are also 
responsible  for  providing primary  edueation,  social  services,  recreational facilities,  and  the 
like.  Counties  provide  health  care,  collective  transport  and  secondary  education.  Only 
roughly thirty percent of revenues from taxation accrue to local governments, the remainder 
of their outlays being covered by  reimbursements and grants from  the State. There exists a 
considerable  degree  of autonomy  for  local  governments,  which  are,  however,  required  to 
approximately balance their budgets. The social security funds represent only a small part of 
the total social security system. There are five  different programmes in this sector, including 
the unemployment insurance system, which is financed by contributions from  employees and 
employers,  as  well  as  from  the  State.  The  public  enterprises  include  state-owned, 
unincorporated  enterprises,  such  as  state  railways  and  the  postal  system.  They  operate 
partially on a commercial basis, but are not free to set prices and wages  on  their own.  The 
number of fully or partly stated-owned incorporated companies is small, comprising mainly of 
the telephone  companies,  the  national  oil  and  gas  company  and  the Danish  share in  the 
Scandinavian Airline System (SAS). As the State's shareholdings are not important and state-
owned  unincorporated enterprises are required to apply commercial principles, privatisation 
has not been an important issue in  Denmark. It is  only  in  recent years that proceeds from 
privatisation became of some quantitative importance.  In  1990  privatisation  measures were 
estimated to bring in Kr. 5 billion. 
Budgetary rules and procedures 
Under  and  after  the  Danish  medium-term  programme  embarked  upon  in  1982/83  the 
government presents each year a revised five-year  target scenario, taking past developments 
into  account.  The budget  process  starts by  setting  a  target for  net  expenditure  of central 
government, i.e.  gross spending including payments to local government minus user fees and 
other  similar  revenue,  and  minus  the  State's  contribution  to  financing  unemployment 
benefits.  The  target  aimed  at  has  in  recent  years  been  approximately  constant  real 
expenditure. The global target figure is broken down into individual net spending ceilings for 
each  Ministry.  Compliance with  these ceilings  is  checked  quarterly and spending overruns -84-
have to be met by an increase in user fees,  or cutbacks in programmes. In recent years both 
the State and  municipalities  have  introduced  new  and  raised  existing  charges  to  users  of 
publicly  provided  goods  and  services.  Apart  from  a  reduction  of general  grants  to  local 
government, other measures have been taken to limit expenditure growth, such as negotiated 
expenditure limits ('framework') for local government. In practice these limits to expenditure 
growth have not been fully respected by local governments. In 1988/89 a new instrument has 
been introduced by limiting tax rates and thus revenues by common agreement. In both 1990 
and  1991  no  formal  restrictions  were  placed  on  local  spending,  but  local  governments 
committed themselves not to raise local income tax rates, which was  expected to limit their 
ability to increase expenditure. 
In recent years spending overruns occurred, but the most important reason for the recent 
rise of the central government budget deficit is  that revenues fell well short of expectations 
(table 8.9). 
Table 8.9 Central government budget balance: expectations and outcomes 
1989  1990  1991 
fiscal  budget  outcome  fiscal  budget  outcome  fiscal  budget 
total  income  288.4  271.9  291.5  276.0  282.6 
of which: 
direct  taxes  115.4  117.1  124.3  119.9  123.8 
indirect  taxes  147.5  142.0  151.3  141.0  145.1 
total expenditure  287.2  289.6  297.5  299.2  312.1 
balance  1.2  -17.7  -6.0  -23.2  -29.5 
Source: OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 28 
8.6 Recent developments· 
The outcome for the 1991  budget was  a central government budget deficit of Kr billion 36, 
which  is  considerably  more  than  envisaged  (see  table  8.9).  Some  important  measures 
included in the 1992 Budget consist of an agreement with local governments to fix their level 
of expenditures  and  the removal  of some duties  on  beer and  wine  as  part of the EC tax 
harmonization effort.  The VAT rate was  increased  to 25%  at the beginning of 1992.  The 
European  Court  ruled  against  the  special  labour  market  VAT,  which  implied  lost  tax -85-
revenues of Kr billion 4.5  for  1992.  The actual budget deficit for  1992 will probably amount 
to Kr billion 40 or more, instead of Kr billion 30.5 as envisaged in the 1992 budget. 
The most recent (1993) budget contains proposals to cut expenditure by some Kr 7.5 billion 
to reduce the deficit. The number of public sector employees will be trimmed by  4, 100. The 
government also proposed to privatize state property and to cut subsidies to enterprises and 
unemployment benefits. The proposed measures will result in  a deficit of Kr billion 33.9.  At 
the moment of writing is  was  not clear· whether the minority government would  succeed in 
getting these proposals accepted by parliament. 
8. 7 Fiscal policy flexibility 
In this section the flexibility of the budget, i.e.  the scope to reduce spending and/or increase 
revenues is  analysed.  Table 8.2  shows  how the general government deficit has been reduced 
from its peak of 9.1  percent of GDP in  1982 to a surplus of 3.4 percent in 1986.  Since then, 
the deficit has increased again to  1.5  percent in  1992.  With respect to the deficit reference 
value as laid down  in the Maastricht Treaty, the deficit is  not 'excessive'.  We conclude that 
the deficit as such poses hardly a problem anymore. As follows  from table 8.2  gross public 
debt amounts to 66 percent of GDP in 1992. 
Scope to increase revenues 
As the overall tax burden on  the Danish economy is  among the highest within  the EC,  the 
scope for  increasing  rates of major  taxes  seems  to  be very  limited.  Nevertheless,  we  will 
investigate some possibilities. 
The  rate  of  the  corporate  income  tax  offers  little  leeway,  since  in  the  European 
Community rates tend to converge in the 35-40% band. The Danish ·ntle (38%) is  at about 
the same level as  in  surrounding countries (assuming that the German rate will  be further 
reduced). 
The  top  rate  of  the  personal  income  tax  (68%)  already  exceeds  the  top  rate  of 
neighbouring  Germany  by  fifteen  points.  This  gap  will  further  increase  if by  1995  the 
German top  rate is  reduced  to  46%  as  is  now  envisaged.  Indeed,  there is  some political 
pressure now to reduce Danish income tax  rates. Tax facilities are favourable.  Interest paid 
and contributions to pension saving are fully  deductable from  the personal income. tax base. 
The deductability of interest on mortgages could be limited in combination with a reduction -86-
of  housing  subsidies.  The  deductability  of other  interest  payments  could  be  reduced  by 
introducing statutory limits as is the case in many other EC Member Countries. 
The VAT-rate of 25%  is  already among the highest  in  the EC.  Among taxes which  are 
less  important in revenue terms,  some increase of property tax  rates seems to be the only 
feasible option. 
Table 8.10 summarizes the flexibility of fiSCal policy with respect to government revenue. 
Scope to reduce expenditure 
Demographic developments have had a decisive influence on trends in public spending in the 
past. The number and the share in  the population of smaller childeren began to drop from 
the late 1960s, while the number of old people· and their share in total population continually 
rose. According to OECD estimates, demographic changes until the year 2000  are likely to 
be similar to  those of the past twenty years  (OECD, Economic Surveys,  1988,  p.  40).  This 
implies  some  downward  flexibility  of spending  on  education  and  family  benefits,  while 
spending on health is likely to increase. Projections by Holzmann {1988)  indicate that as far 
as  the demographic influence is  concerned, the share of pension outlays in Danish national 
income may  drop  in  the near future.  Since spending on  old  age pensions is  quite high  in 
comparison with other EC Member States - taking into account the high participation rate in 
Denmark - there is probably also some scope to reduce benefit levels. 
Transfer payments have  been boosted by  relatively  high  subsidies,  which  mainly  benefit 
agricultural  exports,  collective  transport  and  housing  associations.  Spending  on  economic 
services is also quite high and may be reduced. 
Most options for budget cuts are to  be found  in  the area of social security and welfare, 
notably by reducing the generosity of the system. As to  unemployment benefits, for instance, 
generosity can be reduced both in terms of the level of the benefit and itS duration. 
Table 8.11 summarizes the flexibility of fiscal policy with respect to government outlays. T
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9. Ireland 
9.1  Introduction 
In the early 1980s  Ireland's budgetary position worsened significantly:  general government's 
net borrowing amounted to 13.4  percen~ of GDP in 1981; at the time its gross debt ratio rose 
to  80  percent  of GDP.  Deficits  were  financed  to  a  considerable  degree  through  foreign 
borrowing. 
Over the period 1960-80  the public sector has absorbed an increasing share of Ireland's 
national  output.  Rising  expenditure  on  social  programmes  and  higher  spending  on  public 
infrastructure were  the  most  important  factors  behind  growing  public  outlays  in  the  late 
1970s. A third factor behind this growth was the Irish industrial development strategy. Falling 
employment in agriculture and in traditional indigenous industries, high population growth
22
, 
and  a  high  dependency  ratio  all  implied  the  need  to  promote  employment  in  the  non-
agricultural  sector.  Prospective  investors  have  been  offered  a  broad  range  of generous 
financial  and fiscal  incentives,  including  capital grants,  training,  research  and  development 
grants, and various forms of tax relief.
23 
The main  sources  of very  steeply  rising  public  revenues  have  been  the proceeds  from 
indirect taxes,  from  personal income tax,  and  from  social security contributions. The rapid 
growth  of the latter revenue category reflected both an  increase in  the number of insured 
workers  and  an  expansion  of  the  insurance  schemes  concerned.  The  Social  Insurance 
schemes covering unemployment,  pensions,  accidents and ill-health are intended to  be self-
financing  and  participation  is  compulsory  for  all  dependent  employees.  The  State covers, 
however,  any  deficit  in  the  insurance  funds  and  also  provides  Social  Assistance  benefits 
(subject to a means test) for individuals not covered by insurance schemes. 
During the  1960s  and  the early  1970s  the policy  outlined  above  was  associated  with  a 
22  The  Irish  birth  rate  during  the period  1950-80  was  over  20  per  thousand,  which  far 
exceeded  the European average. Although the birth rate has fallen  since  1980,  it  is  still 
significantly higher than the birth rate in other EC Member States. 
23  Apart from  the strain on public finances from funding the industrialisation program,  the 
structural  transformation  of Irish  manufacturing  __  to  a  base  for  export-oriented  foreign-
owned  industries  introduced  another  problem.  Direct  foreign  investment  created  little 
employment in  indigenous supplying industries.  Foreign frrms  tended to import the raw 
materials  and  intermediate  inputs.  Despite  relatively  high  levels  of economic  growth, 
employment increased only moderately during the 1970s. One possible explanation is that 
over this period labour costs have risen considerably, thus encouraging the substitution of 
(subsidised) capital for labour. See OECD, Economic Surveys,  1983, p. 40. -90-
substantial,  but  stable budget  deficit.  From  1974  onwards,  however,  deficits  ballooned  and 
became associated with a substantial widening of the current external deficit. 
9.2 General outline of  economic policies in the 1980s 
By  1981  the current account deficit had increased to almost 15 percent of GDP and inflation 
amounted to almost 20  percent (table 9.1), which made it unavoidable to constrain demand. 
It took several years before this disinflation process had run its complete course; in  1987 the 
rate of inflation fell  to 3 percent, while the current account showed a surplus. The process of 
disinflation  commanded  a  high  price  in  terms  of  unemployment
24
;  moreover,  the 
government budget deficit remained at a very high level despite continued efforts to redress 
the public  finances  between  1981  and  1986.  The internal dynamics  of the public  finances 
became unsustainable, as a vicious circle of accumulating debt, rising debt-servicing costs and 
higher  borrowing was  set  in  motion.  Since  1987  government  net  borrowing  has,  however, 
been reduced considerably  (table  9.2).  The steep upward  trend  in  the public  debt-to-GDP 
ratio has been reversed. 
The success of the second phase of the budget consolidation process can be ascribed  in 
part to  the  economic  circumstances  under which  fiscal  consolidation  took place.
25  Indeed, 
the  cumulative  change  of the  cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance  during  the  first  phase 
exceeds  that  during  the  second  period,  implying  that  much  of the  basis  for  succesful 
stabilization in the second phase was laid in the earlier period (figure 9.1).  Whereas the first 
phase coincided with generally weak economic trends (low growth, high real interest rates, a 
real appreciation of the Irish pound), the second phase of budgetary adjustment took place 
at an ideal point in the economic cycle:  an upswing in world trade after 1986,  falling interest 
rates  and  a  stabilization  of the  real  exchange  rate.  Initially,  the recovery  was  exclusively 
export-led,  but  as  investment  and  private consumption  rose  internal  demand  became  the 
main impetus to economic growth. Simulations with the OECD's Interlink model suggest that 
without  the external influences  of a large fall  in  oil prices and  a  strong recovery of world 
24  The  increase  in  unemployment  was  actually  cushioned  by  heavy  outward  migration 
between  1981  and  1990.  Although unemployment decreased during 1988-1990,  this fall  is 
indeed as much attributable to high levels of outward migration as to employment growth. 
Rising  unemployment  went  together  with  an  increasing  proportion  of  long-term 
unemployed. 
25  EC, Ireland,  Country Studies, nr. 6,  1991. -91-
trade,  efforts  at  fiscal  consolidation  would  have  reduced  both  the volume  and  the  price 
component of GDP between 1986  and  1988.
26  It should,  however,  be pointed out that these 
simulation  results  do  not  take  account  of improved  confidence  and  expectational  effects, 
which  may be important.  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1990)  found  that  expectations  of a  lower 
share of government spending in output stimulated private consumption; Dornbusch (1989) 
concludes that there is some evidence for improved expectations in the asset market.  TJ 
Figure 9.1  Cyclically adjusted primary balance(% GDP), 1980-1992 
10~--------------------------------------------------
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Source: OECD 
26  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1989, p. 36. 
X1  Dornbusch (1989) also concludes that participation in the ERM failed to help reduce the 
output  cost  of disinflation.  A  similar  conclusion  is  reached  by  Egebo  and  Englander 
(1992), who found evidence for policy credibility effects in financial markets but not for a 
shift  in  inflation  expectations  in  labour  or  product  markets  after  1987.  For  further 
evidence on the credibility aspect of policy, see Kremers (1990). -92-
Table 9.1  Main economic indicators, 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
GOP  growth  2.7  2.6  -0.7  -1.6  2.3  1.0  -1.2  5.0  1.4  5.0  6.6  1.3  2.5  3.3 
Uneq>l oyment  7.3  9.9  11.4  14.0  15.5  17.4  17.4  17.7  16.7  15.6  13.7  15.8  16.5  16.0 
Inflation  18.6  19.6  14.9  9.2  7.4  5.0  4.3  3.2  2.5  3.9  3.2  3.0  2.7  2.7 
Interest  rate  14.6  12.7  11. 1  11.3  9.4  9.0  10.1  9.2 
Nominal  unit  labour costs 
(1980=100)  100  94.8  98.1  100.2  96.7  96.8  102.2  98.7  96.2  91.4  95.3  93.8 
Current  account  <X  of  GOP)  -11.5  -14.7  -10.6  -6.8  -6.4  -4.1  -3.1  1.4  2.3  1.8  3.0 
Dependency  ratio  0.70  0.69  0.69  0.68  0.68  0.67  0.66  0.65  0.65  0.64  0.63 
Change  in the  relative price 
of  public services  2.8  1.5  -1.5  -0.8  0.8  0.7  0.2  2.4  2.5  2.2  2.1 
Participation rate: 
men  87.6  87.7  87.8  87.1  86.6  85.5  85.1  84.3  83.9  82.7  82.2 
women  36.3  36.9  37.6  37.8  36.9  36.6  37.2  38.5  37.6  37.5  38.9 
Source: OECD 
During  the  first  phase  of fiscal  consolidation  budgetary  adjustment  efforts  focussed  on 
increasing tax revenue, while in the second phase expenditure cuts were a prime target (see 
also section 9.3). 
The  1980  Budget  aimed  at  reducing  the  government  borrowing  requirement  through  -
among other policy  measures - increasing revenue from  the income tax  and indirect taxes. 
But in  fact  current spending overruns caused the deficit to increase. Part of these overruns 
were due to the government's part of the National Understandingl' of October 1980,  which 
implied higher public sector wage growth than envisaged, the introduction of additional social 
welfare payments and a commitment to sustaining employment. 
In  1981  spending  overruns  occurred  with  lower  revenues  than  expected,  leading  to  an 
increase of the general budget deficit;  the cyclically adjusted deficit swelled even more. The 
slippage  occurred  mainly  on  current  expenditure.  Between  1979-1982  current  expenditure 
increased from  40  percent to 49  percent of GDP. The main factors behind this increase of 
outlays have been (OECD, Economic SUNeys,  1983, pp. 19-21): 
28  This  held  an  agreement on pay  and  working  conditions  between  the Irish  Congress  of 
Trade Unions and employer organisations (including the Government). -93-
- substantial increases in the real value of per capita transfers
29
; 
- large increases in public sector employment
30
; 
- high burden of debt service charges; 
- demographic factors which  have raised  the demand for  public services,  especially health 
and education. 
Although the supplementary Budget of July  1981,  introduced by  the government elected in 
June 1981, introduced some fairly important tax and expenditure changes (including a rise of 
the 10% VAT rate to 15% and sharp excise increases), they had little effect on the outcomes 
for  1981. After its 1982 Budget Proposals had been defeated by parliament, the government 
resigned. The ensuing general election led to a change of government. 
Although  the new  Budget  included  several  adjustments  to  the previous  one,  its  overall 
effect  on  the public  sector budget  deficit  was  little  different.  The  1982  outturn showed  a 
further deficit growth. The budget situation became clearly unsustainable.  Foreign debt had 
increased to over 40 percent of GDP by 1982.
31 
In  October  1982  the  government's  economic  plan  The  Way  Forward  was  published, 
proposing  the complete  elimination  of the budget  deficit  by  1986.  However,  the minority 
Fianna Fail government fell  at the general election in November  1982. The new Fine Gael-
Labour Coalition government which  took office after the elections, proposed to reduce the 
deficit in 1983, notably by, inter alia, the following tax measures: 
29  Spending on  old  age  pension  increased  by  27  percent  in  real  terms between  1979  and 
1982; real unemployment benefits rose 4 percent. Source: OECD, Economic Surveys,  1983, 
p. 51. 
30  In 1982 public sector employment amounted to 314,000 persons, which  is  24.5  percent of 
the total labour force.  The average annual increase over the perio~t~979-82 amounted to 
3 percent. See OECD, Economic Surveys,  1983,  p.  19.  For later developments,  see table 
9.3. 
31  The  economic  impact  of foreign  borrowing  differs  from  domestic  borrowing  in  two 
respects.  First,  foreign  borrowing temporarily  provides  additional  resources .  available  to 
the  country  to  consume,  or  to  invest.  By  the  same  token,  servicing  such  borrowing 
subsequently  implies  a  loss  of  resources,  and,  hence,  has  a  deflationary  impact.  By 
contrast, domestic borrowing implies transfers between residents; the subsequent servicing 
of this debt implies a transfer between residents. Moreover, interest payments to residents 
generate tax  receipts. Second,  borrowing in domestic currency tends to  push  up  interest 
rates  and  crowds  out  domestic  investment,  whereas  external  borrowing  puts  upward 
pressure on the exchange rate, thereby crowding out activity in those sectors most exposed 
to international competition. -94-
Table 9.2 General government budget deficit(% GOP), 1980-1992 
1980  1981  '1982·  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Current  receipts  37.7  38.4  40.7  42.4  42.5  42.4  42.3  42.6  43.6  39.6  39.5  40.4 
Total  expenditure  50.4  42.8'  54.5  '54~2  52.3  53.6  53.4  51.7  48.8  43.1  43.1  44.5 
Net  borrowing  -12.7  -13.4·· -13.8. -11..8.' -9.8  -11.2  -11.2  -9.1  -5.2  -3.5  -3.6  -4.1 
Gross  public debt  73.9  79.8  89.7  100.3  104.8  108.5  120.8  122.0  120.4  110.1  103.0  102.8 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
- a new top rate of the persa'nal incom.e_ taX' (65% instead of 60%  ); 
- non-indexation of income true brackets f6r.inflation; 
- increases in the standard a~d high VAT rates by 5 percent points; 
- temporary levy on income of 1%. 
For the first  time in  a  number of years,' budget  targets for  the year were largely attained, 
despite a decline in real GNP of ~lffiost' 2  percent. Current expenditure continued to rise as 
a proportion of GNP in  1983, but its annual growth rate shrank from 27 percent in  1981-82, 
to 12 percent. Public sector empioyme~t has been cut back since 1982, and as from that year 
growth of government real wages was quite moderate for a number of years (table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 Employment situation in the public sector, 1982-1990 
:· 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
'  ......  ~  ./  '  : 
1.  Government  employment  314  313  307  303  301  296  286  270  270 
(*  1000) 
2.  as % of  total  employment  15.8  15.8  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.7  15.2  14.3  13.7 
3.  Growth  of  government  .. 
real  wages  -4.8  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.8  3.3  0.0  4.7  5.3 
4.  Growth  of  relative 
government  wages  a)  -2.7  -0.2  -2.4  -1.7  -2.4  1.  7  -2.2  5.0  4.6 
a>  Compared  with  hourly earnings  in manufacturing-deflated by  consumer  price index. 
Source: OECD -95-
The imposition of substantial tax increases in the 1982 and  1983  Budget implied a marked 
tightening  of fiscal  policy;  the cyclically  adjusted primary deficit  was  reduced  significantly 
(figure  9.1).  The actual deficit  declined less.  The 1984  Budget implied  distinctly less fiscal 
adjustment than had been achieved over the previous two years. Most of the proposed deficit 
reduction reflected carry-over effects of tax increases enacted in the 1983 Budget. Additional 
measures included  the  introduction  of· a  new  VAT rate of 8%  on adult clothing and  the 
increase of various excise duties on beer, wine, cigarettes and petrol. The main expenditure 
increases were a 7 percent rise in  social welfare payments to offset the effects of inflation, 
and the introduction of a family income supplement. 
In October 1984 the government published its national plan Building on Reality 1985-1987. 
This  plan foresaw  a  reduction  in  the deficit;  most  of the reduction was  supposed  to take 
place  towards  the latter half of the period.  In addition,  the government  pledged  itself to 
prevent the share of national output absorbed by  taxation from  rising above its  1984  level. 
Important  elements  of planned  spending  restraint  induded  the  intention  to  allow  only 
modes~ pay increases in the public service and a major fan in the level of public investment. 
It was widely agreed that the return on much public investment had been low and sometimes 
even negative (OECD, Economic Surveys,  1985, p. 28). 
The 1985 Budget envisaged increased government borrowing. In order to reduce Irish/UK 
tax  and  price differentials  some changes were introduced in  the tax system.  The top VAT 
rate of 35%  was  reduced  to  23%,  and  the excise  duty  on televisions  was  halved.  Higher 
indirect taxes were imposed on cigarettes and petrol. The top rate of the personal income tax 
was  reduced from  65%  to 60%  (the other rates being 35% and 48%,  respectively). Further 
measures taken included a rise of welfare payments slighdy above the then expected rate of 
inflation, and a 6 percent pay increase for public servants. 
Like  the 1984  and  1985  Budgets,  the 1986  Budget sought only  miflbr  fiscal  adjustment. 
The deficit hardly decreased. Important measures of the 1986 Budget included: 
- increase of personal income tax exemptions; 
- further reduction of the top rate of the income tax (.58%) and an increase of the standard 
VAT rate to 25%; 
- rise of various excise taxes (on cigarettes and petrol); 
- 4-5 percent higher social welfare benefits; 
- 7 percent pay increase for public service workers. -96-
Table 9.4 Social welfare indicators,  1980~1990 
, 1980 .. 1981  19~  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
1.  Replacement  ratio  73.9  78.5  83.1  78.1  76.8  76.3  74.6  75.9  65.8  62.8  n.a. 
2.  Real  unemployment 
benefits  (1980=100)  100.0  101.7  104.1  99.2  93.1  94.3  91.5  88.9  85.0  82.6  81.1 
3.  Real  old age 
pension  (1980=100)  100.0  102.9  111.8 112.5  111.7 112.3  112.7 112.6  113.0  112.1  113.0 
Source: OECD 
The 1985  and 1986 Budgets  (~iled to achieye the targets set out in Building on Reality 1985-
1987.  Capital  spending  fell.  further  ,_t~an  envisaged,  but  nominal  targets  for  current 
expenditure were not achieved, despite a  much slower than expected rise in consumer prices 
and  despite  continued  tigh~  limits ,  .  on  public  sector  employment.  In  real  terms  the 
overshooting was much larger. One reason .for this was lower-than-expected GDP growth and 
higher unemployment. Another reason .  was .the increase in real pay of government workers 
(table  9.3),  and  the  rise  of  real  tran~fers  (table  9.4).  Many  improvements  of  the 
compensation of groups of civil servants w~re awarded by an Arbitrator who is  independent 
of  the  government  and  whose  recommendations  have  been  heavily  influenced  by 
considerations  of comparabili!)',  histor~c relativities  and  so  on.
32  Although  the  government 
delayed the decision  - which  was  protested by a  one-day strike in  the public services  - the 
Arbitrator was eventually r~appointed in 1986. 
The Programme for National Recovery (PNR), announced in October 1987,  set the following 
objectives for the period till the end. of 1990~ 
- reduction of the Exchequer bqrrowing requirement to 5-7 percent of GNP to stabilize the 
debt-to-GNP ratio; 
- achieving lower inflation and ~nterest rates; 
32  Most  public  service  employees  fall  under  the jurisdiction  of various  Conciliation  and 
Arbitrator Schemes.  Discussions  take place  in  a  Board  with  employers  and  employees 
equally represented under a Chairman appointed for  a fixed  period by  the Government. 
Since employers  and employees  are usually  on opposite sides,  it is  the Chairman - thus 
popularly called the Arbitrator - who  rules in  the end. The Arbitrators recommendations 
are, however, not legally-binding. -97-
- reform of the tax system; 
- moderation of annual pay increases to a maximum of 2.5 percent. 
The target for  1987 was more than achieved, not only by a reduction in  capital expenditure, 
but  also  by  a  significant  fall  in  the  ratio  of  current  government  spending  to  GNP. 
Expenditure cuts depended heavily on a freeze of wages in the government sector, and strict 
limitations  on  public sector  hiring.  A  number of housing·. grants were  eliminated;  hospital 
charges were introduced for hospital stays and tax brackets were not indexed for inflation. In 
1988 the ratio of current expenditure to GNP was below target by 0.8 percentage points, due 
to lower-than-budgeted unemployment compensation and tighter control of welfare outlays. 
Likewise, capital expenditure was reduced more than envisaged in the original budget plans. 
However,  by  far  the most significant  deviation  from  the initial budget projections was  the 
unexpectedly  large  increase  in  tax  revenue.  A  tax  amnesty,- combined  with  improved  tax 
collection, generated extra revenue sixteen times over· ·original· estimates.  Even without  this 
once-and-for-all  surge  in  tax  revenues,  current  revenue  flowed  richly  due  to  the  strong 
economic recovery. 
The  1989  Budget provided  for  an  increase of outlays,  mainly  due  to  a  general rise  in 
social welfare payments by  3 percent, and  a  12  percent rise of compensation for  the long-
term  unemployed.  After four  years  of continued  reductions,  capital  expenditure  was  also 
slightly increased. The 1989 Budget also brought some steps in the reform of the tax system: 
- reduction of personal income tax rates; 
- tax  relief for  household's mortgage  interest payments artd  life  insurance premiums was 
reduced; 
- excise duties on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes were increased again; 
- the standard rate of the corporate income tax· was reduced from 47% to 43%. 
The 1990 Budget projected a further small drop of the Exchequer borrowing requirement 
(EBR). In the event, the outturn proved to be slightly better than projeeied, thanks largely to 
the cyclical buoyancy of the economy. The 1991 Budget projected a further small decrease of 
the EBR. Higher transfers and interest rates were· expected to push up general government 
spending by  about 0.5  percent of GNP. The standard rate of the income tax was reduced to 
29%;  the top rate was  reduced to 52%. The standard VAT rate was  reduced to 21%, while 
the 10% VAT rate was increased to 12.5%. -98-
9.3 Detailed analysis of  government spending 
Table 9.5  presents data on general government spending by  economic classification for  the 
period 1980-1991. 
The fact that productivity gains tend to be lower in the government than in the private 
sector means that the deflator of public consumption  rises  faster  than  the consumer price 
index,  unless wages of public servant$ stay behind. This so  called  'relative price effect' can 
also be discerned in Ireland (see table 9.1). The reduction of government consumption has, 
to a considerable degree, been realised through reductions in public sector employment and 
sometimes  through  a  moderate trend  in  government wages  (table  9.4).  A  new  three-year 
agreement has been ratified in  1991. This Programme for Economic and Social Progress 1991-
1993  (PESP) provides for an annual average wage increase of 3.5  percent up  to  1993.
33  The 
PESP terms also apply to public sector employees. 
During the first  half of the 1980s  government  transfers increased.  This  rise  in  transfer 
payments reflected four main factors:,. 
- increased real per capita .benefits (table 9.4); 
•  wider entitlement to existing schemes; 
•  introduction of new schemes; 
•  higher unemployment and a lower participation ratio of older workers have increased the 
number of beneficiaries. 
In 1986 some 743,000 persons received welfare benefits (excluding child benefits), compared 
with 400,000 in  1970. By contrast, the number of persons with jobs was virtually the same in 
1986 as it had been in 1970. 
Interest payments have been reduced since 1985 by 2 percent points of GDP. With one of 
the highest  public  debt-to-GOP ratios in  the EC,  lrelands budget deficit  is,  however,  very 
sensitive to interest rate movements. 
Capital spending has been reduced considerably during the  1980s.  Even in  periods with 
little,  if any,  improvement  in  the  overaD  situation  of the  public  finances,  gross  capital 
formation has been reduced nevertheless. 
33  Like the previous "Programme for  National  Recovery",  the PESP  has been based  on  a 
consensus  among government,  employers,  farmers  and  trade unions.  A  key  element  of 
both programmes was a wage agreement, limiting per capita wage growth. 
,.  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1987, pp. 63-64. -99-
Table 9.5 General government expenditure, economic -cl~ssification (%of GDP), 1980-1991 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  19l:S7.  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Consi.Mf1)tion  19.9  19.9  19.8  19.3  18.7  18.7  18.9  17.8  16.7  15.4  16.1  17.1 
CQII1)ensation  of 
en.,loyees  12.9  13.3  13.3  13.1  12.9  12.7  -~~'~  .  12.4  11.6  12.2  10.8  11.5 
Current  transfers  16.7  17.7  19.6  20.3  19.9  20.3  20.6  20.9  20.8  16.6  16.4  17.0 
transfers to 
t','' 
households  12.7  13.7  15.7  16.3  16.2  '16.7  1.7 .:$  .1.Q.8  16.3  14.5  14.1  14.6 
Interest payments  6.6  7.4  9.0  9.3  9.4  10.3  9.7  9.7  9.4  9.1  8.4  8.3 
Capital  transfers  1.4  1.0  0.9  0.6  0.4  ·o.i  0.5  0.4  -0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Investment  5.9  5.7  5.3  4.7  4.0  .·  4.0·  3.1. '·.  2o9·  2.0  1.9  1.9  1.9 
Total 
expenditure  50.4  51.8  54.5  54.2  52.3 .  53.6:.  51.4  ::s-1.7  48.8  43.1  43.1  44.5 
~  - ~  f'~ 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
',"t 
Table 9.6 presents a detailed analysis of general governt:nent spending. Government spending 
expressed as a percentage of GDP reached its peak in  1985,  a_nd  declined ever since.  Over 
the period 1985-89 demand and policy considerations affecting social welfare spending have 
often pulled in opposite directions: trends in the number of beneficiaries exerted downward 
influence on expenditure, higher benefit levels  tende~ to push up outlays. The effect of both 
tendencies varied, however, between expenditure programmes.
35 
3S 
:·  "  ..  -
., 
NESC, A  Strategy for the Nineties:  Economic  Stability- and  Structural  Change,  Dublin, 
1990, p. 204. - 100-
Table 9.6 General government spending(% GDP), 1980-1990 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
1.  Defense  1.9  1.8  1.8  1. 7  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.4 
2.  Other  general  public services  4.1  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.9  4.4  4.7  4.0  4.0 
3.  Education  6.0  6.4  6.4  6.3  6.1  6.1  6.1  6.2  5.6  5.3  5.2 
4.  Health  8.0  7.7  7.5  7.5  7.0  7.0  6.9  6.5  5.9  5.7  5.8 
5.  Social  security and  welfare  10.2  11.0  12.8  13.5  13.4  13.6  13.9  13.4  12.4  11.4  11.3 
6.  Housing  3.4  3.6  3.3  3.2  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  2.1  1.4  1.3 
7.  Other  social  services  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.3 
8.  Agriculture  3.1  3.1  3.1  2.8  2.5  2.3  2.2  3.2  4.5  1.0  1.9 
9.  Industry  2.8  3.3  3.0  2.4  2.3  2.0  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.0  1.1 
10.  Transport  4.8  4.4  3.5  3.3  3.0  2.8  2.9  2.3  2.1  2.0  2.1 
11.  Other  economic  services  2.6  2.0  3.4  2.9  2.9  3.2  2.8  2.9  1.9  1.6  1. 7 
12.  Public debt  11.7  12.0  14.3  14.7  14.6  18.3  17.1  17.2  24.5  12.2  14.8 
13.  Total  expenditure  59.9  61.2  65.1  64.2  62.2  66.0  64.9  63.5  67.6  47.9  51.8 
Source: Statistical Office, Republic of Ireland 
Table 9.7 presents a more detailed analysis of social welfare expenditure. As in  many other 
countries, costs of health services are inflated, in the absence of incentives to minimize costs. 
Ireland's health  spending as  a  share of GDP is  rather high.  Measures  taken since  March 
1987  to  reduce  outlays  included  closing  of  some  older  and  smaller  hospitals,  and  the 
imposition of charges for stays in public hospitals. 
Spending  on  pensions  in  Ireland  is  relatively  low,  reflecting  Irelands  relatively  young 
population. During the 1980s  the real income position of pensioners improved considerably 
(table 9.4). 
Unemployment  outlays  are  not  very  much  above  those  in  many  other  EC  Member 
Countries,  depite  the  high  unemployment  rate  (table  9.1)  and  the  high  replacement  ratio 
(table 9.4). 
Spending on housing subsidies is  relatively  high,  but has been reduced during the seond 
half of the 1980s. - 101-
Table 9.7. Detailed analysis of social welfare expenditure(% GDP), 1980-1989 
1.  Health 
1a  Sickness 
1b  Invalidity, disability 
1c  Occupational  accidents 
and  diseases 
2.  Pension  schemes 
2a  Old  age 
2b  Survivors 
3. Maternity and  family 
3a  Maternity 
3b  Family 
4.  Unefl1)loyment 
4a  Placement,  vocational 
guidance,  resettlement 
4b  Unemployment 
5.  Housing  and  miscellaneous 
Sa  Housing 
Sb  Miscellaneous 
6.  Total 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
8.54  8.22  8.37  8.32  8.03  8.16  8.19  7.75  7.31  6.84 
6.95  6.88  6.81  6.69  6.43  6.55  6.54  6.15  5.75  5.36 
1.48  1.25  1.44  1.52  1.48  1.49  1.53  1.47  1.44  1.36 
0.10  0.09  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.12 
7.15  6.73  7.15  7.29  7.13  7.03  7.07  7.01  6.76  6.30 
5.80  5.33  5.62  5.70  5.55  5.45  5.50  5.46  5.26  4.90 
1.35  1.40  1.53  1.59  1.58  1.57  1.57  1.55  1.51  1.41 
2.28  2.33  2.70  2.80  2.75  2.71  2.87  2.85  2.64  2.44 
0.62  0.61  0.58  0.54  0.54  0.50  0.49  0.49  0.41  0.39 
1.66  1.73  2.11  2.22  2.21  2.21  2.38  2.37  2.23  2.05 
1.78  2.19  2.83  3.39  3.50  3.70  3.79  3.64  3.36  2.96 
0.16  0.17  0.25  0.37  0.43  0.47  0.57  0.54  0.51  0.41 
1.62  2.02  2.58  3.02  3.07  3.23  3.22  3.10  2.85  2.55 
0.96  1.06  1.13  1.24  1.21  1.34  1.31  1.26  1.28  1.09 
0.77  0.78  0.80  0.93  0.91  1.01  0.98  0.95  0.93  0.79 
0.19  0.27  0.33  0.31  0.30  0.33  0.33  0.31  0.34  0.31 
20.68  20.53  22.17 23.03  22.64  22.94 23.22  22.50  21.35  19.62 
Source: EC, Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts,  1991 
9. 4 Detailed analysis of  government revenues 
Table 9.8  presents a breakdown of government revenue according to the mobility of the tax 
base. 
With  respect  to  taxes  on  portfolio  income  of individuals  Ireland  has  a  withholding  tax 
..  -
(Deposit Interest Retention Tax, DIRT) of 29% on interest paid to residents; Ireland has no 
withholding tax for  non-residents. DIRT may,  however, be reduced or eliminated under the 
terms  of its  more  than  twenty  international  tax  treaties.  There  is  no  withholding  tax  on 
dividends.  Dividends  from  a  company  qualifying  for  the  10%  company  tax  rate,  are  50 
percent exempt from income tax, subject to a maximum of £7,000. - 102-
Table 9.8. Breakdown of taxes according to degree of mobility of the tax base(% of GDP), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Taxes  on  corporate profits  1.5  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.3  1.6  1.3 
2.  Taxes  on  goods  and  services  14.9  15.9  16.9  17.6  17.7  17.0  17.3  16.7  17.3  16.7 
2.1  VAT  5.0  5.4  7.1  8.1  8.3  7.9  8.2  7.9  8.5  8.1 
2.2 Excise duties  9.6  10.1  9.3  8.9  8.6  8.4  8.4  8.1  8.1  7.9 
2.3 Other  taxes  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7 
3.  Taxes  bearing on  use  of  labour  5.0  4.9  5.8  6.4  6.7  5.6  5.6  5.5  5.7  5.4 
3.1  Soc.  sec.  contributions employees  1.6  1.6  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.1  1.9 
3.2 Soc.  sec.  contributions employers  3.2  3.2  3.5  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.3 
3.3 Soc.  sec.  contributions self-employed  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.9  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.3 
3.4 Other  taxes  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.7  1.0  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.5 
4.  Taxes  on  income  of  individuals  10.9  11.0  11.0  11.3  12.0  12.0  12.8  13.6  14.3  11.9 
5.  Taxes  on  property  1.8  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.7  1. 7  1.8 
6.  Miscellaneous  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.9  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5 
7.  Total  tax  revenue  34.0  35.2  36.8  38.3  39.1  38.2  39.1  39.3  41.2  37.6 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1989, Paris 1990 
OECD, Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1990, Paris 1991 
Revenue from  taxes  on corporate profits in  Ireland is,  when compared to the EC average, 
rather  low,  reflecting  the  policy  to  attract  foreign  investors.  As  from  1 April  1991  the 
company tax rate has been reduced from 43% to 40%. This is quite high in comparison with 
the corporation income tax rate in the UK of 33%, but it is broadly in line with the average 
European rate. For the manufacturing sector as well as for  qualifying setvice activities  the 
rate is,  however, only 10% until December 31, 2010. This reduced rate is regarded as a vital 
element  to  attract  foreign  investment  and  it  has  been  extended  to  international financial 
service  operations  in  a  special  zone  in  Dublin.  The  10%  rate· iS  available  to  most 
manufacturing activities. 
In  recent  years  steps  have  been  taken·  to  curb  depreciation  allowaaces  ,which. are 
completely abolished  as  from April  1,  1992.  It was  argued by  the minister of Finance that 
"the elimination of 100 percent accelerated capital allowances will remove the bias in favour 
of capital intensity rather than employment" (Budget 1990, p.  41 ). However, the reduction in 
capital  depreciation  allowances  has  not  been  extended  to  companies  in  the  international 
fmancial  setvices  centre,  the  Shannon  customs-free  airport,  nor  to  the  special  building 
incentives in designated areas for urban renewal. - 103-
In 1988 a tax was imposed on pension fund investment income on a once-off basis on the 
grounds that pension funds had earned 'exceptionally high returns on their investments'. 
Indirect  taxes  on  goods  and  services  produce  over  forty  percent  of total  government 
revenue. Excise duties are high in comparison with  the EC average and also  in  comparison 
to the UK, where excise duties brought in 4.9  percent of GDP in  1988.  VAT is charged at 
the following rates (according to the 1992 Budget): 
- 0%: 
- 10%: 
- 121h%: 
-16%: 
- 21%: 
food, books, exports and children's clothing and footwear; 
building and hotel accommodation and newspapers; 
domestic energy products, meals, entertainment, agricultural services; 
fuel,  electricity, telecommunication, repair and maintenance, most clothing and 
footwear; 
other goods and services. 
As  to  social  security  contributions,  various  rates  apply  to  different  classes  of 
employment. The PRSI (Pay Related Social Insurance) rate for private sector employees is 
7.75%  for  earned income up  to £19,000  and 2.25%  for  all  other income  over this amount. 
The employer's PRSI rate is 12.2% up to a salary limit of £20,300. 
For the personal  income tax  two  rates  exist  in  1992:  27%  and 48%,  respectively.
36  It is 
the intentention of the government to achieve a standard rate of personal income tax of 25% 
by 1993; the Programme for Economic and Social Progress envisages only one higher rate of 
44%,  replacing  the existing  higher  rates.  In  the  UK the  1991/92  top  tax  rate amounts  to 
40%. 
Due to  various allowances,  the tax  base  is  eroded.  Allowances  can  be placed  into four 
categories: 
1.  basic exemptions, i.e. single, married and widowed persons allowances; 
2.  secondary  allowances  and  exemptions,  i.e.  income  exempted  because  of the recipient's 
age, or physical incapacity; 
3.  discretionary reliefs,  i.e. :income, exempted because of the way  in which income is. earned 
or disposed of; and 
4.  other allowances. 
Table  9.9  provides  further  information  on  the  relative  importance  of  each  category  of 
allowances. As follows  from  table 9.9,  exempt income in  1985/86 amounted to 76.8  percent 
36  Income tax due on employment income is collected by means of a withholding tax on the 
employer known as PA  YE - Pay As You Earn. A corresponding system is  applied to the 
collection of social security taxes (Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI). The employer is 
responsible for the withholding of amounts due. - 104-
of the income tax base; in  1989/90 this ratio had dropped to 68.4  percent. It is likely,  that 
this reduction in exempted income (as a proportion of the tax base) results mainly from the 
buoyancy of the economy. 
Table 9.9 Estimates of income exempted by category, 1981-1990 
1981/82  1985/86  1989/90 
Basic  56.3  55.1  63.5 
Secondary  13.4  16.0  3.7 
Discretionary  9.2  12.2  14.9 
Other  21.2  16.7  18.0 
Total  (%)  100  100  100 
<£million)  2462  4086  4703 
Tax  base<£ million)  3946  5321  6870 
Source: National Economic and Social Council 
A  number of benefits-in-kind  (free fuel  allowance,  free medical treatment) are available to 
those receiving welfare benefits, but not to those employed even if their income is almost as 
low. The overall result is that many low-paid workers find themselves in a 'welfare trap'. 
Taxes on immovable property are very low, as the Residential Property Tax (RPT) base is 
eroded,  notably  due  to  the  high  levels  at  which  exempted  property  values  and  income 
tresholds  are set.  In  1992/93  these  tresholds  were  slightly  reduced  to  £90,000  (property 
value) and £27,500 (income). 
9.5 Budgetary process 
The government sector in Ireland consists of the central government, local governments, and 
the social security system. Tax autonomy of local government is limited. 
There is  widespread government intervention in  the private sector through  an extensive 
array of subsidies and tax privileges. According to the EC First Survey on State Aid in the 
European Community, total aid to industry amounted to 5.3  percent of GDP in the period 
1981-86,  which  is  high  if compared to  the EC average  of 3.0  percent.  Aid  to  industry  is 
currently  cut  back.  The  State  enterprise  sector  is  rather  extensive.  In  addition  to  state 
provision of electricity, gas,  telephone services and most transport, state companies are also 
involved in banking, insurance, fertilisers, petrol-refining, steel, sugar, and car ferries. - 105-
The target for budgetary policy of central government is  a further reduction of the debt-
to-GDP ratio.  Multi-annual budget plans - from  year t to  t +  2 or t +  3 - are used,  but these 
plans are not explicit about the evolution of expenditure and revenue. Moreover, such plans 
are only indicative and they are not being revised when new  information on its constituent 
components  or on the underlying  assumptions  becomes available.  In  order to  increase the 
reliability of multi-annual budget plans, a revision procedure might be helpful, since it would 
allow policymakers to obtain a realistic view of the efforts needed to reach specified targets. 
In  the  most  recent  plan,  the Programme for Economic  and Social  Progress  1991-1993,  the 
debt-ratio is the only quantified macroeconomic target. 
In terms of completeness and transparancy the Irish budget shows a good score. As to the 
parliamentary process, there are no restrictions on amendments by parliament. 
The  Ministry  of Finance  monitors  the  execution  of  the  budget  on  a  quarterly  basis. 
Spending overruns require a supplementary budget law.  Transfers between chapters of the 
budget are only allowed after approval of the minister of Finance. Carry-over of expenditure 
to the next year is not allowed. 
9. 6 Recent developments 
According to  the  1992  Budget  the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement  (EBR)  amounted to 
2.1  percent  of GDP  (in  1991),  of which  0.8  percent  is  destined  for  capital  investment 
purposes.  The  1992  estimate  implies  a  slight  increase  of the  EBR  to  2.4  percent.  Public 
service pay is about 9 percent above the 1991  provisional outturn, due to the carryover cost 
of pay increases awarded in  1991, usual provision for increments and a package of measures 
to implement the Pay Agreement which forms part of the PESP. The minister of Finance has 
argued that: "Were it not for this package, I would have had to find  mtire than £100 million 
extra to fund the cost of pay increases this year  ..... The package is absolutely essential in 1992 
to enable us to keap Exchequer borrowing under control" (Budget 1992, p.16). 
Social welfare spending is increased to provide full protection of benefits against inflation, 
while some programmes have been improved in real terms. 
As to taxation, it is the government's intention to achieve a standard personal income tax 
rate  of 25%,  with  a  single  higher  rate  of 44%.  The  1992  Budget  included  the  following 
measures in this respect: 
- reduction of the standard income tax rate of 29% to 27%; - 106-
-reduction of the top rate from 52% to 48%; 
- increase of personal exemptions. 
Some tax base broadening measures were also announced,  including the abolishment of the 
tax relief on life assurance. Tax reliefs for certain kinds of dividend income and for proceeds 
of profit-sharing schemes are also to be abolished. Fringe benefits will be taxed as from April 
6,  1993.  Unemployment benefits will be treated as income for  tax purposes, but this change 
will not take place until 1993. 
The 1992 Budget also proposed some changes to VAT-rates (section 9.4) and the lowering 
of certain  excises  (new  cars,  petrol)  and  the increase of others (including cigarettes).  The 
road tax for vehicles is also raised. 
9. 7 Flexibility of  fiscal policy 
As has been explained in section 9.2,  the Irish success in reducing public sector imbalances 
has  been  greatly  helped  by  external  economic  developments.  Although  the  general 
government  deficit  has  been brought  down  considerably,  the  Irish  public  finances  are still 
vulnerable  due  to  the  enormous  overhang of public  debt.  Despite  a  substantial  reduction 
since  1987,  the  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  still  hovers  around  100  percent,  with  a 
corresponding interest burden of 8-9  percent of GDP.  The high  debt ratio implies that the 
fiscal outlook is very sensitive to changes in international interest rates
37 and the growth rate 
of world  trade.  This  became  all  to  clear  in  1991  when  low  economic  growth  and  rising 
unemployment led to an increase of government's net borrowing. Policy efforts are presently 
aimed at reducing the debt ratio to 100 percent in terms of GNP by  1993 and to 75  percent 
by  2000.  In  terms of GDP,  which  in  recent years  has  been considerably higher  than· GNP, 
these targets conform to a debt-ratio of 89 percent in 1993  and of 65  percent in 2000.  Such 
targets  pose a  big  challenge  to  policymakers.  During this  century a  60  percent debt  ratio 
could not be achieved without a significant rise in the primary surplus. Nevertheless, the debt 
ratio will continue declining. 
37  A  number  of factors  combine  to  determine  the vulnerability  of the  public  finances  to 
interest rate changes.  The major factors  are the level of the debt and its  duration. The 
Irish position can currently be characterised as being high debt/short duration. - 107-
· Scope to increase revenues 
While overall tax levels in  the Irish economy are not among the highest within the EC,  the 
incidence  of taxation  is  uneven,  the  main  burden  being  borne  by  labour  income.  This  is 
reflected  in  the emergence of a very substantial 'tax wedge' between gross  labour cost  and 
net wage.  This large tax wedge  acts as a powerful disincentive to both labour demand and 
labour supply.  It is,  therefore, desirable to reduce the high average and marginal rates of tax 
on earned income, as argued by the National Economic and Social Council. 
Although some progress has been made both in reducing tax rates and in broadening the 
tax  base,  Irish  personal income  tax  rates are still  rather high  by  international  standards.
38 
The  number  of tax  brackets  has  been  reduced  to  two  by  1992  (from  six  in  1983).  The 
combination  of marginal  income  tax  rates and  social  insurance contributions  makes  for  a 
complicated  marginal rate structure, with  quite high  rates existing  at relatively  low  income 
levels,  thereby affecting a large proportion of tax payers. This is largely the cumulative result 
of past failures to index the income tax system for inflation. 
The tax base is severely eroded by a wide range of allowances, reliefs and exemptions (see 
section 9.4).  Taxation  of imputed  rent from  owner-occupied houses was  abolished  in  1969. 
Tax relief for interest on loans for non-business purposes is, for instance, relatively generous. 
Recently, some restrictions have been introduced, with 80 percent of interest paid now being 
deductable, with a cap. Further broadening of the tax base seems desirable. It is noteworthy, 
that tax yield from farm incomes is unsatisfactory as only a minority of farmers are liable to 
tax.  Among  the  options  to  increase  tax  revenues,  the  least  distorting  seems  to  be  the 
introduction of a tax on residential property. 
To prevent cross-border revenue losses,  Irish tax  rates have been brought closer to those 
in  the United Kingdom,  where the standard VAT rate now  amounts to  17.5%.  No  further 
adjustment is required here. A target to increase revenue may be the abolition of zero VAT-
rated consumer items. The National Economic and Social Council advisis to apply a 3% rate 
on presently zero-rated items. 
One of the reasons why  the tax burden on income and expenditure is so high,  is  the fact 
that taxes on capital and corporate income tax do  not produce much revenue.  The base of 
capital taxation is seriously eroded by exemptions and reliefs. Capital gains on a wide variety 
of assets are tax exempt. Although a start has been made with the phasing out of accelerated 
depreciation provisions,  the prolongation of the 10% manufacturing rate to 2010  has greatly 
38  Tax rate reductions since  1986  have not only  been financed  by  broadening the tax  base, 
but also to a considerable extent by the buoyancy of tax revenues. - 108-
reduced policy options to reform corporate income taxation. 
There  is  no  comprehensive  long-term  policy  of  public  sector  asset  privatisation. 
Improvement of the commercial performance of public enterprises has been emphasized by 
imposing stricter financial conditions on  investment.  Government guaranteed debt of public 
enterprises has fallen from  25  percent of GNP in  1986 to 17 percent in  1990.
39 The financial 
position  of  public  enterprises  has  improved  somewhat  since  the  mid-1980s.  In  1991 
substantial receipts from privatisation (about 1 percent of GDP) were obtained. There seems 
to be some scope for further privatisation. 
Table 9.10 summarizes the flexibility of fiscal policy with respect to government revenue. 
Scope to reduce expenditure 
During the second half of the 1980s current expenditure was considerably cut back. Much of 
this  reduction  has been  accomplished  through adjustment of public sector employment and 
wage  conditions.  The recent  increase in  current spending probably reflects catch-up  effects 
from  previous years when  the relative income position of public sector employees worsened 
(table  9.3).  However,  given  the sensitivity of the budget  to public  sector wages,  continued 
restraint seems warranted here. 
Changes in  the age structure of populations have important implications for the demand 
for  social  transfers  and  services.  The  ageing  of the  population  is  likely  to  increase  the 
demand for pensions and for health care, while demographic pressure on education systems, 
family benefits, and other services utilised mainly by young people may decrease. Ireland has 
a  relatively  young  population.  In  1980  the  percentage  of population  aged  65  and  over 
amounted to  10.7  percent, which  is  rather low  in  comparison to  the OECD-average of 12.2 
percent.  By  1990  the  share  of old  people  in  the  total  population  had  increased  to  11.3 
percent. According to  OECD projections this will slightly decrease to  11.1  percent by  2000, 
while the share of population aged 0-14  (27.5 percent in  1990}, is projected to decline to 23.2 
percent in  2000  (OECD (1988)).  Projections by  Holzmann  (1988)  indicate that taking into 
account the isolated impact of demographic change, the share of pension expenditure in Irish 
national income will  fall  until  2000.  Educational spending is  another area where projected 
demographic trends should allow some savings to be made. The drop in the birth rate since 
1980  and  emigration  of individuals  in  the  pre-childbearing  age  group  should  allow  for 
39  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 59. (10) 
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Expenditure  overruns  have  to  be  fiatted  by  supplementary budget  laws,  but  carry-over  of 
unspent resources is allowed. The minister of Finance has certain powers to phase payments 
appropriations throughout the year. There are usually rather big differences between original 
budget targets and final  outturns.
53  It is  remarkable, that there is  no  self-correcting mecha-
nism in case of budgetary overruns. 
10.6 Recent developments 
A sad tradition of missed budgetary targets continued in 1991. Estimated current expenditure 
was  higher  than  originally  planned  for  and  revenues  fell  short  of projections.  The  main 
objectives of the Italian Programme of  Economic Convergence (1992-1994)  are to reduce both 
the rate of inflation  and  the budget  deficit.  The main instruments  are an  incomes  policy, 
primarily directed at wages  of public sector employees,  and a substantial privatisation plan. 
Other measures relate to  a revision of the pension system and the funding of local govern-
ment.  Regarding  the  pension  system  it  is  important  to  realize  that  central  government 
transfers to social security funds in  1990 amounted to 6.7 percent of GDP, which is equal to 
about two thirds of the general government deficit. 
The 1992 Budget Bill set the target for the state-sector borrowing requirement at 127,800 
billion  Lire,  implying a corrective manoeuver of 55,500  billion Lire.  Of this amount 30,500 
billion Lire wi!!  be found  by  increasing revenue (including 9,000  billion  Lire privatisations) 
and 25,000 billion Lire from spending cuts. 
Higher revenue is  sought  through broadening the tax base of income taxes  by  way  of a 
reduction of tax facilities,  stricter enforcement to counter tax erosion and higher taxation in 
specific areas, that have thus far enjoyed particularly favourable tax treatment. 
Spending  cuts  have  to  be  realized  through  containment  of public sector  salaries  (by 
limiting wage increases and personnel), reduced transfers to the National Institute for Social 
Security, to the Regions,  to local government and to local public health administrations, and 
by lower capital transfers to public enterprises and local government. 
S3  For an illustration see OECD Economic Surveys,  1989, p. 78. - 124-
The medium term objectives are to reduce the state sector deficit from 10 percent in 1991 
to 5.5  percent of GNP in  1994  and to reverse the upward trend of the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio as from 1994. 
Structural policies are aimed at privatisation of public enterprises; reduction of state aid 
(in the period 1986-1988  total aid has already been reduced by  approximately 1 percent of 
GDP)  to  3 percent  of GDP;  reforming public  sector  employment;  reform  of the pension 
system and changing local government finances. 
In 1992 the incoming government announced plans for unprecedented large spending cuts 
with  substantial  reductions  in  spending  relating  to  pensions  and  health  care.  These  plans 
immediately  provoked  massive  strikes  with  pleas  for  a  different  distribution  of  fiscal 
adjustments, for instance by eliminating massive tax evasion by the self-employed. 
Expenditure pressures in the 1990s 
Expenditure pressures may be expected in several policy areas. 
Compensation of employees (1989:  12.1 percent of GDP). The decline of relative govern-
ment wages  in  the  1980s  will  produce  'catch-up'  effects  in  the  1990s,  which  have  already 
materialized. 
Social security and welfare (1989:  16.2 percent of GDP). Since these expenditures showed 
a very substantial growth in the 1980s, at a time when the dependency ratio actually declined 
(6.6 percent) such outlays will be very difficult to control in the 1990s when the dependency 
ratio is expected to rise by 4 percent. 
Interest payments (1989:  9 percent of GDP). Since no change is  projected in  net borro-
wing  and  the  debt  is  expected  to  increase  (relative  to  GDP),  in  the  absence  of a  sharp 
decrease in  interest rates,  interest payments will  continue to  absorb  a  growing  amount of 
public  resources.  Moreover,  reduced  confidence  of  financial  markets  in  Italian  debt  can 
easily  lead  to  a  relative  increase in  Italian  interest  rates.  Moreover., .given  the very  short 
maturity of the debt  (31  months in September  1989;
54  and  about 85  percent of negotiable 
government debt either has a maturity of less than twelve  months or bears floating rates
55
) 
any increase of interest rates will immediately translate into higher interest payments, further 
worsening the financial  position  of the government.  Treasury gross  borrowing requirement 
54  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1990, p. 43. 
55  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1989, p. 92. - 125-
was  around 40  percent of GDP in  1990.
56  Moreover,  it is  rather alarming to note that the 
net Italian government borrowing requirement is roughly equal to the combined deficit of all 
other EC Member States. 
10. 7 Flexibility of  fiscal policy 
In the Italian case, considering the sheer magnitude of policy adjustments required to meet 
the fiscal criteria of EMU, it will be impossible to completely concentrate on the expenditure 
side of the budget. Policymakers will  also have to find  additional revenue, although this can 
easily have negative implications for convergence of Italian and EC inflation rates. The most 
efficient way  to raise revenue is by increasing the efficiency of the tax system, by privatisati-
on  and  by  increased  use  of the benefit principle,  because such  policies will  induce greater 
efficiency. Such measures will no doubt meet with resistance, because initially subsidized jobs 
will  be lost and because of adverse income  effects.  Given  present investment performance, 
spending  cuts  will  have  to  spare capital  expenditure,  although  this  category  of outlays  is 
flexible in the short run. 
This  section  scrutinizes  factors  influencing  the  degree  of  flexibility  of  revenues  and 
spending items by category. Results are summarized in tables 10.7 and 10.8 respectively. 
Scope to increase tax revenues 
In the Italian case, there seems to be only limited scope to increase the rates and to broaden 
the base  of certain  taxes,  so  as  to  improve  the  overall  budgetary  position  of the general 
government. Taxes on portfolio income of individuals may have to be lowered by discretiona-
ry rate reductions, since otherwise erosion of the tax base through tax evasion and avoidance 
will probably result. Italy has presently a 32.4% withholding tax on dividends, a 15% withhol-
ding  tax  on interest paid out and  a  21%  withholding  tax  on  royalties:~  The country has  an 
extensive  network  of  45  double  taxation  agreements,  which  generally  reduce  tax  to  be 
withheld to 5-15%. 
Increasing the present rate of the corporate income  tax  (including local  tax  about 46%) 
does  not  seem  to  be  advisable,  given  that  in  the  European  Community  rates  tend  to 
converge  in  the 35-40%  band.  Nevertheless,  it  may  be possible  to  tap  this  tax  source  to 
greater avail  by  way  of improved  enforcement,  reduction  of certain  tax  expenditures  and 
revaluation of business assets. 
56  Ibidem, p. 43. - 126-
Given  rates and  the weak  relationship between  the VAT tax base and macro-economic 
consumption,  VAT  revenues  can  almost  certainly  be  substantially  increased  by  improved 
enforcement. The rates of certain excise duties (cigarettes, distilled alcohol and wine) can be 
raised, since these are low compared with those in other EC countries. On wine there even is 
no  duty at all.  Harmonisation will  lead to  revenue losses from  excise  duties on mineral oil 
products and natural gas. 
It is  quite obvious, that taxes on labour use will have to be raised in  order to bring them 
in  line with  total social security outlays.  The gap  between total outlays and revenues from 
social security contributions explains about two thirds of the total general government deficit. 
The deductability of social security payments for  enterprises operating in  the Mezzogiorno 
could be limited. 
Revenues from  taxes  on income of individuals  (presently  10  percent of GDP) are below 
the EC average. The top rate of the national Italian income tax  (50%) lies in between the 
top  rates  of its  Northern  neighbours,  France  (56.8%)  and  Switzerland  (11.5%  plus  local 
income taxes of 14.5-20% in major cities). The potential for broadening the personal income 
tax  base is  -judging from  OECD-data - very  limited,  since  erosion of the tax  base hardly 
occurs.  Nevertheless,  revenue  potential  of the  personal  income  tax  could  be substantially 
enlarged by  improving enforcement of the existing legislation. There seems every reason to 
expect substantial revenue gains by  improving the tax effort of self-employed and the liberal 
professions.  Ever since  the introduction  of the indexation  of the income brackets in  1990, 
fiscal dividend from inflation can no longer be counted on. 
As taxes  on property are at present relatively unimportant revenue sources,  there seems 
to be scope for expanding their role in the Italian tax mix. This would bring the tax mix more 
in line with the EC average. Especially taxes on immovable property can hardly be avoided 
by taxpayers, which is an additional plus, given the present weak enforcement of major taxes 
on income and consumer spending. 
Scope to increase non-tax revenue 
Outstanding  public  debt  could  be reduced  by  privatising  part of the  assets  of the public 
sector. OECOS?  estimates put the value of such assets at some 60  percent of public debt, on 
which  the nominal yield  is  less  than 2%.  Privatisation  could  positively  affect  expectations, 
possibly  triggering lower  interest  rates.  Of course,  there  is  the  danger  that  proceeds  of 
privatisation will be used to postpone necessary spending cuts elsewhere in  the budget. One 
57  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1990, p. 86. - 127-
also  has to realize that proceeds f,rom  privatisation by  definition do  not change net borro-
wing - since this deficit concept excludes net investment - and that the proceeds have a once-
for-all character. Such considerations indicate that privatisation cannot be a perfect substitute 
for other forms of budget consolidation. Meeting the EMU debt criterion solely by selling off 
government assets will  not be appreciated by  debtors and EC policymakers alike.  Govern-
ment debt can be reduced, but the eventual contribution of privatisation to long term budget 
consolidation  will  depend  on  the positive  gap  between  lost  proceeds  of assets  sold,  and 
interest payments foregone on government debt redeemed. The general performance of the 
economy can be improved if privatisation leads to efficiency gains. The potential to increase 
revenue by privatisation in the short run is - for the time being - limited by the absense of a 
good blueprint or implementation strategy. 
Other non-tax revenues can be enlarged through a greater role for the benefit principle, 
with user fees tied to the use of public services. 
Scope to reduce outlays 
As public expenditure net of interest payments is close to the EC average, observers should 
not be too optimistic in assessing the possibilities for spending cuts. Moreover, demographic, 
political and regional factors will interfere with any substantial intervention. 
General public  services,  defense,  public  order and  safety  are provisions  typically  in  the 
traditional public  domain,  where  expenditure  pressures  from  the  demand  side  are almost 
absent. Nevertheless, in  Italy some reduction of their GDP share could be achieved by wage 
restraint,  combined  with  some  increase  in  efficiency  induced  by  a  limitation  of  price 
compensation.  Defense  might  contribute  some  'peace  dividend',  especially  by  reduced 
procurement. 
In recent decades there has been much  demand  pressure on  welfare state expenditures 
which  is  likely  to  continue  in  the  1990s.  Nevertheless,  some  flexibility  will  remain.  For 
expenditures with a merit good character, like education and health,  it must be possible to 
realize  some  efficiency  gains  and  to  profit from  government  wage  restraint.  Spending  on 
education can  be constrained  in  line with  the expected  fall  of the young  age  dependency 
ratio. The substantial rise in the projected old age dependency ratio in the 1990s (  4.2 percent 
point) will put strong upward pressure on health care spending. Some of that pressure can be 
taken  away  by  increasing  the role  of user fees  for  buyers  of medicine  and  for  diagnostic 
activities, which will reduce demand and costs. 
Over  half of public  spending on  housing  and  community  amenities,  the third  spending - 128-
category with a merit good character, consists of capital expenditure which is flexible from a 
technical point of view. As this expenditure component hardly showed any increase over the 
1980s (capital expenditure even declined relative to GDP), there is probably little room for a 
downward change. 
Social security and welfare spending is  by  far  the most importatnt expenditure category 
identified in table  10.4,  increasing by  over 3 percent points during the 1980s.  Social security 
and welfare  outlays  consist  of a  price and  a  volume  component.  The price component  is 
flexible  from  a  technical point of view,  but as  this  directly affects  the income (of relatively 
poor individuals) it will politically prove to be very difficult to bring down public outlays this 
way.  Such  political problems are aggravated  by  large  regional  differences  in  income levels 
and  dependency ratio's.  The volume component strongly depends  on  the general economic 
outlook which  is  difficult  to  change  in  the short run.  Much  upward  pressure on spending 
levels is  to be expected from the ageing of the population. The old age dependency ratio in 
the 1990s is projected to rise by 4.2 percent (from the working age population), which except 
for  Greece is  much more than in  any other EC  Member State, and double the European 
average.  Public  spending  on  pensions,  which  represents  almost  one  third  of current  non-
interest  expenditure,  constitutes  a  serious  threat  to  any  consolidation  efforts.  Corrective 
measures  can  be  taken  by  raising  the  retirement  age  to  European  levels,  by  reducing 
maximum benefits and by adjusting indexation mechanisms. 
Recreational,  cultural  and  religious  affairs  are only  small  expenditure  items  1n  relative 
terms which remained essentially constant over the 1980s.  Flexibility is assumed to be rather 
small here. 
This  brings  us  to  the  mixed  economy  items  'economic  services'  and  'other  functions' 
(mainly  interest  payments).  Spending  on  economic  services  (including  transportation, 
communication, and state aid to industry) - after a rise in  the mid  1980s - returned in  1989 
to  its  1980  level,  in  terms of GDP,  as  a  result of declining subsidies and current transfers. 
The  capital  formation  component  of economic  services  (about  one  fourth)  is  technically 
flexible  in  the short run.  However,  from  an  economic point of view  it would  not be a wise 
policy  to  cut  these  expenditures,  since  they  contribute  to  the productivity  of the national 
economy as  a whole.  It is  more obvious  to  reduce various state aids,  as Italy's level is  well 
above the EC average (Italy 3.1 versus the EC 2.2 percent of GDP in  1986-1988).  Moreover, 
other Member States - as a result of Community policy - are also  reducing financial aid  to 
industry. 
Interest payments now are in the same range as the borrowing requirement (10 percent of - 129-
GDP). The discretionary flexibility of these payments is  almost nil.  The automatic flexibility 
of the interest-to-GDP ratio is  great. Interest rates are fixed  exogenously and rate changes 
quickly translate into higher interest payments due to the short average term-to-maturity of 
the debt. The high debt level combined with the persistent deficit can easily create credibility 
problems. Since interest payments are in no way positively associated with GDP growth,  the 
latter also strongly influences the interest-to-GDP ratio through the 'denominator effect'. As 
these arguments cut both ways,  there can  be an  important automatic upward  flexibility  of 
interest spending as well as automatic downward flexibility. T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
7
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
b
u
d
q
e
t
 
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
c
a
t
e
q
o
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
X
t
a
l
y
B
 
+
+
b
 
+
b
 
_
c
 
_
_
 
c
 
t
o
t
a
l
d
 
1
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
t
a
x
 
C
o
n
p
!
t
 
i
t
 
i
o
n
 
.
.
 
2
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
b
a
s
e
 
t
a
x
 
C
o
n
p
!
t
 
i
t
 
i
o
n
 
+
 
(
3
.
5
)
 
3
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
&
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
b
a
s
e
 
h
a
r
m
o
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
+
 
(
5
.
6
)
 
3
.
1
 
V
A
T
 
3
.
2
 
E
x
c
i
s
e
 
d
u
t
i
e
s
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
h
a
r
m
o
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
+
 
(
3
.
9
)
 
3
.
3
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
0
 
(
0
.
9
)
 
4
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
d
e
c
b
:
t
 
i
-
+
+
 
(
2
.
4
)
 
4
.
1
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
.
 
c
o
n
t
r
.
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
o
n
s
 
M
e
z
z
o
g
i
o
m
o
;
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
4
.
2
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
.
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
 
+
+
 
(
8
.
7
)
 
4
.
3
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
.
 
s
e
l
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
0
 
(
1
.
2
)
 
4
.
4
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
0
 
(
0
.
2
)
 
5
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
;
 
r
e
a
l
 
G
O
P
 
i
n
d
e
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
+
 
(
1
0
)
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
6
.
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
r
a
t
e
s
;
 
b
a
s
e
 
+
+
 
(
0
.
9
)
 
7
.
 
M
i
s
c
e
l
l
a
n
e
o
u
s
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
(
·
)
 
8
.
 
N
o
n
-
t
a
x
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
+
+
 
(
2
.
 
7
)
 
a
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
~
'
l
'
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
i
s
 
p
r
i
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
b
o
l
d
 
t
y
p
e
.
 
b
 
A
 
p
l
u
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
u
p
w
a
r
d
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
)
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
(
%
 
G
O
P
)
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
s
i
g
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
c
 
A
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
d
o
w
n
w
a
r
d
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
l
o
w
e
r
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
,
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
)
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
%
G
O
P
)
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
P
,
O
l
i
c
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
s
i
g
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
0
 
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
O
P
 
(
1
9
8
9
)
 
i
s
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
w
 
0
 T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
8
 
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
b
u
d
q
e
t
 
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
c
a
t
e
q
o
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
X
t
a
l
y
a
 
+
+
b
 
+
b
 
_
c
 
_
_
 
c
 
1
.
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
-
w
a
g
e
s
;
 
+
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
-
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
2
.
 
D
e
f
e
n
s
e
 
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
+
+
 
3
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
-
w
a
g
e
s
 
+
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
4
.
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
-
+
+
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
;
 
p
e
n
d
f
t
u
r
e
>
;
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
5
.
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
;
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
+
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
-
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
6
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
l
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
;
 
G
O
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
G
O
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
;
 
+
 
f
a
r
e
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
7
.
 
H
o
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
a
m
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
e
x
-
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
(
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
-
+
 
m
e
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
8
.
 
R
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
,
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
+
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
u
s
 
a
f
f
a
i
r
s
 
9
.
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
;
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
a
r
g
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
+
+
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
a
i
d
 
1
0
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
;
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
 
0
 
G
O
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
G
O
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
c
o
n
s
o
l
i
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
i
s
 
p
r
i
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
b
o
l
d
 
t
y
p
e
.
 
b
 
A
 
p
l
u
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
d
o
w
n
w
a
r
d
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
l
e
s
s
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
,
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
)
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
C
X
 
G
O
P
)
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
b
u
i
l
t
-
i
n
-
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
.
 
t
o
t
a
l
d
 
(
4
.
2
)
 
(
2
.
1
)
 
(
 
1
.
 
7
)
 
(
5
.
2
)
 
(
5
.
8
)
 
(
1
6
.
3
)
 
(
1
.
5
)
 
(
0
.
6
)
 
(
6
.
4
)
 
(
8
.
4
)
 
T
h
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
o
r
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
s
i
g
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
c
 
A
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
u
p
w
a
r
d
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
m
o
r
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
,
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
)
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
%
G
O
P
)
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
b
u
i
l
t
-
i
n
-
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
o
r
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
s
i
g
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
d
 
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
G
O
P
 
(
1
9
9
1
>
 
i
s
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
9
 
M
a
j
o
r
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
-
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
8
9
a
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
p
o
r
t
-
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
r
p
o
-
V
A
T
 
E
x
c
i
s
e
 
d
u
t
i
e
s
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
-
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
-
T
a
x
e
s
 
N
o
n
-
t
a
x
 
r
e
·
 
f
o
l
i
o
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
r
i
t
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
-
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
-
o
n
 
p
r
o
·
 
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
b
 
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
e
m
·
 
e
n
J
;
)
l
o
y
e
r
s
/
s
e
l
f
-
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
p
e
r
t
y
 
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
e
n
J
;
)
l
.
 
1
9
8
0
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
s
p
i
r
i
t
s
,
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
;
 
p
r
i
-
e
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e
;
 
c
e
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
;
 
m
o
t
o
r
 
v
e
-
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
;
 
p
o
s
t
a
l
 
h
i
c
l
e
s
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
 
p
a
y
-
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
 
m
e
n
t
 
1
9
8
1
 
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e
 
1
9
8
2
 
r
a
t
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
;
 
b
e
e
r
;
 
b
a
n
a
-
b
a
s
e
;
 
p
r
o
-
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e
;
 
n
a
s
;
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
p
e
r
t
y
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
r
v
.
 
1
9
8
3
 
r
a
t
e
s
,
 
b
a
s
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
m
o
t
o
r
 
v
e
h
i
c
l
e
s
;
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
p
e
-
s
i
c
k
n
e
s
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
 
p
a
y
-
-
r
a
t
e
 
t
r
o
l
 
m
e
n
t
 
w
 
1
9
8
4
 
e
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
b
a
s
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
;
 
d
i
e
s
e
l
;
 
h
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
o
i
l
 
b
a
s
e
 
b
u
i
 
l
-
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
d
i
n
g
s
 
1
9
8
5
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
·
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
t
a
x
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
r
-
I
 
o
n
s
;
 
p
e
n
a
l
t
y
 
p
e
n
a
l
t
y
 
l
a
t
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
v
i
c
e
s
;
 
p
u
-
l
a
t
e
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
b
l
 
i
c
 
t
r
a
n
s
-
p
o
r
t
 
1
9
8
6
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
p
e
t
r
o
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
1
9
8
7
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
b
a
s
e
;
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
;
 
r
o
a
d
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
-
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
 
p
a
y
-
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
e
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
t
a
x
;
 
s
u
r
c
h
a
r
g
e
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
m
e
n
t
 
1
9
8
8
 
t
i
g
h
t
e
n
i
n
g
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
i
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
;
 
s
u
r
t
a
x
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
 1
9
8
9
 
e
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
;
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
;
 
'
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
u
t
i
-
l
 
i
t
y
;
 
a
d
n
i
-
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
 
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
:
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
,
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
A
 
'
R
e
c
e
n
t
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
'
,
 
1
9
8
0
 
-
1
9
8
9
.
 
b
 
F
o
r
 
s
i
m
p
l
i
c
i
t
y
,
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
-
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
 
l
i
k
e
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
t
i
n
g
 
t
a
x
 
e
v
a
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
,
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
.
 T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
.
1
0
 
M
a
j
o
r
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
c
u
t
s
 
i
n
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
8
9
a
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
r
-
D
e
f
e
n
s
e
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
H
o
u
s
i
n
g
 
R
e
c
r
e
a
t
.
,
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
O
t
-
v
i
c
e
s
b
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
C
O
f
l
'
l
l
l
J
-
c
u
l
t
.
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
h
e
r
 
n
i
t
y
 
a
m
e
-
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
u
s
 
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
f
f
a
i
r
s
 
1
9
8
0
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
1
9
8
1
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
e
x
p
.
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
e
x
p
.
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
s
t
a
f
f
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
a
C
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
;
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
;
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
1
9
8
4
 
w
a
g
e
s
;
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
;
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
1
9
8
5
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
;
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
e
n
-
t
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
1
9
8
8
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
r
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
;
 
p
o
s
t
 
o
f
f
.
 
1
9
8
9
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
;
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
 
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
i
n
:
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
,
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
A
 
'
R
e
c
e
n
t
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
'
,
 
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
8
9
.
 
b
 
F
o
r
 
s
i
m
p
l
i
c
i
t
y
,
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
c
u
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
 
l
i
k
e
 
w
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
c
a
p
s
,
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
.
 
-
w
 - 132-
11. The Netherlands 
11.1 Introduction 
The  Netherlands  is  one  of the  six  founding  members  of the  European  Community.  The 
Dutch  economy  may  be  characterised  as  being  both  small  and  extremely  open.  In  1991 
exports  and  imports of goods  and services constituted 58  percent and 54  percent of GDP, 
respectively. 
Over the past decade,  GDP growth  reflected the worldwide  recession of the early  1980s 
and  the  ensuing  recovery  of  the  international  economy.  On  average,  real  GDP  growth 
hovered around 2 percent, slightly below the EC average. 
Table  11.1  provides some additional information on the performance of the Netherlands 
economy in the 1980s.  Inflation was  {far)  below  the average  experience of most  other EC 
Member States. All told,  employment measured in constant labor years hardly increased. It 
took several years with  strong employment growth  to  make up for  the earlier loss  of jobs 
during the recession years 1981-84. Unemployment, after peaking at 11.7 percent in  1983-84, 
gradually fell  to  6.1  percent of the labour force  ( =  325,000)  by  1991,  somewhat below  the 
present EC average.  However,  a  statistical  artefact  hides  the true size  of unemployment, 
since perhaps as  much as  a quarter million  of 'hidden' unemployed have been absorbed by 
public disability programs. Moreover, higher enrollment rates in tertiary education, substanti-
al participation in newly  introduced early retirement programs, and the growth of part-time 
jobs all served to restrict labour supply. 
Both in  the 1960s and the 1970s labour succeeded in  shifting part of then strongly rising 
tax burdens onto recipients of capital income. Also, income losses  du~  ~9 deteriorating terms 
of trade have in part been made good through additional wage demands. Sharply in contrast, 
the economic recovery of the second half of the 1980s was  preceded by  a marked improve-
ment  of the share of capital  in  value  added  (from  10  to  20  percent).  In  tandem,  overall 
inequality of the personal income distribution has increased somewhat. Nevertheless, by  1989 
- the latest year for which such information is  available - the personal income distribution in 
the Netherlands was flatter than in almost any other EC Member State. 
Levelling  of personal incomes  is  to  an  important  degree  the  result  of public  programs. 
Indeed, "among OECD countries the Netherlands is one of those which have gone furthest in 
their  sustained  efforts  to  promote  a  tolerant,  caring  and  supportive  society  through  the - 133-
action of government" .
58 
The rise of the welfare state has been reflected in  a particularly strong growth in public 
spending and  taxation  levels  after the mid  1950s.  In  the longer  run,  the expansion  of the 
public sector is largely explained by the increase of transfer payments to private households. 
First, the volume of such transfers has tremendously grown. The number of benefit recipients 
(B)  has  continually outgrown  the labour force  (L).  Between  1960  and  1986  the B/L ratio 
exploded  from  0.36  to 0.86,  to  (temporarily) stabilize only  in  the second  half of the 1980s. 
Second, over the years the relative price of transfers has risen. In 1960 average benefits (b) 
amounted  to  25  percent of average wage  income  (w),  whereas by  1980  the b/w-ratio  had 
climbed to 0.43. By the early 1990s successive reductions of benefit levels during the previous 
decade had brought the b/w ratio down somewhat to 0.38. 
In the 1960s  and early 1970s  the expansion of the public sector was greatly facilitated by 
relatively  high  rates  of economic  growth.  The  decline  in  national  economic  performance 
during the later 1970s and early 1980s triggered a financial 'crisis' of the Dutch welfare state. 
As from 1975 annual budget deficits have been large in historical terms. This was reflected in 
the subsequent upsweep of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio from  0.42 in the mid 
1970s to 0.80 in 1992. 
Table 11.1  Main economic indicators, 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
GOP  growth  0.9  -0.7  -1.4  1.4  3.2  2.6  2.0  0.8  2.7  4.0  3.9  2.2  1.8  2.3 
Un~loyment  4.1  6.3  8.8  11.2  11.2  10.0  9.2  8.7  8.3  7.4  6.5  6.1  6.4  6.3 
Inflation  7.0  6.3  5.3  2.8  2.1  2.2  0.3  -0.2  1.0  1.6  2.3  3.4  3.4  3.8 
Interest rate  10.7  12.2  10.5  8.8  8.6  7.3  6.4  6.4  6.3  7.2  9.60  8.9  8.3  8.3 
Nominal  unit  labour 
costs  (1980=100)  100  90.3  92.8  90.5  83.6  81.2  85.8  89.4  87.1  82.1  82.8  80.5 
Current  account  -1.5  2.2  3.2  3.1  4.2  4.1  2.7  1.4  2.5  3.3  3.8  4.1  4.4 
(percent  GOP) 
Dependency  ratio  33.4  33.0  32.5  31.9  31.5  31.3  31.1  31.3  31.0 
Participation rate: 
men  79.4  80.9  80.8  n.3  76.5  75.8  75.3  79.0  79.4  79.6  79.6 
women  35.5  37.9  39.0  40.3  40.7  40.9  41.3  48.8  50.6  51.0  53.0 
Source: miscellaneous OECD and government publications 
sa  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1991, p. 57. - 134-
11.2 General outline of  economic policy in the 1980s 
When the second oil shock hit the Netherlands, both business profits and the share of capital 
in  national  income  had  - considering  the  postwar  experience  - reached  historical  lows 
(relative  to  GDP),  in  part as  a  consequence  of 'excessive'  wage  demands  in  the previous 
decade.  Because  financial  reserves  had  been  drained  and  due  to  restructuring  of major 
industry  sectors (i.e.  ship  building),  firms  in  1981-1982  shed jobs at a  monthly  rate of 10-
15,000.  In  just  three years  time  unemployment  shot  up  from  4.1  to  11.2  percent.  Since 
transfers  to  strongly  rising  numbers  of benefit  recipients were  at  the time  fully  linked  to 
contractual wages,  general  government  spending was  in  fact  out  of control.  By  1983  the 
government  take  out  of  GDP  was  over  62  percent;  one  year  before  government  net 
borrowing had peaked at 7.1 percent of GDP (table 11.2). 
Table 11.2 General government budget(% GDP), 1980-1993 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Current  receipts  53.7  54.0  54.4  55.8  54.7  55.1  53.9  55.0  54.7  52.2  51.3  51.8  52.5  52.4 
Total  expenditures  57.8  59.5  61.5  62.2  60.9  59.8  59.9  61.6  59.8  57.4  56.6  56.2  56.6  56.1 
Net  borrowing  -4.0  -5.5  -7.1  -6.4  -6.3  -4.8  -6.0  -6.6  -5.2  -5.2  -5.3  -4.4  -4.1  ·3.7 
Gross  public debt  45.9  50.3  55.6  62.0  66.1  69.7  71.6  75.4  77.7  77.9  78.3  78.4  79.5  79.1 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
The Cabinet which entered office in 1982 set itself three major policy goals: 
1.  restoring profitability of firms to previous levels; 
2.  curbing public spending to  reduce the deficit,  holding the level  of taxes  and other public 
sector revenues more or less constant; 
3.  stimulating employment through increased private investment and  a general reduction of 
working hours. 
Initially, spending cuts deepened the recession. On the other hand, exports picked up and set 
into  motion  the ensuing process  of economic  recovery.  After  eight  years  of restraint,  the 
process of public sector consolidation has clearly met with some success.  Public outlays have - 135-
been  reduced  by  some  5  to  6 percent points of GDP.  The public  deficit  has  been  about 
halved (to 4.1  percent of GDP in 1992), whereas the tax-to-GDP ratio dropped a few  points 
to about 52 percent of GDP. Improved macroeconomic performance during the second half 
of the 1980s, wage restraint resulting in a doubling of capital's share in national income, the 
recovery of business investment,  impressive job growth in  the private sector and prolonged 
efforts  to  effectively curb public spending,  all  contributed to  the succesfull  roll-back  of the 
public sector. Table 11.2 summarizes these achievements by outlining trends in public outlays, 
current receipts and  net borrowing requirement of the public sector during the 1980s.  The 
remainder of this section considers policies pursued in greater detail. 
It has often been argued that the disappointing growth  performance of the Dutch economy 
at the end of the 1970s  had its origin in  the late sixties,i.e.  in the early days of natural gas 
exploitation. High productivity growth in the energy sector was transmitted into inappropria-
tely rapid labour income increases in the export sector through the process of national wage 
determination ('linking' of all wages  and benefits to the trend in  high  productivity sectors). 
The subsequent  loss  of competitiveness and weaker  international demand  led  to  declining 
employment  growth,  higher  unemployment  and  higher  public  sector  spending.  In  1978  a 
blueprint of medium term objectives and policies was presented ('Blueprint 81') which aimed 
at improving  competitiveness  of the  Dutch  economy,  halting  the growth  of public  sector 
revenues  as  a  proportion  of net  national  income  (NNI),  and  reducing  the  public  sector 
deficit.  59 
The 1980 Budget was the second to be based on the new medium-term blueprint. In order 
to  encourage wage  moderation personal exemptions in  the income tax were expanded.  On 
the expenditure side a package of demand boosting measures in the order of Gld 2 billion, 
corresponding to 3/4 percent of GDP was proposed. This boost to demand could be financed 
from  higher natural gas  revenues,  which  were expected  to produce  an~  additional inflow  of 
non-tax  receipts  and  corporate  taxes  of Gld  2.1  billion.  The  1979  policy  of holding  the 
increase of government wages and social benefits 1 percent below the rise in private sector 
wages  was  continued.  Further  measures  included:  higher  indirect  taxes,  an  only  partial 
correction for bracket creep in the income tax due to inflation, and a reduction of investment 
59  Net  national  income  is  equal  to  GDP  minus  depreciation  plus  net  primary  income 
received  from  the rest of the world.  In the Netherlands, NNI is  about  10  percent lower 
than GDP. (It) 
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subsidies  for  investment  in  buildings.
60  The  1980  Budget  foresaw  an  unchanged  general 
government  budget  deficit  (5.5  percent  of net  national  income).  Economic  developments 
were, however,  much less favourable than envisaged and the deficit eventually turned out to 
be 2 percent point higher than the target level.  As government took recourse to a statutory 
incomes  policy  to  ensure  that  import  price  pressures  did  not  translate  into  a  further 
weakening of competitiveness and profitability of the industrial sector, the scope to increase 
taxes was limited. So the brunt of the adjustment effort had to fall on the expenditure side of 
the budget. Especially public sector incomes (wages and transfers) became a prime target for 
cutting outlays. However, rising interest payments and increasing unemployment put upward 
pressure on government spending.  Despite increasing gas  revenues the general government 
borrowing requirement exceeded policy norms previously set, due to lower tax revenues than 
envisaged  and  higher  spending  levels. 
61  Thus  collective  claims  on  resources  expanded 
further. One third of the 1979-1981 increase in general government expenditure was on social 
Table 11.3 Employment in the public sector, 1980-1989 
1.  Government  employment 
(X  1000) 
2.  as X of  total  employment 
3.  Growth  of  government 
real  wages 
4.  Growth  of  relative 
government  wages 
I)  1979-1984. 
b)  1984·1990. 
Source: OECD 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
714  728  734  733  730  736  742  746  743  740 
14.9  15.4  15.9  16.2  16.1  16.0  15.8  15.7  15.4  15.1 
•0.1  o)  1.3 b) 
0.4  o)  ·0.7 b) 
60  The Investment Account (WIR Scheme) was  introduced in  1978  and extended in  1980.  It 
provided for tax credits for various types of investment. 
61  Natural  gas  revenues  amounted  to  14  percent  of central government  receipts  in  1980. 
Between  1979  and  1982  receipts from  natural gas  tripled.  Apart from  some  temporary 
volume growth  in  1979,  higher gas revenues stemmed from  the preceding surge in  crude 
oil  prices.  Renegotiation  of  export  contracts  brought  an  additional  once-and-for-all 
increase of export prices during 1981. - '137-
security.  It  is  quite  clear  then,  that  the  original  aims  of Blueprint  1981  to  reduce  the 
government deficit and public sector growth have not been met. Despite improved competiti-
veness, output and employment growth fell also well short of expectations.
62 
The economic programme of the incoming centre-left government foresaw a reduction of 
the general government budget deficit to 6.5  percent of NNI in 1982 and to 5.5  percent by 
1983. 
Taxes and social security contributions would  be  kept at their 1981  levels in  terms of NNI. 
Revenues  soon turned  out  to  be Gld  2.2  billion  lower  than assumed,  and various  revenue 
boosting  measures  were  taken  (almost  Gld  1  billion).  The  government  also  proposed  a 
package of measures aimed at curbing spending due to sickness (Gld 1.8 billion). In addition 
it presented the first part of its Employment Scheme, which was supposed to create some 25-
30,000  new jobs. The Spring Memorandum brought out that revenues from  natural gas and 
tax  receipts proved  to  be disappointing, while  expenditure was  higher than envisaged;  both 
factors  resulted in  a public sector borrowing requirement of over 8 percent of NNI.  Disac-
cord on  the allocation  of unavoidable spending cuts brought the government down  in  May 
1982. 
An interim cabinet managed to implement only part of the restrictive policy proposals for 
1983  (Gld 5.3 billion, instead of the proposed 8.5 billion). Consequently, general government 
budget deficit increased further to almost 10 percent of NNI. The 1983 Budget of the interim 
cabinet included new proposals representing the furthest reaching package of fiscal restraint, 
since 1979. 
The new centre-right government that - after elections - came into office late in  1982 was 
clearly  faced  with  unsustainable  budget  conditions.  Continuation  of public  borrowing  at 
prevailing levels would  have led to an explosion of government debt and interest payments. 
At the  time,  it  was  felt  that  large  deficits  would  put  upward  pressure  on  interest  rates, 
thereby  hindering  the  recovery  of business  investment.  The government  announced  as  its 
objective  the  reduction  of the general  government  financial  deficit  to  7.4  percent  of net 
national income by the end of its four-year term in office (in 1986). The target was modified 
in  the course of the period to cover the State deficit alone, which was  to be reduced to 5. 7 
percent of NNI.  By  now,  the authorities shared the view  that the size of the public  sector 
itself was  an impediment to  balanced long-term growth.  High  tax  and social security levels 
were  thought  to  create  potential  welfare  losses,  distorting  work,  saving  and  spending 
decisions in the private sector. 
62  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1981, p. 29. - 138-
The  new  government  maintained  most  budget  proposals  of  its  interim  predecessor. 
Important measures included:  an increase in social security contributions, restraint of public 
sector  incomes,  reduction  of the indexation  for  inflation  of income  tax  brackets  from  100 
percent to 80 percent, and some minor tax reliefs for business. 
The  1984  Budget  involved  important  cuts  in  expenditure  from  planned  levels.
61  A  3 
percent cut in real wages  of public sector employees  and social security benefits produced 
half of the targeted amount. Tax revenues were also  increased. The standard VAT rate was 
raised by  1 point to  19%, excise taxes were increased, the 1983  'temporary' income tax hike 
was continued and higher income tax rates were raised, while the lowest were reduced. The 
corporate income tax rate was reduced by five percent points, down from 48%. 
The 1985 Budget also introduced spending cuts (Gld 9.3 billion), including a Gld 2.5 billion 
cut in  social security benefits (see also section 11.3). The 1983  'temporary' income tax  hike 
was  again  continued, while  the corporate income tax  rate was  cut further by  one point,  to 
42%.  In  1985  and  1986  the  level  of minimum  wages,  social  insurance  benefits  and  child 
allowances was 'frozen'. 
The  1986  Budget  concluded  that  the objectives  set  in  the  1982  programme had  largely 
been attained. Initially,  the government aimed at a reduction of the borrowing requirement 
of central and local government, with  no  increase in  the 'collective burden' (total of taxes, 
social  security  contributions  and  certain  non-tax  revenues  of government,  expressed  as  a 
percent of NNI). In the event, public spending had fallen, while the objective of a central and 
local government deficit of 7.4 percent of NNI had been broadly achieved. Although in  itself 
this was  a remarkable achievement, some critical sounds might be voiced.  First, the decline 
in  the deficit  is  much  less impressive once the social security system  is  taken into account. 
Second,  by  1986  expenditures were Gld  12.6 billion higher than foreseen at the start of the 
plan  (table  11.4).  Part  of  this  overspending  occurred  because  certain  programmes  were 
expanded,  part  of it  was  due  to  slippage  in  a  number  of 'open-enlled'  income  related 
programmes. 
61  The re-current attempts of policymakers to catch up with worsening budget prospects have 
come to be known by the shorthand of budget 'cuts'. Certain observations seem important 
for any assessment: 
the cuts are made from a baseline of multi-year expenditure plans, which are based on 
assumptions of medium-term growth; 
the cuts are proposed  to  be permanent adjustments,  lowering the level  of multi-year 
plans over the entire planning horizon; 
the cuts are defined in terms of central government budget and include cuts in transfers 
to other levels of government. - 139-
Table 11.4 Projections and outcomes of the 1982 Programme (Gld billion) 
1984  1985  1986 
1982  Programme  expenditure cuts  7.0  7.0  7.0 
Additional  cuts  4.7  2.3  1.0 
Total  expenditure cuts  11.7  9.3  8.0 
Expenditure overruns  6.2  3.2  3.2 
Net  expenditure reductions  5.5  6.1  4.8 
Source: OEt:D, Economic Surveys,  1986, p. 36 
After the  1986  elections the centre-right coalition  remained in  power until  mid  1989.  The 
coalition Agreement for the 1987-1990 period, drawn up around mid-1986, aimed at reducing 
the central government budget deficit to 5.25  percent of NNI by  1990.  Deficit reduction was 
to  be accompanied  by  at least a stabilisation of the 'collective burden' and without loss  of 
real net income for families  at the minimum  income level.  With the benefit of hindsight it 
can  be  concluded  that  these  objectives  of fiscal  policy  have  been  met.  Reduction  of the 
deficit was  hampered, however,  by  a  marked  drop  in  natural gas  revenues accruing to  the 
government (figure 11.1). Especially in  1987 gas revenues decreased sharply. As a consequen-
ce,  the 1987 target for the central government deficit was  missed, as the fall in gas revenues 
could only partly be offset by  additional spending cuts and tax increases (one percent point 
higher VAT rate,  higher excise  taxes  on energy,  reduced income tax  facilities  for  enterpri-
ses). 
During the 1987-89 period spending overruns even exceeded those in  1984-86  (table 11.5), 
but  buoyant  tax  revenues  ensured  that  nonetheless  deficit  targets  were  met.  Using  these 
windfall  revenues to  finance  spending overruns implied  that the pace .pf consolidation was  .  . . 
slower than what could have been achieved. Because of attractive capital market conditions, 
a larger part than projected of public housing loans has been repaid to central government 
earlier than  scheduled,  temporarily  boasting central government  non-tax  revenues.  Official 
deficit figures have been corrected for these temporary changes. - 140-
Figure 11.1 Central government natural gas revenues {Gld billion), 1980-1994 
80  Bt  ee  83  84  er;  86  ar  88  89  90  91  9e  93  94 
Source: Budget Memorandum 1993 
A  further  important  development  was  the  governments'  decision  to  end  the  system  of 
investment  subsidies,  which  was  announced  early  in  1988.  The  Investment  Account  Act 
(WIR), which came into effect in  1978,  had replaced earlier tax expenditures in the form of 
accelerated depreciation and an investment allowance programme. The arguments in favour 
of the WIR - a programem providing refundable tax credits to investors - were that it was 
broadly  based,  better suited  to  steer investment  and  that  it  did  not  discriminate  against 
unprofitable firms. The WIR provided subsidy at a basic rate, which varied according to type 
of investment  activity.  Supplementary subsidies  aimed  to  promote specific  goals,  like,  e.g., 
helping small and medium-sized business, certain regions (abolished in  1983),  and environ-
mental  improvement.  As  of  May  1986  ftrms  making  losses  were  no  longer  entitled  to 
subsidies granted under the WIR programme. As a compensation for the abolishment of the 
WIR in  February 1988,  the government took over employer social security contributions to 
finance child allowances, while reducing the corporate income tax rate from 42 to 35%. - 141-
Table 11.5 Outlays and revenues (Gld billion), 1984-1989 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Outlays 
Projected  163  164  169  168  168  170 
Realised  163  166  171  175  172  175 
Difference  0  2  2  7  4  5 
Revenues 
Projected  127  135  143  139  144  147 
Realised  133  143  164  160  150  151 
Early redemptions  0  2  16  13  -1  0 
Difference  6  6  5  8  7  4 
Source: Sterks, DeHaan and De Kam (1989) 
Another important development to be mentioned was the reform of the personal income tax 
that was  only fully  implemented by January  1,  1990.  Dutch marginal income tax rates were 
very high, probably reducing labour supply, particularly for married women, and encouraging 
the growth of the black economy. On the basis of recommendations of the Oort-commission 
(1986), the personal income tax system was simplified. National insurance contributions were 
combined  with  the income  tax  system.  The  tax  base was  broadened  by  some  60  percent, 
while tax rates were reduced (De Kam and Van Herwaarden, 1989, p.  138). The top rate, for 
instance, was reduced from 72% to 60%. The number of brackets was  reduced from nine to 
three (see section 11.4 for details). 
In May 1989 the government fell on disagreement over financing the National Environmental 
Policy Plan. According to the coalition Agreement of the centre-left gg.vernment  that came 
into office in November 1989 the central government budget deficit would be brought down 
further  by  0.5  percent  points  of NNI  annually  in  the  period  1990-1994,  taking  it  to  3.25 
percent, with the 'collective burden' not exceeding 53.6 percent. 
In 1989, budgetary outcomes were in part determined by a set of special factors. First, the 
standard rate of the VAT was  reduced from  20  to  18.5%,  to bring it more in line with  the 
EC Commission's proposals and to moderate wage claims. Second, social security contributi-
ons  were  cut  to  reduce  surplusses  in  the  social  security  funds.  Third,  spending  overruns 
occurred  (see  table  11.5),  notably  showing  up  in  the  investment  subsidy  scheme  (WIR). 
Although  this  programme  had  already  largely  been  stopped  in  February  1988,  residual - 142-
subsidy  claims  still kept flowing  in  as  applicants were allowed  to  spread  their claims  over 
several  years.  Finally,  tax  revenues  were  unexpectedly  low,  while  the  number  of social 
security recipients rose faster than expected. 
According to the 1990 Budget the target for the central government budget deficit could be 
met, albeit mainly because of the partial cancellation of a planned advance payment from the 
central government  to the children's allowance  Fund,  to  relieve  cash  demands  in  1991.  In 
February  1991  the  Government  published  its  Midterm  Review,  which  confirmed  that  on 
unchanged policies the budget deficit was likely to exceed its target by a considerable margin 
as  a result  of a  number of unforeseen developments  (shortfall of revenues,  rise in  interest 
rate,  higher  than  expected  wage  increases  in  the  private  sector)
64
•  The  Midterm  Review 
contained  proposals  for  additional  expenditure  cuts  and  revenue  increases  amounting  to 
around  Gld  17.5  billion  in  1994,  to  keep  the budget  deficit  in  line with  the medium  term 
target.  The  proposals  include  cuts  in  subsidies  (Gld  3.4  billion  in  1994),  reduction  of 
disability  and sickness  benefits  (Gld  4.8  billion)  and  the number of public  sector workers 
(Gld  1.1  billion),  and cuts  in  expenditure  on  defense  and  social  welfare  (Gld  3.8  billion). 
However, at that time a considerable part of the spending cuts was not specified. 
The  1991  and  1992  Budget  presented  more  detailed  proposals  on  spending  cuts  as 
announced in the Midterm Review.  Additional spending cuts have been announced. Accor-
ding to the 1993  Budget the central government budget deficit will be reduced according to 
schedule,  while  the  'collective burden' is  expected  to  decline  from  53.6  percent of NNI  in 
1992 to 53.0 percent in 1993. 
11.3 Detailed analysis of  government spending 
Over the post-war period successive Dutch governments have constructed one of the most 
extensive social welfare systems in the EC area. Education was strongly expanded, access to 
medical care was  improved  and  attempts were made to ensure that adequate housing was 
available to lower income groups. Over the period 1970-82, total public expenditure grew at 
an annual average rate of 13  percent. The rate of growth was  extremely rapid in the early 
1970s  when  authorities  introduced  expansionary  budgets  while  transfer  payments  to  the 
64  Social benefits are conditionally linked to private sector wages,  the conditionality referring 
to the fact that government can decide to decouple the rise of social security benefits from 
increases of private sector wages if the dependency ratio should exceed its 1989 level. - 143-
unemployed  and  the disabled  rose.  Afterwards,  the rate of spending increases decelerated, 
but  it  remained  above  GDP  growth.  The  most  rapidly  rising  spending  categories  were 
transfer and interest payments. 
After  1983  general  government  spending  was  reduced  (table  11.6).  Spending  cuts  have 
notably  fallen  on  the  government  wage  bill,  transfers  and  public  sector  investment.  The 
reduction in  the wage bill largely reflected a fall  in  real wages.  Between 1982 and 1991  real 
wages  of civil  servants  lost  12  percent points  against  private  sector  wages  (De Kam  and 
Sterks, 1992, p.  121). Apart from this 'price' effect, the volume of public labor contributed to 
a  markedly  lower  wage  bill  (relative  to  GDP).  Up  to  1979,  government  employment 
expanded faster than total labour supply,  limiting unemployment, but since  1980  the growth 
in  the number of government  employees has fallen  increasingly behind  the growth  of total 
employment (table 11.3). 
Lower real transfers per recipient explain the reduction in government transfers.  Reduced 
spending levels have been the result of several factors. First, the minimum wage has declined 
relative to average wages and as 80  percent of all benefit payments (at minimum level) are 
linked to net minimum wage, transfers have fallen as well. Second, for earnings-related social 
insurance against  unemployment and  disability,  the benefit  rate has been reduced  from  80 
percent of last wages to 70 percent (see below for some details). In the 1980s, the number of 
·transfer recipients continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace. 
The  share  of government  investment  in  GDP  is  now  at  historically  low  levels.  This 
progressive decline has initially reflected the completion of a number of large infrastructure 
projects (notably dykes  to protect the country against its arch enemy,  the sea), but in  more 
recent years it seems that the public capital stock may well be deteriorating. 
A comparison of spending levels indicates that by international standards, the Netherlands 
spends relatively little on government consumption. In contrast, it tends to spend considera-
bly more on transfer payments. - 144-
Table 11.6 General government spending in the Netherlands, economic classification(% GDP), 1980-1992 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Government  consumption  17.9  17.8  17.7  17.5  16.6  16.2  16.0  16.4  15.8  15.3  14.9  14.5  14.3 
compensation  of employees  13.0  12.7  12.6  12.2  11.5  11.1  11.0  11.2  10.7  10.2  9.9  9.7  9.6 
Current  transfers  30.6  31.5  33.3  34.1  33.1  32.4  32.4  33.7  33.4  32.0  31.9  32.5  32.7 
transfers to households  26.3  27.4  28.9  29.4  28.1  27.3  27.1  27.5  26.9  26.1  27.0  27.1  27.5 
Interest payments  3.7  4.4  5.2  5.7  6.0  6.3  6.2  6.1  6.1  5.9  5.9  5.9  6.2 
Capital  transfers  2.3  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.4  2.3  2.8  3.0  2.2  1.8  1.6  1.0  1.1 
Government  investment  3.3  3.1  2.9  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.3 
Total  expenditure  57.8  59.5  61.5  62.2  60.9  59.8  59.9  61.6  59.8  57.4  56.6  56.2  56.6 
Source: EC, Tables on Public Finance 
In  the  traditional areas of public spending - defense,  public  security  and  law  and order -
there have  been slight  reductions.  The growth  of education  outlays  also  slowed.  Spending 
levels were influenced by an important change in the student grant programme introduced in 
1986,  and  subsequent  modifications  of this  newly  introduced  programme.  It consists  of a 
basic  grant  and  supplementary  support  in  the  form  of  an  interest-bearing  loan  or  an 
additional grant.  While  parental income  is  not  taken into  account  for  determing the basic 
grant, supplementary support depends on parent's income and wealth. 
Public spending on  health,  which  is  largely  (more than three quarters) financed  through 
the social  security system,  also  slightly  decreased.  Still,  the Netherlands  is  one of the five 
biggest  spenders  on  health-related  services  (both  publicly  and  privately  financed)  in  the 
OECD area.  As  in  most  'high-spending'  countries,  a  relatively  large  share of spending  is 
devoted  to  the  high-cost  hospital  care sector.
65  Up  to  1983,  hospitals were  fmanced  on  a 
'fee-for-service' basis. Under a new 'external/internal' budgeting scheme; individual hospitals 
are allocated a global sum for  current expenditure and broadly allowed  to spend it as they 
wish.  Proposed additonal reforms to the health system on the basis of the Dekker Commissi-
on Report (1987) are currently being implemented. 
Government spending on housing consists primarily of subsidies. There are two categories 
of housing subsidies in  the rental sector: supply-related or 'object subsidies' (Gld 8 bln) and 
income-related or 'subject subsidies'  (Gld 2 bln),  that benefit low-income households which 
have  to  pay  relatively  high  rents.  Subject  subsidies  to  renters,  which  are  income-tested, 
65  OECD, Economic Surveys,  1989, p. 43. - 145-
increased rapidly after 1979.  Government more or less controls rents of a large part of the 
housing stock. To cut back the amount of object subsidies,  in  recent years rents have been 
increased  at a  higher rate than inflation;  where rents are low  relative to quality,  they  are 
allowed to rise at a faster rate. 
Table 11.7 General government spending(% GOP), 1981 - 1990 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
General  public services  2.65  2.75  2.95  3.07  2.93  3.16  4.12  4.21  4.03  3.26 
Defense  3.10  3.10  3.12  3.06  2.97  2.94  2.94  2.82  2. 71  2.65 
Public order and  safety  1.28  1.32  1.32  1.29  1.27  1.29  1.35  1.28  1.10  1.18 
Education  6.91  6.79  6.62  6.27  6.11  6.24  5.96  5.80  5.58  5.  71 
Health  6.50  6.72  6.63  6.37  6.29  6.00  6.20  6.06  6.23  6.16 
Social  security and  welfare  20.50  21.70  22.21  21.50  20.55  20.31  20.58  19.67  19.82  20.16 
Housing  and  Comn.  Amenities  1.62  1.68  2.05  2.35  2.42  2.32  2.49  2.53  2.33  2.14 
Recreational,  Cultural 
and  religious affairs  0.48  0.49  0.51  0.55  0.49  0.58  0.36  0.38  0.29  0.19 
Economic  services  6.19  6.30  5.97  5.98  5.58  6.02  6.39  5.25  4.40  3.88 
Other  functions  6.23  6.87  7.32  7.56  7.82  7.99  8.09  7.81  7.61  7.40 
Total  outlays  55.45  57.72  58.71  57.99  56.44  56.84  58.49  55.83  54.09  52.72 
Source: IMF, 1991 Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
The present social security system in the Netherlands consists of social insurance program-
mes supported by  a welfare programme ('safety net'). Employee insurance is based on  the 
principle  of equivalence:  premiums  paid  are  based  upon  risk,  with·"both  premiums  and 
benefits income-related, with a cap.  National insurance covers all inhabitants of the Nether-
lands and is based upon the solidarity principle: benefits are the same for everyone who is in 
a  similar  position,  but  the  premium  due  is  a  percent  of taxable  income,  with  a  cap.  In 
contrast to social insurances, social welfare benefits are means-tested and are again intended 
to benefit people who  in general cannot resort to insurance benefits; thus, it forms a kind of 
safety net. In contrast to social security expenditure which is primarily financed by contributi-
ons from employers and employees, social welfare is fmanced from general revenue. - 146-
Table 11.8 Detailed analysis of social welfare expenditure(% GDP), 1980- 1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Health  14.30  14.43  14.61  14.27  13.29  13.21  13.71  13.50  13.50  7.49 
1a>  Sickness  8.52  8.40  8.55  7.95  7.62  7.41  7.36  7.59  7.48  7.47 
1b)  Invalidity,  disability  5.81  6.03  6.06  6.32  6.14  5.89  5.85  6.12  6.02  6.03 
1c)  Occupational  accidents  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
2.  Pension  schemes  9.66  9.80  10.14  9.78  9.54  9.05  9.28  9.59  10.07  9.95 
2a)  Old  age  8.25  8.38  8.69  8.36  8.18  7.74  7.98  8.27  8.72  8.60 
2b)  Survivors  1.41  1.41  1.45  1.42  1.36  1.30  1.30  1.33  1.36  1.35 
3.  Maternity and  family  2.81  2.76  2.78  3.18  2.99  2.91  2.73  2.16  1.87  1.59 
3a>  Maternity  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11 
3b)  Family  2.71  2.66  2.67  3.07  2.88  2.80  2.61  2.04  1.75  1.  74 
4.  UneqJloyment  1.78  2.53  3.47  4.20  4.01  3.62  3.40  3.33  3.05  2.77 
4a)  Placement  etc.  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
4b)  Unemployment  1.78  2.53  3.47  4.20  4.01  3.62  3.40  3.33  3.05  2.77 
5.  Housing  and  miscellaneous  0.69  0.77  0.97  0.98  0.95  0.95  0.98  1.25  1.07  1.06 
Sa)  Housing  0.28  0.30  0.38  0.46  '0.35  0.33  0.33  0.37  0.39  0.38 
5b)  Miscellaneous  0.41  0.48  0.59  0.52  0.60  0.63  0.66  0.88  0.68  0.69 
Total  29.27  30.29  31.96  32.42  31.25  29.89  29.60  30.04  29.56  28.87 
Source: EC, Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts 1980-1989, 1991 
In the Netherlands, sickness insurance for lost work time involves relatively large amounts. In 
the beginning of the 1980s the number of days lost due to sickness dropped sharply, but since 
1986  it has been rising again  (table 11.9). Sickness benefit is payable for 52 weeks at a rate 
(since 1986) equal to 70 percent of average daily wages over the last year. Sickness benefit is 
in 99  percent of all cases topped up under collective wage agreements to  100 percent of net 
wage. 
In  comparison  with  most  surrounding  countries,  disability  and  invalidity  pensions 
expressed  as  a  percent  of GDP,  are  also  high  in  the  Netherlands.  Both  the  number  of 
recipients (table 11.9) and the generosity of the system explain high outlays on the disability 
program.  The increase of the number of recipients can  only  partially be  explained  by  the 
growth  of the population  of working  age.  It probably  also  reflects  a  general relaxation  of 
criteria  for  disablement.  Benefits  are  related  to  the  degree  of disability,  which  in  turn - 147-
depends  on  reduced  earnings  capacity.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  the  take-up  of the 
disability  programme includes  a  substantial  number of 'hidden'  unemployed,  since  benefit 
formulas are more generous than those of unemployment programmes. Estimates of hidden 
unemployment vary between 29 to 50 percent of total programme volume. 
66 
Individual old age pension, consisting of 50 percent of the net minimum wage,  accrues to 
nearly all persons aged 65  and over.  Single aged have a pension equal to 70  percent of net 
minimum wage.  Spending on old  age age pensions has grown  at the end of the  1980s with 
the  rising  number  of retired  people  (table  11.9).  Survivor's  benefits  are  paid  to  widows 
younger  than  sixty-five  and  equal  (as  from  1986)  70  percent  of net  minimum  wage.  The 
system also includes age-related orphans pensions. 
Child allowances are granted for children under the age of 18  and vary with the number 
and age of childeren. 
Unemployment  benefit  is  provided  for  by  social  insurance  for  nine  months  up  to  five 
years (depending on working history); once this benefit entitlement is exhausted transfers are 
received  under  the  social  welfare  programme.  Initially,  (gross)  unemployment  benefits 
represented 80  percent of gross wages;  the replacement ratio was  reduced to 70  percent as 
from the mid 1980s.
67 
66  Under' the new  system  (as from  1987)  the benefit is  split  in  two  components for  those 
with  less  than  80  percent  disability.  The disability  component  is  based  on  the level  of 
disability  and  the  remaining  is  paid  under  the  rules  governing  the  unemployment 
programme if the recipient is also deemed unemployed. This change not only affected new 
entrants, but also those under 35 already in the programme (representing only 30 percent 
of the total number of benefit recipients). Tightening of the criteria for new entrants has 
had less effects than expected. However, of late the number of new beneficiaries classified 
as fully disabled has fallen somewhat. 
67  As from January 1987 some further important changes have been introduced in unemploy-
ment insurance.  Under the new  system,  the unemployed  must  at least have worked  26 
weeks  in  the year before unemployment  to  be entitled to unemployment benefit.  If this 
requirement  is  met,  the  recipient  receives  the  standard  benefit  of 70  percent  of lastly 
earned gross wage  for  six  months. If an unemployed  is  older than 23  and  has a labour 
history  of three years  during the five  years  before unemployment,  this  standard  benefit 
can be prolonged for a period running between 3 months to 4.5 years, depending on age. 
Benefits can be prolonged for  one year at 70  percent of the minimum wage.  Individuals 
who  are older than  57.5  years when  they  became  unemployed  may  receive  this  benefit 
until the age of 65.  If an unemployed individual does not meet the 26 weeks requirement 
or if entitlement is exhausted, social assistance can be obtained. Unemployed youths aged 
16 and 17 years are not entitled to social assistance (their parents receive child allowance) 
and the level of benefit is less generous for people under 23. - 148-
Table 11.9 Number of benefit recipients (1000 benefit years), 1980-1992 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Old  age  1280  1306  1326  1341  1354  1781  1820  1856  1893  1927  1956  1982  2008 
Survivors  168  168  169  171  172  171  169  168  166  186  187  190  191 
Early retirement  11  12  14  16  20  21  24  28  34  36  38  39  40 
Invalidity  718  670  621  573  529  485  439  395  349  305  201 
Disability  608  634  648  663  682  698  713  725  740  758  n8  801  809 
SiCk!'lf!SS  306  288  272  260  260  257  271  280  294  316  346  353  351 
U~loyment  149  221  288  270  445  476  4n  537  567  559  518  504  517 
Social  assistance •>  2n  283  296  297  307  208  208  213  218  221  220  220  222 
•>  Excluding  un~loyment. 
Source: Dutch Ministry of  Social Affairs, Sociale nota 1993 
11.4 Detailed analysis of  government revenues 
Table 11.10 presents a detailed analysis of government revenues according to the mobility of 
the  tax  base;  table  11.11  compares  the  Dutch  tax  system  to  that  in  some  neighbouring 
countries. 
With respect to taxes  on  portfolio income of individuals  the Netherlands has  a dividend 
withholding tax of 25%.  Under the terms of nearly fifty  international tax treaties this rate is 
generally  reduced.  Dividends and interest  received  are included  in  taxable  income.  Invest-
ment  income  of individuals  is  taxed  at 38.5  to  60%  (1992).  As  from  1987  banks have  to 
report  to  the authorities all  interest  paid  to  private clients  holding  bank deposits.  At  the 
time, the introduction of compulsory reporting caused considerable tax -flight (probably some 
Gld 5 billion was involved). 
Revenue from  taxes on corporate profits in  the Netherlands is  in line with revenue from 
this source in  surrounding countries.  Profits  of corporations and  other taxable  entities  are 
taxed  at 40%  on the first  Dfl 250,000  of taxable profits and 35% on the excess.  If a Dutch 
corporation owns 5 percent or more of the paid-up capital of another Dutch corporation and 
the shares are not held as inventory, dividends and capital gains on those shares are exempt 
from  Dutch  corporate  tax  ('participation  exemption').  If certain  additional  conditions  are 
met, these rules also apply to the participation in capital of a foreign corporation. - 149-
Table 11.10 Breakdown of taxes according to the degree of mobility of the tax base (% of GDP), 1980-1989 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1.  Taxes  on  corporate profits  3.0  3.1  3.1  2.8  2.6  3.1  3.4  3.7  3.5  3.5 
2.  Taxes  on  goods  and services  11.6  11.2  11.0  11.3  11.4  11.5  11.9  12.6  12.5  12.0 
2.1  VAT  i.3  7.1  6.8  6.9  7.1  7.3  7.5  7.9  8.0  7.5 
2.2 Exciseduties  3.4  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.6  3.5  3.4 
2.3 Other  taxes  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.1 
3.  Taxes  bearing on  use of  labour  17.4  18.0  18.9  21.0  20.0  19.9  19.6  20.7  20.6  18.9 
3.1  Soc.  sec.  contributions employees  7.2  7.5  8.1  9.2  8.5  8.9  8.6  9.2  9.2  8.7 
3.2 Soc.  sec.  contributions employers  8.2  8.1  8.0  8.3  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.4  8.3  7.5 
3.3 Soc.  sec.  contributions self-employed  2.0  2.4  2.8  3.5  3.6  3.0  2.9  3.1  3.1  2.7 
3.4 Other  taxes  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4.  Taxes  on  income  of  individuals  12.0  11.1  10.8  10.0  9.4  8.7  9.3  9.5  9.9  9.7 
5.  Taxes  on  property  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.7 
6.  Miscellaneous  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
7.  Total  tax  revenue  45.8  45.2  45.4  46.7  45.0  44.9  45.8  48.5  48.4  46.0 
Source:  1980-1984: OECD, Revenue Statistics ofOECD Member Countries 1965-1989, Paris 1990 
1985-1989: OECD, Revenue Statistics of  OECD Member Countries 1965-1990, Paris 1991 
The corporate income tax rate is quite similar in neighbouring countries, except for Germany 
which has a relatively high tax rate on retained profits (50%).  Recently, proposals have been 
put forward to reduce the German rate to 44% as from January 1,  1994 .. :-
lndirect taxes are relatively important. Most goods and services are taxed at 17.5% value 
added tax as from  October  1,  1992.  Some services,  e.g.  insurance and  banking,  are exempt. 
Certain basic necessities are taxed at 6%. Although Dutch VAT-rates are not out of line with 
those  in  most  neighbouring  countries,  the  standard  VAT  rate  in  Germany  (15%  as  from 
January 1,  1993) is still 2.5 percent point below the standard rate in the Netherlands. 
It  follows  from  table  11.10  that  social  security  contributions  have  somewhat  increased 
during the 1980s.  Effective January  1,  1990,  national insurance contributions (25.55  percent 
in 1992), which  cover both employees and self-employed,  are levied  together with the wage 
withholding tax and personal income tax on a uniform basis. As  of this date, all  such  taxes - 150-
are due by  employees and benefit recipients. The resulting income loss for these groups has 
been  compensated  for  by  a  'compensation  allowance'  which  the  employer  pays  to  the 
employee.  Employee insurance contributions (these programmes cover only employees) are 
paid both by employees and employers. 
It follows  from  table  11.10  that this source of government revenue is  considerably more 
important in  the Netherlands than in  most neighbouring countries. As has been explained in 
the  previous  section,  this  is  due  to  both  'volume'  and  'price'  of social  security  in  the 
Netherlands, which are both high in comparison to those in surrounding Member States. 
Table 11.11 Tax rates in some EC Member Countries 
Belgiun  Germany  France  UK  Netherlands 
Corporate  income  tax  rate •>  39%  50%  37X  34%  35% 
VAT  b>  reduced  rate  1/6%  7X  2.1/5.5%  0%  6% 
standard rate  19.5%  15%  18.6%  17.5%  17.5% 
Personal  income  c> 
lowest  rate  25%  19%  5%  25%  38.5% 
top rate  55%  53%  56.8%  40%  60% 
top  rate applies to  income:(Dfl >  132,561  135,274  84,867  78,132  85,930 
number  of  brackets  7  forlllJla  d>  13  2  3 
Personal  exampt ion  e>  9,961  6,329  6,194  10,863  5,225 
•>  Tax  rates  for  1990.  In  the  UK  the  1992/93  rate  amounts  to  33%.  Belgium  has  a  tower  rate  for  small 
business.  The  German  tax  rate  on  profits  distributed  to  shareholders  is  36%.  The  tax  rate  in  the 
Netherlands  amounts  to  40%  for  profits  up  to Oft  250,000.  Source:  OECD,  Taxing  Profits  in a  Global 
Economy,  Paris,  1991. 
b>  Expected  VAT  rates,  as  from  1  January  1993.  Source:  Tweede  Kamer,  vergaderjaar  1991-1992,  22713,  nr. 
3,  p.  2. 
c>  Rates  in 1991.  Source:  International  Bureau  of  Fiscal  Documentation. 
d>  The  German  personal  income  tax  rate is based  on  a  forlllJla.  For  1991  and  1992  an  additional  solidarity 
tax  of  3,75%  of  total  tax  liability is  levied. 
e>  For  a  single  individual.  Calculations are based  upon  the average  exchange  rate  in 1991. - 151-
The personal income tax has a personal exemption of Gld 5,225 (1992) and three rates:68 
- 13%  income tax (plus 25.55%  national insurance contributions) on  the first  Dfl 42,966  of 
taxable income; 
- 50% on the next Dfl 42,964; and 
- 60% on the excess of taxable income. 
To  be  taxable,  income  must  arise  from  one  of the  following  sources:  profits  from  an 
enterprise or a liberal profession; income from present or past employment (including social 
security  benefits  in  case  of sickness,  disability  or  unemployment,  and  pension  benefits); 
income  from  other  labour;  income  from  immovable(9  and  movable  property  and  income 
from  periodical payments;  also  capital gains  are sometimes  included  in  the tax  base.
70  An 
exemption for  dividend and interest of Dfl  1,000  (Dfl 2,000  for  married couples)  is  granted 
for  each of these income items. Taxpayers may claim various  deductions,  including interest 
payments  (without  limit)  on  loans  and  medical  expenses  to  the  extent  that  they  exceed 
certain  limits.  Pension  premiums  based  on  a  qualifying  pension  plan  are  tax  exempt. 
Subsequent pension benefits are included in taxable income. 
As follows  from  table 11.10 revenue from  the personal income tax expressed as a percent 
of GDP has declined during the 1980s. Table 11.11 indicates that the top rate of the personal 
income tax,  - not withstanding the tax reform of 1990 - is still quite high in comparison with 
the top rate in  neighbouring countries. Note, however,  that local authorities in  Belgium levy 
additional local income taxes of 6-9% and that Germany has a solidarity tax in  1991/92. The 
level  of taxable  income from  where the top  rate applies is  much  lower  in  the Netherlands 
than it is in Belgium and Germany (table 11.11). 
Taxes  on  immovable  property  vary  throughout  the  country.  Municipalities  have  very 
limited powers to levy taxes, the most important municipal tax being the tax levied on owners 
and tenants of immovable property. 
68  Non-earning individuals who  form  a joint household  may  transfer their exemption  to the 
partner earning the household income. 
(9  The owner-occupier of a house must include 2.5  percent of the rental value of the house 
in his taxable income. Certain costs (including interest payments) related to the house may 
be  deducted  (without  limit),  which  often  results  in  negative  taxable  income.  Aggregate 
negative income from owner-occupied housing amounts to Gld  11  billion in  1992. 
70  In general, in the Netherlands capital gains are not included in  taxable income.  However, 
capital  gains  realized  in  the  course  of a  business  and  through  the  sale  of substantial 
holdings  of shares  in  one  company,  and  certain  non-speculative  gains  are  included  in 
taxable income. l2) 
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11.5 Budgetary process 
Organisation 
The  Netherlands  is  a  unitary  state with  three levels  of government:  state,  provincial  and 
municipal.  Provinces  and  municipalities  (local government)  spend  about  one  third  of total 
public outlays. Local authorities are limited in  their spending through regulation and central 
government  supervision.  Spending  of local  authorities  is  controlled  through  'block'  and 
'specific purpose' grants from central government which together finance about 90 percent of 
local  expenditure.  Local  government  mainly  acts  as  an  agent  of  central  government, 
especially  in  the  areas  of housing,  welfare  benefits,  police,  and  education.  Although  local 
government  is  allowed  to  borrow  for  capital  expenditure,  central government  can  restrict 
local borrowing. 
Since  1982 there has been a continuing effort to critically reconsider the scope of central 
government activity.  First, sales of public shareholdings in some forty firms have been made. 
Second,  as regards State enterprises, the Post Office has been split up into three companies 
under a holding company fully  owned  by  the Government;  the Government Printing Office 
has been set up  as  a  private company to  be sold  off in  the future;  the State Fishing  Port 
Authority  has  been  transferred  to  the  private  sector,  while  the  State  Mint  will  also  be 
privatised. 
Social insurance funds finance their outlays (30  percent of total public outlays) by  special 
contributions.  Central  government  controls  social  security  spending  to  a  large  extent  by 
determining benefit formulas and entitlements, and by annually fixing contibution rates. 
Parliament has  two  Chambers.  Since no  political party has  an  overall  majority,  coalition 
cabinets have  to be formed.  Every  four years  the Second  Chamber is  directly  elected.  The 
term  of  the  present  centre-left  coalition  finishes  by  the  end  of  1994.  Normally,  parties 
participating  in  a  coalition  conclude  so  called  'coalition  agreements',  which  contain  a 
substantial financial  paragraph regarding budgetary policy  and  which  usually  detail tax  and 
spending priorities. 
The Ministry of Finance plays a central role in budgetary matters. Ministers in the cabinet 
discuss and decide upon proposals regarding the extent and allocation of budgetary cuts put 
forward  by  the  minister  of Finance.  For the  minister  of Finance  it  is  important  to  have 
support of the Prime Minister in his confrontation with other spending ministers. - 153-
Budgetary rules and procedures 
There are no  legal constraints on budget deficits and the level  of government outlays.  The 
current coalition Agreement (which  is  shaped as a  political commitment) identifies  targets 
relating to both the budget deficit and the collective 'burden' (both expressed as a percent of 
NNI); as a result the relative level of spending is also determined. 
Multi-annual budget plans or projections are published on a regular basis. Although multi-
year estimates as such  are not approved by  Parliament, they can be considered as standing 
government  policy.  Ministers  are thus  under  pressure  to  keep  their  spending  in  line  with 
projected outlays.  Revisions to the projections are made two  times a year to incorporate the 
consequenses  of changing  economic  conditions,  without  questioning  initial  budget  targets. 
The multi-year plans, linked to the current year (t-1), cover a period of four years following 
budget year t. 
Parliamentary appropriation 
Annual appropriation of all central government expenditure is  required. The budget is  both 
on  a  cash  and  commitment  basis.  There  is  no  prior  vote  on  budget  totals,  but  before 
discussing separate chapters of the budget, there is a general and political discussion on the 
budget  as  a  whole.  Only  the Second  Chamber  has  the  right  to  amend  the  budget.  Once 
enacted, the budget can only be changed by  supplementary budget laws.  Given  the precom-
mitments  laid  down  in  the coalition Agreement,  it  is  common  practice  not  to  violate  the 
targets for the government budget deficit or the collective 'burden'. 
Budget execution 
Rules have been formulated for in-year budget control to prevent, signal and compensate for 
spending  overruns.  According  to  these  Rules  of Stringent  Budget  Policy  any  expenditure 
overrun has in principle to be compensated for by  the department where the overrun took 
place  ('specific compensation').  In special circumstances 'general compensation'  (by  cutting 
budgets of all  departments) is  allowed,  but only  by  cabinet decision.  This procedure stimu-
lates spending ministers to make realistic multi-year budget plans. 
Cash limits can be imposed  on departmental spending totals,  to  tighten  up  the Rules  of 
Stringent  Budget  Policy.  Prior  approval  by  the  minister  of Finance  can  be  prescribed  for 
expenditure items and commitments, even  after Parliamentary appropriation.  Carry-over of 
approved  outlays  to  next  year's  budget  is  not  permitted.  Neither  is  it  allowed  to  transfer 
unspent funds from one article to another, without prior Parliamentary approval.  Parliament - 154-
is regularly informed about progress in executing the budget. 
The  introduction  and  the  gradually  more  effective  enforcement  of budgetary  rules  has 
considerably improved budgetary control. This can be concluded from  budgetary practice in 
recent years (Sterks, 1992; De Haan, 1992). 
11.6 Flexibility of  fzscal policy 
Table 11.2 shows that the general government deficit has been reduced by three points from 
7.1  percent of GDP in  1982 to 4.1  percent in  1992. At the same time, current receipts fell  by 
1.9  percent points. It follows  that expenditure has been cut back by  4.9  percent points.  This 
implies an average annual reduction by 0.5 percent of GDP. 
The deficit  target  of the present government,  laid  down  in  the coalition  Agreement  of 
1989,  is  to further  reduce the deficit  to  3.25  percent of NNI  by  1994  (about 3% of GDP). 
According to the most recent (1993) Budget Memorandum,  there is  all reason to expect that 
this target will be met. In terms of the deficit concept as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, 
the deficit will  amount to 2.6  percent of GDP in  1994.  This figure  is  only slightly above the 
present level  of general government  investment.  We  conclude  that in  the Netherlands  the 
deficit as such poses hardly a problem anymore. The only problem to comply with the EMU-
criteria is  the present high level of government debt. As follows  from table 11.2  gross public 
debt kept rising from 55.6 percent of GDP in  1982 to 79.5  percent in  1992,  in  spite of deficit 
reductions  realized  in  that  period.  With  additional  deficit  reductions  as  laid  down  in  the 
coalition  Agreement  the  deficit-to-GDP  ratio  will  slowly  decline.  If  deficit  reduction 
continues by 0.5  percent point a year the deficit will stand at 1 percent of NNI  in  1998.  The 
60  percent debt-to-GDP target will  then be met between years 2000  and 2005.  To that end 
expenditure has to be further reduced, because the tax level is already high in  relative terms. 
Moreover, it is  desirable to  reduce taxes to improve the competitive position of the Nether-
lands within EMU. 
Besides the need to comply with EMU criteria, it is  essential to reduce interest payments 
in  order to  increase  the  flexibility  of the budget  and  to  increase  the share  of productive 
outlays in total government spending. 
Regarding  the  EMU  debt-to-GDP  criterium,  the  Netherlands  could  stress  one  specific 
feature of the national fiscal  make-up which  makes its high debt ratio look more acceptable. 
Different  from  the  situation  in  other  EC  Member  States  the  pensions  of  government - 155-
employees  in  the  Netherlands  are fully  funded.  This  substantially  reduces  the amount  of 
future liabilities of the Dutch government relative to the situation in other countries. 
Scope to increase tax revenues 
Given the already high revenue-to-GDP ratio in  the Netherlands there is  not much room to 
further increase taxes. Nevertheless we will investigate some possibilities. 
There is  no  scope  to  raise  tax  rates on portfolio  income of individuals.  Given  the  high 
mobility of the tax base, higher rates may even produce lower revenue. 
Similar arguments apply to taxes on corporate profits. The corporation income tax rate is 
at about the same level as in  surrounding countries (assuming that the German rate will  be 
further  reduced).  Although  some broadening of the tax  base might  be envisaged,  it  would 
evidently be no wise policy to restrict present supple rules to determine taxable profit by too 
much. 
At the moment of writing,  the standard rate of VAT has just been reduced from  18.5  to 
17.5%. Although this is  2.5  points above the German level,  no further reductions seem to be 
necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  to  increase  the  VAT-rate  again  would  detract  from  the 
consistency and the continuity of tax policy. 
Taxes on the use of labour are largely earmarked to finance social security programmes. It 
does not make sense to use higher proceeds from these levies for deficit reduction, since this 
would  imply  that social  security  funds  will  run  a  surplus.  Moreover,  the level  of taxes  on 
labour use is very high  already when compared with  tax levels in  other Member States (for 
example,  about five  percent points above the German level).  This has  resulted in  relatively 
high  marginal and average tax wedges.  The scope to  scale down  the wedge depends on the 
success of trimming social security expenditure.  GDP growth  is  an important variable here, 
because higher output increases the tax base as well as scales down the overall spending level 
(by reducing transfers to the unemployed). 
Total revenue from  taxes  on  income  of individuals,  expressed  as  a  percent  of GDP,  is 
below  the  Belgian  and  German level.  Nevertheless,  high  income  earners  (which  are most 
mobile)  are  confronted  with  relatively  high  rates.  Tax  facilities  in  the  Netherlands  are 
favourable.  Interest paid and contributions to pension saving  are fully  deductable from  the 
personal income  tax  base.  The deductability  of interest  on  mortgages  could  be limited  in 
combination  with  a  reduction  of  housing  subsidies.  The  deductability  of  other  interest 
payments could be reduced by  introducing statutory limits as is  the case in  many other EC 
Member States. A rather strong case is  to be made for broadening the tax base by  including 
presently untaxed private capital gains in  the concept of taxable income.  Progression of the 13) 
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personal income tax  makes revenues react more than proportionally to GDP growth.  Some 
additional revenue might result from increased enforcement. 
Local governments have room to raise their taxes on  immovable property. However,  this 
can only be a policy option when at the same time central government grants are withdrawn 
and central government  taxes  are cut.  Local  governments  hardly contribute to  the general 
government deficit; municipalities cannot be expected to raise tax rates to create a surplus. 
Non-tax  revenues  can  be  increased  by  further  implementation  of the  benefit-principle 
(introduction of more user charges).  Non-tax  revenues from  the exploitation of natural gas 
heavily depend on the dollar-guilder exchange rate and on world crude oil prices. 
Scope to reduce e:menditure 
After over a decade of sometimes severe cuts, it will prove to be difficult to realise substanti-
al  additional  cuts.  Salaries  of government  employees  have  for  many  years  detoriated  tn 
relative terms, weakening the competitive position of government in the labour market. 
General  public  services  might  be  rendered  more  efficiently,  but  on  the  other  hand 
environmental policy  objectives ask for  additional spending.  Defence outlays can be further 
reduced,  but  opinions  clearly  differ  as  to  the  size  of the  'peace  dividend'.  Policy  options 
available also  depend on  NATO,  so  room for  cuts should  not be judged too optimistically. 
The growing number of (serious) crimes asks for additional spending on law and order items. 
Demographic change will  push up  (primary) education outlays, expenditure on health and 
the  general  old  age  pension.  The  growth  of  health  expenditure  might  be  reduced  by 
increased use of financial incentives to restrict supply and demand. 
Undoubtedly,  most possibilities for  budgetary cuts are to be found  in  the areas of social 
security and welfare.  Present public spending related to sickness and disability is  out of line 
and  can  certainly be cut  back,  although  upward  pressures  are considerable because  of the 
ageing  of the  work  force.  The  generosity  of the  social  security  system  can  be  reduced; 
especially  benefit  levels  for  singles  are  higher  than  in  neighbouring  countries.  Policy 
measures  to  increase  the  participation  rate  will  work  out  favourably  on  social  security 
spending and hence on the level and rates of social security contributions. A reduction of the 
minimum wage may be considered. The greying of the population leads to a built-in growth 
of outlays.  GDP growth  is  an  important determinant of employment opportunities and  can 
work  out  both  sides.  Increased  public  spending  related  to  the  inflow  of  immigrants  is 
foreseen. 
Individual rent subsidies tend to  rise endogenously.  In  line with  policy  options to  reduce 
present tax  facilities  for  owner-occupied  housing,  subsidies to  tenants ('object' and 'subject' - 157-
subsidies alike) can be trimmed. Public transport subsidies can be cut by increased efficiency 
and higher fares. The need for infrastructural investment in rail and road transport will push 
up investment spending. 
High  public  debt  and  the  relative  short  term  to  maturity  makes  the share  of interest 
payments to GDP vulnerable to the interest rate and the rate of GDP growth, respectively. T
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